UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION

In Re: Highland Capital Management, L.P. State No. 19-34054-SGJ-11

Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

Appellant State No. 19-34054-SGJ-11

[3904] Order Pursuant to Plan "Gatekeeper Provision" and Pre-Confirmation "Gatekeeper Orders" Denying Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding. Entered on 8/25/2023.

Volume 32

APPELLANT RECORD

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

In re:

00 00 00 00 00 **HIGHLAND CAPITAL** Chapter 11

MANAGEMENT, L.P. Case No. 19-34054-sgj11

Reorganized Debtor.

APPELLANT HUNTER MOUNTAIN INVESTMENT TRUST'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND DESIGNATION OF ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE APPELLATE RECORD

COMES NOW Appellant/Movant Hunter Mountain Investment Trust, both in its individual capacity and derivatively on behalf of the Reorganized Debtor, Highland Capital Management, L.P., and the Highland Claimant Trust, (collectively, "Appellant" or "HMIT"), and files this Second Supplemental² Statement of the Issues and Designation of Items for Inclusion in the Appellate Record pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8009(a)(1):

I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

- Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that the "colorable" claim analysis allowed the A. court to consider evidence and other non-pleading materials including, but not limited to, the court's reasoning that:
 - 1. the colorability analysis is stricter than a non-evidentiary, Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis;
 - 2. the colorability analysis is "akin to the standards applied under the ... Barton doctrine";
 - 3. the colorability analysis requires a "hybrid" of the Barton doctrine and "what courts have applied when considering motions to file suit when a vexatious litigant bar order is in place"; and/or,

And in all capacities and alternative derivative capacities asserted in HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding [Dkt. Nos. 3699, 3815, and 3816] ("Emergency Motion"), the supplement to the Emergency Motion [Dkt. No. 3760], and the draft Complaint attached to the same [Dkt. No. 3760-1].

² Appellant files this Second Supplement pursuant to the Clerk's request at Docket #3949 and correspondence on 10/23/2023.

4. "[t]here may be mixed questions of fact and law implicated by the Motion for Leave"?

[See Dkt. Nos. 3781, 3790, 3903-04].

B. Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that Appellant lacked constitutional or prudential standing to bring its claims in its individual and derivative capacities?

[See Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

- C. Did the bankruptcy court err in alternatively determining that, even under a non-evidentiary, Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis, Appellant did not assert colorable claims including, but not limited to, determining that:
 - 1. Appellant's allegations are conclusory, speculative, or constitute "legal conclusions";
 - 2. Appellant's claims or allegations are not "plausible";
 - 3. Appellant's allegations pertaining to a *quid pro quo* are "pure speculation";
 - 4. Proposed Defendant James P. Seery ("Seery") owed no duty to Appellant in any capacity as a matter of law;
 - 5. Appellant failed "to allege facts in the Proposed Complaint that would support a reasonable inference that Seery breached his fiduciary duty to HMIT or the estate as a result of bad faith, self-interest, or other intentional misconduct rising to the level of a breach of the duty of loyalty";
 - 6. Appellant's allegations pertaining to its aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims are speculative and not plausible;
 - 7. The remedies of equitable disallowance and equitable subordination are not remedies "available" to Appellant as a matter of law;
 - 8. Appellant's unjust enrichment claim is invalid as a matter of law because "Seery's compensation is governed by express agreements";
 - 9. Appellant is not entitled to declaratory relief because it has no colorable claims; and/or
 - 10. Appellant cannot recover punitive damages for its breach of fiduciary duty claim? [See Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

D. Alternatively, even if the bankruptcy court correctly determined that its "hybrid" *Barton* analysis controls, did the court violate Appellant's due process rights by denying Appellant its requested discovery?

[See Dkt. Nos. 3800, 3853, 3903-04, June 8, 2023 Hearing].

- E. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by denying Appellant's requested discovery including, but not limited to:
 - 1. ordering that Appellant could not request or obtain any discovery other than a deposition of Seery and James D. Dondero; and/or
 - 2. determining that state court "Rule 202" proceedings supported the denial of discovery?

[See Dkt. Nos. 3800 & June 8, 2023 Hearing; see also Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

- F. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by denying Appellant's alternative request for a continuance to obtain the requested discovery?
- G. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by excluding Appellant's evidence, or admitting the same for only limited purposes, offered at the June 8, 2023 Hearing?
- H. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by overruling Appellant's objections to Appellees' evidence offered at the June 8, 2023 Hearing?
- I. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by excluding Appellant's experts' testimony?

 [See Dkt. No. 3853; see also Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].
- J. Alternatively, did the bankruptcy court err by striking Appellant's proffer of its excluded experts' testimony from the record?

[See Dkt. No. 3869].

- K. Alternatively, if the bankruptcy court correctly determined that its "hybrid" *Barton* analysis controls, did the bankruptcy court err in determining that Appellant had not asserted colorable claims under that "hybrid" analysis including, but not limited to, its findings that:
 - 1. there is no evidence to support that Seery shared material non-public information with the Claims Purchasers;
 - 2. there is no evidence to support the alleged quid pro quo;
 - 3. the material shared was *public* information; and/or
 - 4. the Claims Purchasers had sufficient and lawful reasons to pay the amounts paid

for the purchased claims.

[See Dkt. Nos. 3903-04].

- L. Did the bankruptcy court err in finding that Appellant is controlled by Dondero, and, as such, Appellant "cannot show that it is pursuing the Proposed Claims for a proper purpose"?
- M. Alternatively, does sufficient evidence support the bankruptcy court's evidentiary findings made pursuant to its "hybrid" *Barton* analysis?
- N. Did the bankruptcy court err in denying an expedited hearing on Appellant's Motion for Leave? [See Dkt. 3713].
- O. Does the bankruptcy court's use of a new "colorability" standard to determine if claims by non-debtors against other non-debtors may proceed violate *Stern v. Marshall* and its progeny?
- P. Did the bankruptcy court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Order, to Amend or Make Additional Findings, for Relief from Order, or Alternatively, for New Trial under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 including, but not limited to by:
 - 1. declining to consider disclosures that demonstrated that Appellant is "in the money"—an issue pertinent to the court's erroneous standing decisions; and
 - 2. concluding that the disclosures failed to reinforce Appellant's standing to pursue the claims presented?

[Dkt. 3936].

II. DESIGNATION OF ITEMS FOR INCLUSION IN THE APPELLATE RECORD

1. Notice of Appeal

000001

a. Notice of Appeal [Dkt. 3906];

000276

b. Amended Notice of Appeal [Dkt. 3908]; and

- c. Second Amended Notice of Appeal [Dkt. 3945]
- 2. The judgment, order, or decree appealed from:
 - a. Memorandum Opinion and Order Pursuant to Plan "Gatekeeper Provision" and Pre-Confirmation "Gatekeeper Orders": Denying Hunter Mountain Investment

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000835

Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceedings [Dkts. 3903 & 3904]; and

001045

b. Order Denying Motion of Hunter Mountain Investment Trust Seeking Relief Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 [Dkt. 3936].

3. Docket sheet.

00/049

a. Bankruptcy Case No. 19-34054

4. Other Items to be included:

a. HMIT hereby designates the following items in the record on appeal from Cause No. 19-34054-sgj11:

Vol. 2	FILE DATE	DOCKET NO.	DESCRIPTION
001. 2	THE DATE	(INCLUDING ALL	DESCRIPTION
		ATTACHMENTS AND	
		APPENDICES)	
00159		1808	Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (As Modified)
00/660	02/22/2021	1943	Order (I) Confirming the Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization of Highland Capital Management, L.P. (as Modified) and (II) Granting Related Relief
00/821	09/09/2022	3503	Motion to Conform Plan filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P.
00 1830	02/27/203	3671	Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reorganized Debtor's Motion to Conform Plan
VO1. 3	03/28/2023	3699	HMIT Emergency Motion for Leave to File
001849	Thru	(3699-1 — 3699-5) Vol. 4	Verified Adversary Proceeding and Attached Verified Adversary Complaint
VOI 4	03/28/2023	3700	HMIT Motion for Expedited Hearing on
0022	36	(3700-1)	Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
00 22		3704	Farallon, Stonehill, Jessup and Muck Objection to Motion for Expedited Hearing
002248	03/30/2023	3705	HMIT Amended Certificate of Conference

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vol. 5 002251	03/30/2023	3706	HMIT Amended Certificate of Conference
00225	03/30/2023	3707	Highland's Response in Opposition to Emergency Motion for Leave
00226		3708 (3708-1 — 3708-8)	Declaration of John Morris in Support of the Highland Parties' Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Opposed Application for Expedited Hearing on Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
00234	03/31/2023	3712	HMIT Reply in Support of Application for Expedited Hearing
00235	03/31/2023	3713	Order Denying Motion for Expedited Hearing
00235	04/04/2023	3718 (3718-1 — 3718-4)	HMIT Motion for Leave to File Appeal
00239	,	3719 (3719-1)	HMIT Motion for Expedited Hearing on Motion for Leave to File Appeal
00 239	04/05/2023	3720	Order Denying HMIT's Opposed Motion for Expedited Hearing
00 2400	04/05/2023	3721 (3721-1 — 3721-2) Thro Vol. 7	HMIT Notice of Appeal
VOI. 8 002826	04/06/2023	3726 (3726-1) 1ru Vol. 9	Certificate of Mailing regarding HMIT Notice of Appeal
VOL 9 00325	04/07/2023	3731	Notice of Docketing Transmittal of Notice of Appeal
00 326	04/13/2023	3738 (3738-1)	Highland's Opposed Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix a Briefing Schedule and Set a Hearing Date with Respect to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave
00 3210	04/13/2023	3739	Highland's Motion for Expedited Hearing
00 3210	04/13/2023 7 %	3740	Joinder to Highland's Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix Briefing Schedule and Set Hearing Date With Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding filed by Farallon

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			Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
Vol. 10 00 328	04/13/2023	3741	Notice of Hearing for 04/24/2023 at 1:30 PM
00 328 00 328	04/13/2023	3742	Amended Notice of Hearing for 04/24/2023 at 1:30 PM
00 320	04/13/2023	3745	Notice of Appearance and Request for Notice by Omar Jesus Alaniz filed by James P. Seery Jr.
0032		3747	Joinder by James P. Seery Jr. to Highland's Emergency Motion to Modify and Fix Briefing Schedule and Set Hearing Date with Respect to Hunter Mountain Investment Trusts Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
003290	04/17/2023	3748	HMIT's Response and Reservation of Rights
003290	04/19/2023	3751	Notice of Status Conference
00 330	04/21/2023	3758	HMIT's Objection Regarding Evidentiary Hearing and Brief Concerning Gatekeeper Proceedings Relating to "Colorability"
00331	04/21/2023	3759	HMIT's Notice of Rescheduling Hearing
00331	04/21/2023	3761	HMIT's Objection Regarding Evidentiary Hearing and Brief Concerning Gatekeeper Proceedings Relating to "Colorability" ³
00 332	04/23/2023 2 3	3760 (3760-1)	HMIT's Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding and Attached Verified Adversary Complaint
003368	04/25/2023	3765	Transcript of Hearing held on 04/24/2023
00343	05/11/2023	3780	Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's (i) Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding; and (ii) Supplement to Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck

³ A duplicate of Doc 3758.

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VOI. 10	-		Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
101. 10			1
00349	05/11/2023	3781	Order Fixing Briefing Scheduling and Hearing Date with Respect to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding as Supplemented
00346	05/11/2023	3783	Highland and Seery's Joint Response to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Leave
VOI. 11	05/11/2023	3784	Declaration of John Morris in Support of Highland
00353	7	(3784-1 — 3784-46) Vol. 16	Parties' Joint Response
VOI. 17	05/18/2023	3785	HMIT's Reply in Support of Emergency Motion
00466			for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding
0047	05/22/2023	3787	Order Pertaining to the Hearing on Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding [DE##3699 & 3760]
0047	05/24/2023 / -	3788 (3788-1 — 3788-5)	HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing
00480	05/24/2023	3789	HMIT's Application for Expedited Hearing
0048	05/24/2023	3790	Order Pertaining to the Hearing on Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Motion for Leave to File Adversary Proceeding [DE##3699 & 3760]
0048	05/25/2023	3791 (3791-1 — 3791-5)	HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing
004930	05/25/2023	3792	Order Setting Expedited Hearing
00 49:	05/25/2023	3795	Objection to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of June 8, 2023 Hearing filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

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1.1	_		
VOI. 18	05/25/2023 39.	3798 (3798-1)	Highland Parties' Joint Response in Opposition to HMIT's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery
0049:	05/26/2023	3800	Order Regarding Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of the June 8, 2023 Hearing
0049	05/28/2023	3801	Order Regarding Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Expedited Discovery or, Alternatively, for Continuance of the June 8, 2023 Hearing
0049	06/05/2023	3815 (3815-1)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
0050	06/05/2023 19	3816 (3816-1)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding
0051	06/05/2023 4	3817 (3817-1 — 3817-5) Thru Vol. 25	Highland Parties' Witness and Exhibit List with Respect to Evidentiary Hearing on June 8, 2023
00 660	06/05/2023 8	3818 (3818-1 — 3818-9) Thru Vol. 39	HMIT's Witness and Exhibit List in Connection with its Emergency Motion for Leave to File Verified Adversary Proceeding, and Supplement
0092	06/07/2023 73	3820	Highland Parties' Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
0092	06/07/2023 7 <i>O</i>	3821 (3821-1 — 3821-3)	Declaration in Support of Highland Parties' Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
00 94	06/07/2023	3822 (3822-1)	HMIT's Unopposed Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal [WITHDRAWN]
00 94	06/07/2023 24	3823	Joinder to Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC

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Vol. 40 06/07,	/2023 3824	HMIT's Objections to the Highland Parties' Exhibit and Witness List
00 7440		Extraore and Without Else
06/08/	/2023 3828	HMIT's Response to Highland Claimant Trust and James P. Seery, Jr.'s Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Experts Scott Van
00 9436	1.	Meter and Steve Pully
00 94 14	2023 3837	Request for transcript regarding hearing held on 06/08/2023
06/12/	2023 3838	Court admitted exhibits on hearing June 8, 2023 (See Docket Entry Nos. 3817 & 3818)
06/12/	2023 3841	Highland Parties' Reply in Further Support of their
009446		Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully
06/12/	3842 (3842-1)	Claim Purchasers' Joinder to Highland Capital Management, L.P., Highland Claimant Trust, and James P. Seery Jr.'s Reply in Further Support of Their Joint Motion to Exclude Testimony and
00 4456		Documents of Scott Van Meter and Steve Pully filed by Farallon Capital Management, LLC, Jessup Holdings LLC, Muck Holdings LLC, Stonehill Capital Management LLC
00 945 8/13/	2023 3843 Thru Vol.	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 06/08/2023
00 984 -06/13/	2023 3844	Transcript regarding Hearing Held 05/26/2023
00990	2023 3845	HMIT's Request for Oral Hearing or, Alternatively, a Schedule for Evidentiary Proffer
06/13/2	2023 3846	Response in Opposition to Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Request for Oral Argument or, Alternatively, a Schedule for Evidentiary Proffer filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management,
		L.P., Other Professional Highland Claimant Trust, Creditor James P. Seery Jr.
00 990 8 06/13/2	2023 3847	HMIT's Reply to the Highland Parties' Response to Request for Oral Hearing
00 99 206/16/2	2023 3853	Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence

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0099	06/16/2023	3854	Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting Joint Motion to Exclude Expert Evidence
00992	06/19/2023	3858 (3858-1 — 3858-2)	Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2) ⁴
0100	06/23/2023	3860	The Highland Parties' Objections to and Motion to Strike Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Purported Proffer
01002	06/23/2023	3861	Claim Purchasers' Joinder to the Highland Parties' Objections and Motion to Strike Hunter Mountain Investment Trust's Purported Proffer
01002	07/05/2023	3869	Order Striking HMIT's Evidentiary Proffer Pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2) and Limiting Briefing
01002	07/06/2023	3872	Notice of Filing of the Current Balance Sheet of the Highland Claimant Trust filed by Debtor Highland Capital Management, L.P. and the Highland Claimant Trust
01003	07/21/2023	3888	Post-Confirmation Report for Highland Capital Management, LP for the Quarter Ending June 30, 2023 filed by Highland Capital Management, L.P.
01002	07/21/2023	3889	Post-Confirmation Report for Highland Capital Management, LP for the Quarter Ending June 30, 2023 filed by the Highland Claimant Trust
0100	08/17/2023 59	3901	Withdrawal of HMIT's Unopposed Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust
VOI. 43	09/08/2023	3905 (3905-1 — 3905-6)	Motion to Alter or Amend Order, to Amend or Make Additional Findings, for Relief from Order, or, Alternatively, for New Trial Under Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9023, and 9024 and Incorporated Relief Filed by Creditor Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

⁴ HMIT understands that the Court struck this proffer in docket entry 3869. Because the proffer appears to remain on the record and to avoid any argument that HMIT has failed its burden to designate the record, HMIT designates this docket entry out of an abundance of caution.

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Vol. 43	09/11/2023	3907	Clerk's Correspondence regarding HMIT's Notice of Appeal
01013	09/22/2023 6	3928	Notice Regarding Appeal and Pending Post- Judgment Motion filed by HMIT

B. Exhibits.

Further, the Parties submitted hearing exhibits. HMIT designates for inclusion in the record for appeal all the hearing exhibits submitted to the Court, which were all electronically filed and are in the Court's record and are a part of this Appellate Record. (Docs. 3817 and 3818). The following exhibits are submitted and included in the Court's record:

(Dkts. 381	<u>HMIT Exhibits</u> 18, 3818-1, 3818-2, 3818-3, 3818-4, 3818-5. 3818-6, 3818-7, 3818-8, and 3818-9)
	HMIT Exhibits 1-4, 6-80
117.2	HCM Exhibits
	(Dkts. 3817, 3817-1, 3817-2, 3817-3, 3817-4, 3817-5)
	HCM Exhibits 2-15, 25-34, 36, 38-42, 45-46, 51, 59-60, 100

Dated: October 23, 2023

Respectfully Submitted,

PARSONS MCENTIRE MCCLEARY **PLLC**

By: /s/ Sawnie. A. McEntire Sawnie A. McEntire Texas State Bar No. 13590100 smcentire@pmmlaw.com 1700 Pacific Avenue, Suite 4400 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: (214) 237-4300

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Attorneys for Hunter Mountain Investment Trust

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

A true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served via ECF notification on October 23, 2023, on all parties receiving electronic notification.

/s/ Sawnie A. McEntire
Sawnie A. McEntire

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As you start to look towards the confirmation and exit from the case, things that would be appropriate, that, you know, would always be something you would want to look at would be exculpation language, releases. And in this particular case, the injunction, or what Mr. Seery earlier referred to as the gatekeeper clause, is something that is very important for directors, both, you know, as they're thinking through it and as they emerge. All right. Let's shift now to this case, with that background. How did you learn about this case? I had a party who was involved in the case reach out to me in early part of December of 2019 to see if I would be interested in getting involved. I think that was about the time -- it was after -- as I recall, it was after the case had been moved to Dallas and when there was a -- consideration of either a Chapter 11 or a Chapter 7 trustee. I can't remember exactly which it was. But there was talk about a motion to bring on a trustee and get rid of all the management and the like and such. Can you describe in as much detail as you can recall the facts and circumstances that led to your appointment as an independent director? I, as I said, I had -- early December, I had an -one of the parties involved -- had, probably within the next week, probably two or three others -- that reached out to see

if I would be interested in participating. I met with the Creditors' Committee or -- I'm not sure if it was all the members, but representatives of the Creditors' Committee, along with counsel, and I believe financial advisors were involved. They walked me through the issues. They wanted to hear about my C.V. Quite a few of them knew me, knew me well, but others wanted to hear about my background and how I would look at things as an independent director.

That went through into the latter part of December. I knew that they were talking to other parties. I think it was probably right around the first of the year or so that I was informed, maybe a little bit earlier than that, that I was informed that Mr. Seery was one of the other parties that they were talking to, and Mr. Seery and I were put in touch with each other. I had worked with Mr. Seery back probably nine years earlier when I was the CEO of FGIC. He was involved in a matter that we were restructuring, and so knew him a little bit and was comfortable working with him as a, you know, another independent director.

Then we took the time that we had to to -- or, I took the time to -- from the beginning, you know, the early part of December, look at the docket, understand what was taking place. I -- in addition, I met with the company and its advisors, in-house counsel, the folks at DSI who were at the time the CRO and the company's counsel to better understand

some of the issues.

Mr. Seery and I, as I said, were both selected, and we went through the process of, I guess, breaking the tie, I think, if I could say it that way, amongst the creditors and the Debtor as to who would be the third member of the board. And we were given the opportunity to go out, interview, and select the third member, which resulted in Russell Nelms' appointment to the board. And also during that time, we were given the opportunity to have some input — not a hundred percent input, but some input — on the January 9th order that — the January 9, 2020 order that was put in place appointing us and giving us some of the protections that we felt were appropriate and necessary in this case.

Q All right. We'll get to that in a moment, but during this diligence period, did you form an understanding as to why an independent board was being formed, why it was being sought?

A Yes. There was, my words, there was a lot of distrust between the creditors and the management -- not the CRO, but the prior management of the company -- and there had been a motion brought both to obviously bring the case back to Dallas from I think it was originally in Delaware and then there was a motion to seek, you know, to remove management and put in a trustee.

There had been a dozen years of litigation with one party, about eight or nine years with another major party, and

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several other of the major creditors were litigants. other, as I understood, the other creditors, main creditors in the case were all lawyers who had not yet gotten paid for the litigation work that they had done. And so it was obvious that this was a very -- a highly-litigious situation. In addition to speaking with the various constituents, did you do any diligence on your own to try to understand the case before you accepted the appointment? I went to the docket to look at all the -- not every single thing that had been filed, but to try and look at all the key, relevant items that had been filed, get a better understanding of what was out there. Looked at some of the initial filings of the company in terms of the, you know, the creditors, to understand who the creditor base was per the schedules that had been filed. Looked at the -- some of the various pleadings that had been put in place. Did you form a view as to the causes of the bankruptcy filing? Litigation. That was my clear view. This company had been in litigation with multiple parties, various different parties, since around 2008. Generally, you would see litigation like the types that were, you know, that were here, you know, you'd litigate for a while, then you'd try and settle it.

It did not appear to me that there was any intention on

1 the -- the Debtor to settle these litigations, but would 2 rather just continue the process and proceed forward on the 3 litigation until the very last minute. And so it was obvious 4 that this was going to -- that the Debtor was a, as I said, a 5 highly-litigious shop, and that was one of the causes, 6 obviously, the cause of the filing, along with the fact that 7 judgments were about to be entered against the Debtor. All right. And in January 2020, do you recall that's when 8 9 the agreement was reached between the Debtor, the Committee, 10 and Mr. Dondero? 11 Yeah, it was the first week or so, which resulted in a 12 hearing on I believe it was January 9th in front of Judge 13 Jernigan. 14 And as a part of that -- I think you testified at that 15 hearing. Do I have that right? I don't recall if I did. I might have. I might have 16 17 testified at a subsequent hearing. But --18 But was --19 -- I was in the courtroom for that hearing, yes. 20 Was it part of that process by which you accepted the 21 appointment as independent director? 22 I accepted it based upon the order that had been 23 negotiated amongst the parties, the creditors, the Debtor, Mr. 24 Dondero, and others. And that was the key thing that was --25 and approved by the Court on that date. And that was key for

my acceptance of the role as an independent director.

- Q And did you and the other prospective independent directors participate in the negotiation of the substance of the agreement?
- A We did. We didn't have a hundred percent say over it, but we were able to get our voices heard. As Mr. Seery testified earlier, he was instrumental in coming up with an idea about how to put in place the injunction, you know, the -- I think he referred to it as the gatekeeper injunction, which was obviously in this case very critical to all three of us: Mr. Seery, Mr. Nelms, and myself.
- Q Can you describe for the Court kind of the issues of concern to you and the other prospective board members? What was it that you were focused on in terms of the negotiations? A Well, obviously, indemnification was important, but that was something that was going to be granted. Having the right to obtain separate D&O insurance just for the three directors was important. We were concerned that Strand Advisors, Inc. really had no assets, and so we wanted to make sure that the Debtor was going to get -- was going to basically guarantee the indemnification.

The -- because of the litigious nature and what we had heard from all of the various parties involved, including people inside the Debtor who we had talked with, that it would be something that was important for us to make sure that the

injunction, the gatekeeper injunction was put in place.

And can you elaborate a little bit on I think you said you had done some diligence and you had formed a view as to the causes of the bankruptcy filing, but did this case present any specific concerns or issues that you and the board members had to address perhaps above and beyond what you experienced in some of the other cases you described?

A Well, as I said earlier, the fact that the litigation -the various litigations with the creditors have been going on
for what I viewed as an inordinate amount of years, and that
it was clear from my diligence that I had done that this had
been directed by Mr. Dondero, to keep this moving forward in
the litigation, and to, in essence, just, you know, never give
up on the litigation.

It was important that the types of protections that we were afforded in the January 9th order were put in place, because we -- none of us -- none of the three of us, and myself in particular, did not want to be in a position where we would be sued and harassed through lawsuits for the next, you know, ten years or so. That's not something anybody would want to sign up for.

Q All right. Let's look at the January 9th order and the specific provisions I think that you're alluding to.

MR. MORRIS: Can we call up Exhibit 5Q, please?

THE WITNESS: Pardon me while I put my glasses on to

read this.

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MR. MORRIS: All right. And if we can go to

Paragraph 4.

BY MR. MORRIS:

- Q Is that the paragraph, sir, that was intended to address the concern that you just articulated about Strand not having
- 7 | any assets of its own?

to back up the indemnification.

order that we were seeking.

- $8 \parallel A$ Yes, it is.
- 9 Q And can you just describe for the Court how that 10 particular provision addressed that concern?
- A Sure. Since we were directors of Strand, which is the general partner of the Debtor, we felt it was important that the general -- that Highland, the Debtor, would provide the guaranty on indemnification, because Highland had the assets

It was also pretty clear, from my experience in having placed D&O insurance, you know, over the last 25-30 years, that if there was no, you know, opportunity for indemnification, putting in place insurance would be very difficult or exorbitantly expensive. So having this indemnification by Highland was a very important piece of the

- Q And the next piece is the insurance piece in Paragraph 5.

 Do you see that?
- 25 | A I do.

- Q Did you have any involvement in the Debtor's efforts to obtain D&O insurance for the independent board?
- || A I did.

- Q Can you just describe for the Court what role you played and what issues came up as the Debtor sought to obtain that insurance?
- A Sure. The Debtors had been looking to get an insurance policy in place. They were not able to do that. I happen to have worked with an insurance broker on D&O situations in some very difficult situations over the years and brought them into the mix. They were able to go out to the market and find a policy that would cover us, the -- kind of the key components of that policy, though, were, number one, the guaranty that HCMLP would give -- I'm sorry, the guaranty that HCMLP would give to Strand's obligations, and also the -- I'll call it the gatekeeper provision was very important because these parties did not want to have -- they wanted to have what was referred to, commonly referred to as the Dondero Exclusion.

So while we were -- we purchased a policy that covered us, it did have an exclusion, unless there were no assets left, and then the what I'll call -- we refer to as kind of a Side A policy would kick in.

- Q Okay. What do you mean by the Dondero Exclusion?

 A The insurers did not want to cover the -- any litigation
- 25 | that Mr. Dondero would bring against directors. It was pretty

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commonly known in the marketplace that Mr. Dondero was very litigious, and insurers were not willing to write the insurance without the protections that this order afforded because they did not want to be hit with frivolous -- hit with claims on the policy for frivolous litigation that might be brought. MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, this is Mr. Taylor. I've got to object to the last answer. He testified as to what the insurers' belief was and what they would or would not do based upon their own knowledge. It's not within his personal knowledge. And therefore we'd move to strike. THE COURT: I overrule that objection. MR. MORRIS: Your Honor? THE COURT: I overrule the objection. MR. MORRIS: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor. BY MR. MORRIS: Mr. Dubel, can you explain to the Court, in your work in trying to secure the D&O insurance, what rule the gatekeeper provision played in the Debtor's ability to get that? Based upon my discussions with the insurance broker, who I have worked with for 25-plus years, had that gatekeeper provision not been put in place, we would not have been able to get insurance. All right. Let's look at the gatekeeper provision.

MR. MORRIS: Can we go down to Paragraph 10, please?

1 | Perfect. Right there.

BY MR. MORRIS:

- Q Is this gatekeeper provision, is this also the source of the exculpation that you referred to?
- II A Yes.

- Q And what's your understanding of how the exculpation and gatekeeper functions together?
 - A Well, my apologies, I'm not an attorney, so just from a business point of view, the way I look at this is that, you know, obviously, we're -- you know, the directors are not protected from willful misconduct or gross negligence, but any negligence -- you know, claims brought under negligence and the likes of such, and things that might be considered frivolous, would have to first go to Your Honor in the Bankruptcy Court for a review to determine if they were claims that should be entitled to be brought.
 - Q If you take a look at the provision, right, do you understand that nobody can bring a claim without -- in little i, it says, first determining -- without the Court first determining, after notice, that such claim or cause of action represents a colorable claim of willful misconduct or gross negligence against an indirect -- independent director. Do you see that?
- 24 | A I do.
- 25 | Q Is it your understanding that parties can only bring

- claims for gross negligence or willful misconduct if the Court
 makes a determination that there is a colorable claim?
 - A That's my understanding.
 - Q And the second --

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- A I think they have the right -- I think they have the right to go to the Court to ask if they can bring the claim, but the Court has to make the determination that it's a colorable claim for willful misconduct or gross negligence.
- Q And if the Court -- is it your understanding that if the Court doesn't find that there is a colorable claim of willful misconduct or gross negligence, then the claim can't be brought against the independent directors?
- 13 | A That is my understanding, yes.
- Q And was -- taken together, Paragraphs 4, 5, and 10, were they of importance to you and the other independent directors before accepting the position?
 - A They were absolutely critical to me and definitely critical to the other directors, because we all negotiated that together, and it would -- I don't -- I don't think any of the three of us would have taken on this role if those paragraphs had not been included in the order.
 - Q Okay. Just speaking for yourself personally, is there any chance you would have accepted the appointment without all three of those provisions?
- 25 | A I would not have.

And why is that? In this particular case, why did you

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2 personally believe that you needed all three of those 3 provisions? 4 Well, you know, people like myself, you know, someone 5 who's coming in as an independent director, come in in a fiduciary capacity. And, you know, we take on risks. Now, 6 7 granted, in a Chapter 11 case, as the saying goes, you know, 8 it's a lot safer because everything has to be approved by the 9 Court, but there are still opportunities for parties to, in essence, have mischief going on and bring nuisance lawsuits 10 11 that would take a lot of time and effort away from either the 12 role of our job of restructuring the entity or post-13 restructuring, would just be nuisance things that would cost us money. And we, you know, I did not want to be involved in 14 15 that situation, knowing the litigious nature of Mr. Dondero from the research that I had done, you know, the diligence 16 17 that I had done. I did not want to subject myself to that. 18 And it has proven an appropriate and very solid order because 19 of the conduct of Mr. Dondero, as Mr. Seery has testified to 20 earlier. 21 Do you have a view as to what the likely effect would be 22 on future corporate restructurings if you and your fellow 23 directors weren't able to obtain the type of protection 24 afforded in the January 9th order? 25 I think it would be very difficult to find qualified

1 people who would be willing to serve in these types of 2 positions if they knew they had a target on their backs. 3 know, it was something that was clear to us, to Mr. Seery, Mr. 4 Nelms, myself at the time, that if we had a target -- we felt 5 like we would have a target on our back if we didn't have 6 these protections. 7 It just wasn't worth the risk, the stress, the 8 uncertainty, the potential cost to us. And so I don't think 9 anybody else would be, you know, willing to take on the roles 10 as an independent director with the facts and circumstances 11 and the players involved in this particular case. 12 MR. MORRIS: I have no further questions, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: All right. Pass the witness. Let's see. 14 You went -- I'm going to give a time. You went 32 minutes. 15 So, for cross of this witness, I'm going to limit it to an 16 aggregate of 32 minutes. Who wants to go first? 17 MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this is Douglas Draper. 18 I'll be happy to go first. 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. DRAPER: 21 22 Mr. Dubel, prior to your engagement, did you happen to 23 read the case of Pacific Lumber?

And were you advised about Pacific Lumber by somebody

I did not.

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other than a -- your lawyer?

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- A I'm not familiar with the case at all, Mr. Draper.
- Q Are you aware, and you've been around a long time, that different circuits have different rules for liabilities of
- 5 | officers, directors, and people like that?
- 6 A I am aware that there are different, I don't know what the
- 7 | right term is, but precedents, I guess, in different circuits
- 8 | for any number of things, whether it's a sale motion or
- 9 | protections of officers and directors or anything. So each
- 10 | circuit has its own unique situations.
- 11 | Q And one last question. On a go-forward, after -- if this
- 12 | plan is confirmed and on the effective date, you will not have
- 13 | any role whatsoever as an officer or director of the new
- 14 | general partner, correct?
- 15 | A I have not been asked to. As Mr. Seery testified, he may
- 16 | ask for assistance or just -- in most situations that I'm
- 17 | involved with, I may have a continuing role just as a -- I'll
- 18 | call it an advisor or somebody to provide a history. But at
- 19 | this point in time, I have not been asked to have any
- 20 | involvement.
- 21 || Q And based on your experience, you know that there's a
- 22 | different liability for a director and an officer versus
- 23 | somebody who is an advisor?
- MR. MORRIS: Objection to the form of the question.
- 25 | No foundation.

Dubel - Cross

THE COURT: Overruled. 1 MR. DRAPER: Mr. Dubel has shown --2 3 THE COURT: Mr. Dubel, you can answer if you know. 4 MR. DRAPER: Mr. Dubel, you can answer. 5 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I didn't hear 6 you say overruled. Thank you. 7 Mr. Draper, I apologize, could you repeat the question? BY MR. DRAPER: 8 9 The question is you know from your experience that there's 10 a different liability for somebody who is an officer or 11 director versus somebody who's an advisor? 12 Yes, that's my experience, which is why in several 13 situations post-reorganization, while I have not been involved 14 per se, and I use the term involved meaning, you know, on a 15 day-to-day basis, if someone asks me to assist, I'll usually 16 ask them to bring me in as a non -- an unpaid employee or a, 17 you know, a nominally-amount-paid employee, so that I would be 18 protected by whatever protections the company might provide. 19 MR. DRAPER: I have nothing further for this witness, 20 Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: All right. Other cross? 22 MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. 23 MR. RUKAVINA: Yes, Your Honor. 24 MR. TAYLOR: Oh, go ahead, Davor. 25 MR. RUKAVINA: No, Clay, go ahead.

Dubel - Cross

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CROSS-EXAMINATION

2 | BY MR. TAYLOR:

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Q Mr. Dubel, this is Clay Taylor here on behalf on Mr.

4 | Dondero. I believe you had previously testified in response

to questions from Mr. Morris that Mr. Dondero had engaged in a

pattern of litigious behavior; is that correct?

- A I believe that's the testimony I gave, yes.
- Q Okay. And please give me the specific examples of which cases you believe he has engaged in overly-litigious behavior.
- 10 A Well, all of the cases that resulted in creditors, large
- 11 creditors in our bankruptcy. That would be the UBS situation,
- 12 | the Crusader situation which became the Redeemer Committee,
- 13 | litigation with Mr. Daugherty, with Acis and Mr. Terry. And
- 14 | as I mentioned earlier, I'd, you know, been informed by
- 15 | members of the management team that it was Mr. Dondero's style
- 16 | to just litigate until the very end to try and grind people
- 17 | down.
- 18 Q Okay. Was Mr. Dondero or a Highland entity the plaintiff
- 19 | in the UBS case?
- 20 | A No, but what was referred -- what I was referring to was
- 21 | the nature in which he defended it and went overboard and
- 22 | refused to ever, you know, try and settle things in a manner
- 23 | that would have gotten things done. And just looking at,
- 24 | having been involved in the restructuring industry for the
- 25 | last 40 years, as I said, almost 40 years, and been involved

- in many, many litigious situations, it's obvious when someone is litigious, whether they're the plaintiff or the defendant.
 - Q So are you personally familiar with the settlement negotiations in the UBS case that happened pre-bankruptcy,
 - A I have been informed that there were settlement negotiations, and subsequently determined, through discussions with the parties, that they weren't really close to -- to a settlement.
- 10 | Q But are you aware of --

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then?

- 11 A Mr. Dondero might have thought they were, but they were 12 not.
- Q Okay. Would you be surprised to learn if UBS had offered to settle pre-bankruptcy for \$7 million?
 - A As I understand, settlements -- settlement offers prebankruptcy had a tremendous number of -- I don't know what the right term is -- things tied to it and that clearly were never going to get done.
- 19 Q Okay. When you say things were tied to it, what things 20 were tied to it?
 - A I don't know all of the settlement discussions that took place, but what I was informed was that there were a lot of conditions that were included in that. And it's -- if it had been an offer of \$7 million and Mr. Dondero didn't settle for that, there must have been a reason why. So, you know, since

- the entities -- all of the entities within the Highland

 Capital empire, if you'd call it that, were being sued for almost a billion dollars.
- Q Okay. And you say there was lots of conditions that were tied to that. What were the conditions?
- A As I said earlier, I wasn't informed of them on all the prepetition settlements. That's just what I was told, there was conditions.
- 9 | Q Okay. And who were you told these things by?
- 10 A Both external counsel and internal counsel. Mr.
- 11 | Ellington, Scott Ellington, and Isaac -- the litigation 12 | counsel.
- 13 | Q Okay. So --
- 14 | A That's -- sorry.
- Q Okay. In each of these cases, you were informed by your views by statements that were made to you by other people?
- 17 | A Yes.
- 18 | Q Okay.
- 19 A Made -- and particularly made by members of management of 20 the Debtor, which is pretty informed.
- 21 || Q Okay. Which members of management were those?
- A As I just testified, it was Mr. Ellington, who was the general -- the Debtor's general counsel, and Mr. Leventon,
 Isaac Leventon, who was the -- I believe his title was
- 25 associate general counsel in charge of litigation.

Dubel - Cross

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Okay. Thank you.

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MR. TAYLOR: No further questions.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rukavina?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. RUKAVINA:

- Mr. Dubel, we've never met, although I think we were on the phone once together. I know you're a director, so you're at the top, but having been in this case for more than a year, you probably have some understanding of the assets that the
- 9
- 10 Debtor has, don't you?
- 11 I do, but I'm not as facile with it as Mr. Seery, 12 obviously.
- 13 Is it true, to your understanding, that the Debtor 14 owns various equity interests in third-party companies?
- 15 Either directly or indirectly. That's my understanding, 16 yes.
- 17 Okay. Have you heard of an entity called Highland Select 18 Equity Fund, LP?
- 19 I have.

- And is that a publicly-traded company?
- 21 I'm not familiar with its nature there, no.
- 22 Do you know how much of the equity of that entity the 23 Debtor owns?
- 24 I don't know off the top of my head, no.
- 25 And again, these may be unfair questions because you're at

1	the top, so I'm not trying to make you look foolish. I'm just
2	trying to see. Let me ask one more. Have you heard of
3	Wright, W-R-I-G-H-T, Limited?
4	MR. MORRIS: Objection, Your Honor. Beyond the
5	scope.
6	MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, I can recall him on my
7	direct, then.
8	THE COURT: Yeah. I'll
9	MR. RUKAVINA: But I'd just rather get it over with.
10	THE COURT: I'll allow it.
11	MR. MORRIS: All right. If we're going to get rid of
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13	THE COURT: Overruled.
14	MR. MORRIS: No, that's fine.
15	BY MR. RUKAVINA:
16	Q Have you heard of Wright, W-R-I-G-H-T, Limited?
17	A I think I have, but I just don't recall it, Mr. Rukavina.
18	I'm sorry, Rukavina. Sorry.
19	Q It's okay. It's a
20	A I'm looking at your chart here, at your name here, and it
21	looks like Drukavina, so I really apologize.
22	Q Believe it or not, it's actually a very famous name in
23	Croatia, although it means nothing here.
24	So, all of the entities that the Debtor owns equity in, I
25	guess you probably, just because, again, you're not in the

1 weeds, you can't tell us how much of that equity the Debtor 2 owns, can you? 3 I can't individually, no. You know, Mr. Seery is our CEO 4 and he's responsible for the day-to-day, you know, issues. 5 usually we look at it more on a consolidated basis and not in 6 the, you know, down in the weeds, as you refer to it, unless 7 something specific came up. 8 Well, would you remember whether, when Mr. Seery or the 9 prior CRO would provide you, as the board member, financial 10 reports, whether that included P&Ls and balance sheets and 11 financial reports for the entities that the Debtor owned 12 interests in? 13 We might -- we would have seen certain consolidating 14 reports that might -- that would be, you know, consolidating 15 financial statements that would be P&Ls. Where we didn't consolidate them, I'm not sure we saw the actual individual-16 17 entity P&Ls on a regular basis. We might have seen them if 18 there was a transaction taking place. But again, you know, I 19 don't have -- I don't remember every single one of them, no. 20 And you would agree with me, sir, that the Pachulski law 21 firm is an excellent restructuring, reorganization, insolvency 22 law firm, wouldn't you? 23 Yes, I would agree with you there. 24 Okay. And you would expect them to ensure that anything

that has to be filed with Her Honor is timely filed, wouldn't

1	you?		
2	A I would expect that they would follow the rules.		
3	Q Okay. And you have the utmost of confidence, I take it,		
4	in your CRO, don't you?		
5	A I have a tremendous amount of confidence in our CEO, who		
6	also happens to hold the title of CRO, yes, if that's what		
7	you're referring to as, Mr. Seery.		
8	(Interruption.)		
9	MR. RUKAVINA: John.		
10	BY MR. RUKAVINA:		
11	Q Okay, I think yeah, I think I heard that you have		
12	tremendous confidence in the CEO, who happens to be the CRO,		
13	right?		
14	A Yes, that's the case.		
15	MR. RUKAVINA: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll pass the		
16	witness.		
17	THE COURT: All right. Any other cross of Mr. Dubel?		
18	All right. Mr. Morris, redirect?		
19	MR. MORRIS: Yeah, just very briefly, Your Honor.		
20	REDIRECT EXAMINATION		
21	BY MR. MORRIS:		
22	Q You were asked about that Pacific Lumber case, Mr. Dubel;		
23	do you remember that?		
24	A I do remember being asked about it.		
25	Q And you weren't familiar with that case, right?		

1 I'm not familiar with the name of the case, no. 2 But you did know that the exculpation and gatekeeping 3 provisions were going to be included in the order; is that 4 fair? 5 Α I did. 6 And did you testify that you wouldn't have accepted the 7 position without it? 8 I did testify that way. 9 And if you knew that you couldn't get those provisions in the Fifth Circuit, would you ever accept a position as an 10 independent director in the Fifth Circuit on a go-forward 11 12 basis? 13 Not in a situation such as this, no. 14 Okay. Okay. 15 MR. MORRIS: No further questions, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. Any recross on that narrow 17 redirect? 18 All right. Well, Mr. Dubel, you are excused from the 19 virtual witness stand. 20 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: All right. I want to go ahead and --22 MR. DUBEL: Do you mind if I turn my video off? 23 THE COURT: I'm sorry, what? 24 MR. DUBEL: I said, do you mind if I turn my video 25 off?

1 No, you may. That's fine. THE COURT: 2 MR. DUBEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: All right. I want to break now, unless 4 there's any quick housekeeping matter. Anything? 5 MR. MORRIS: No, Your Honor, but I would just ask 6 all parties to let me know by email if they have any 7 objections to any of the exhibits on the witness list that was filed at Docket No. 1877, because I want to begin tomorrow by 8 9 putting into evidence the balance of our exhibits. 10 MR. RUKAVINA: And Your Honor, I was responsible for 11 this due to an internal mistake. The only ones I have an 12 objection to are -- is that 7? John, is that 7, right, 700 --13 MR. MORRIS: Yes. 14 MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, I only have an objection 15 to 70 and 7P, although I think -- think the Court has already admitted 7P, so my objection is moot. 16 17 THE COURT: I have. 18 MR. RUKAVINA: Okay. 19 THE COURT: So, what --20 MR. RUKAVINA: Then it would just be --21 THE COURT: Go ahead. 22 MR. RUKAVINA: I'm sorry. It would just be 70. 23 Septuple O or whatever the word is. 24 THE COURT: All right. So I will go ahead and admit 25 7F through 7Q, with the exception of 70. Again, these appear

1 at Docket Entry 1877. And Mr. Morris, you can try to get in 2 70 the old-fashioned way if you want to. 3 MR. MORRIS: Yeah, I'll deal with 70 and the very 4 limited number of other objections at the beginning of 5 tomorrow's hearing. THE COURT: All right. 6 7 (Debtor's Exhibits 7F through 7Q, with the exception of 8 70, are received into evidence.) 9 THE COURT: So we will reconvene at 9:30 Central time 10 tomorrow. I think we're going to hear from the Aon, the D&O 11 broker, Mr. Tauber; is that correct? 12 MR. MORRIS: That's right. And that should be 13 shorter than even Mr. Dubel. THE COURT: All right. Well, we will see you at 9:30 14 15 in the morning. We are in recess. 16 MR. MORRIS: Thank you so much. 17 THE CLERK: All rise. 18 (Proceedings concluded at 5:09 p.m.) 19 --000--20 CERTIFICATE 21 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the 22 above-entitled matter. 02/04/2021 23 /s/ Kathy Rehling 24 Kathy Rehling, CETD-444 Date 25 Certified Electronic Court Transcriber

Case \$\frac{1}{9}\$-34054-sgj11 Doc 3818-4 Filed 06/05/23 Entered 06/05/23 22:10:41 Desc

HMIT Exhibit No. 54

1	IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS		
2	DALLAS DIVISION		
3	In Re:) Case No. 19-34054-sgj-11) Chapter 11	
4	HIGHLAND CAPITAL) Dallas, Texas	
5	MANAGEMENT, L.P.,	<pre>) Wednesday, February 3, 2021) 9:30 a.m. Docket</pre>	
6	Debtor.)	
) CONFIRMATION HEARING [1808]) AGREED MOTION TO ASSUME [1624]	
7)	
8			
9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE STACEY G.C. JERNIGAN,		
10	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.		
11	WEBEX APPEARANCES:		
12	For the Debtor:	Jeffrey Nathan Pomerantz	
13		PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES, LLP 10100 Santa Monica Blvd., 13th Floor	
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16		PACHULSKI STANG ZIEHL & JONES, LLP 780 Third Avenue, 34th Floor	
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18	For the Debtors:	Ira D. Kharasch	
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Recorded by: Michael F. Edmond, Sr. UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 1100 Commerce Street, 12th Floor Dallas, TX 75242 (214) 753-2062 Transcribed by: Kathy Rehling 311 Paradise Cove Shady Shores, TX 76208 (972) 786-3063 Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording; transcript produced by transcription service.

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DALLAS, TEXAS - FEBRUARY 3, 2021 - 9:38 A.M.

THE CLERK: All rise. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, is now in session, the Honorable Stacey Jernigan presiding.

THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated. All right. We are ready for Day Two of the confirmation hearing in Highland Capital Management, LP, Case No. 19-34054. I'll just make sure we've got the key parties at the moment. Do we have Mr. Pomerantz, Mr. Morris, for the Debtor team?

MR. POMERANTZ: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. Jeff Pomerantz for the Debtors.

MR. MORRIS: And I'm here as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Good.

All right. For our objecting parties, do we have Mr. Taylor and your crew for Mr. Dondero?

MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

All right. For Dugaboy Trust and Get Good Trust, do we have Mr. Draper? (No response.) All right. I do see Mr.

Draper. I didn't hear an appearance. You must be on mute.

MR. DRAPER: I'm present, --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DRAPER: -- Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning.

MR. DRAPER: I'm present, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning. I heard you that time. 1 2 Thank you. 3 All right. And now for what I'll call the Funds and 4 Advisors Objectors, do we have Ms. Rukavina present? 5 MR. RUKAVINA: Yes, Your Honor. Good morning. THE COURT: Good morning. All right. And I will 6 7 check. Do we have Mr. Clemente or your team there? 8 MR. CLEMENTE: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. 9 Clemente from Sidley Austin on behalf of the Committee. 10 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Drawhorn, do we have you there for the NexPoint Real Estate Partners and related funds? 11 12 MS. DRAWHORN: Yes, Your Honor. Good morning. 13 THE COURT: Good morning. All right. Did I miss --14 I think that captured all of our Objectors. Anyone who I've 15 missed? All right. Well, when we recessed yesterday, Mr. Morris, 16 17 I think you were about to call your third witness; is that 18 correct? 19 MR. MORRIS: It is, Your Honor. But if I may, I'd 20 like to just address the objections to the remaining exhibits, 21 since I hope that won't take too long. 22 THE COURT: All right. You may. 23 MR. POMERANTZ: Actually, Your Honor, before we go 24 there, we filed the supplemental declaration of Patrick 25 Leatham, as we indicated we would do yesterday. We just

wanted to get confirmation again that nobody intends to crossexamine him, so that he doesn't have to sit through the festivities today.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I did see that you filed that.

Does anyone anticipate wanting to cross-examine Mr. Leatham, the balloting agent?

MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, I take it that that declaration is part of the record. As long as the Court confirms that, I do not intend to call the gentlemen.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I will take judicial notice of it and make it part of the record. It appears at Docket Entry No. 1887. Again, it was filed -- well, it was actually filed early this morning, I think. So, all right. So, with --

MR. MORRIS: And to avoid --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MORRIS: To -- I was just going to say, to avoid any ambiguity, Your Honor, the Debtor respectfully moves that document into the evidentiary record.

THE COURT: All right. The Court will -- (Interruption.)

THE COURT: Someone needs to put their phone on mute, perhaps. Unless someone was intentionally speaking.

All right. So, I will grant that request. Docket Entry

No. 1887 will be part of the confirmation evidence of this hearing.

(Debtor's Patrick Leatham Declaration at Docket 1887 is received into evidence.)

THE COURT: All right. Anything else? There were other exhibits I think you were going to talk about?

MR. MORRIS: Yeah. Let me just go through them one at a time, if I may, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: All right. So, I'm going to deal with the transcripts that have been objected to one at a time. And I'll just take them in order. The first one can be found at Exhibit B. It is on Docket No. 1822.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: Exhibit B is the deposition transcript from the December 16, 2020 hearing on the Advisor and the Funds' motion for an order restricting the Debtor from engaging in certain CLO-related transactions.

During that hearing, the Court heard the testimony of Dustin Norris. Mr. Norris is an executive vice president for each of the Funds and each of the Advisors.

We would be offering the transcript for the limited purposes of establishing Mr. Dondero's ownership and control over the Advisors.

Mr. Norris also gave some pretty substantial testimony

concerning the so-called independent board of the Funds.

bov.

And as a general matter, Your Honor, to the extent that the objection is on hearsay grounds, the transcript -- at least the portions relating to Mr. Norris's testimony -- simply are not hearsay under Evidentiary Rule 801(d)(2). These are statements of an opposing party, and I think we fall well within that.

So, we would respectfully request that the Court admit into the record the transcript from December 16th, at least the portions of which are Mr. Norris's testimony.

THE COURT: All right. And, again, these appear at

-- I think I heard you say B and then E. Is that correct?

MR. MORRIS: Just B. Just B at the moment. B as in

THE COURT: Okay. Just B at the moment?

All right. Any objections to that?

MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, I had objected, but now that it's offered for that limited purpose, I withdraw my objection.

THE COURT: All right. Then B -- I'm sorry. Was there anyone else speaking?

B will be admitted. And, again, it appears at Docket Entry 1822.

(Debtor's Exhibit B, Docket Entry 1822, is received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: Okay. Next, the next transcript can be found at Exhibit 6R, and that's Docket 1866. Exhibit 6R is the transcript of the January 9, 2020 hearing where the Court approved the corporate governance settlement. We think that that transcript is highly relevant, Your Honor, because it reflects not only Mr. Dondero's notice and active participation in the consummation of the corporate governance agreement, but it also reflects the Court and the parties' views and expectations that were established at that time, such that if anybody contends that there's any ambiguity about any aspect of the order, I believe that that would be the best evidence to resolve any such disputes.

So, for the purpose of establishing Mr. Dondero's notice, Mr. Dondero's participation, and the parties' discussions and expectations with regard to every aspect of the corporate governance settlement, including Mr. Dondero's stipulation, the order that emerged from it, and the term sheet, we think that that's properly into evidence.

THE COURT: Any objection?

All right. 6R will be admitted. Again, at Docket Entry 1822.

(Debtor's Exhibit 6R, Docket Entry 1822, is received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: Next, Your Honor, we've got Exhibits 6S as in Sam and 6T as in Thomas. They're companions. And they

can be found at Docket 1866. And those are the transcripts. The first one is from the October 27th disclosure statement hearing, and the second one actually is from the Patrick Daugherty, I believe, lift stay motion.

I'll deal with the first one first, Your Honor. We believe that the transcript of the October 27th hearing goes to the good faith nature of the Debtor's proposed plan. It shows that the Debtor and the Committee were not always aligned on every interest. It shows that the Committee, in fact, strenuously objected to certain aspects of the then-proposed plan by the Debtors. And we just think it goes to the heart of the good faith argument.

The transcript for the 28th, we would propose to offer for the limited purpose of the commentary that you offered at the end of that hearing, where Your Honor made it clear that employee releases would not be -- would not likely be acceptable to the Court unless there was some consideration paid.

And it was really, frankly, Your Honor's comments that helped spur the Committee and the Debtor to discuss over the next few weeks the resolution of the issues concerning the employee releases.

So we're not offering Exhibit 6T for anything having to do with Mr. Daugherty or his claim, but just the latter portion relating to the discussion about the employee releases. And,

with that, we'd move those transcripts into evidence.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, yes, I do object. 6S is hearsay, and under Rule 804(b)(1) it's admissible only if the witnesses are unavailable to be called. There's been no suggestion that they're not.

As far as 6T, what Your Honor says is not hearsay, so as long as it's just what Your Honor was saying, I do not object to 6T. I object to the balance of it.

MR. MORRIS: Yeah. One second, Your Honor. I would go to the residual exception to the hearsay rule under 807. 807 specifically applies if the statement being offered is supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and it's more probative on the point -- and the point here is simply to help buttress the Debtor's good faith argument -- and it's more probative on the point than any other evidence. And I'm not sure what better evidence there would be than an on-the-record discussion between the Debtor and the Committee as to the disputes they were having on the disclosure statement.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to overrule the objection and accept that 807 exception as being valid here. So, I am admitting both 6S and 6T. And for the record, I think you said they appeared at 1866. They actually appear at 1822.

MR. MORRIS: Okay, Your Honor. I am corrected. It is 6S and 6T, and they are indeed at 1822. Forgive me.

THE COURT: Okay.

(Debtor's Exhibits 6S and 6T, Docket Entry 1822, is received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: The next transcript and the last one is 6U, which is also at 1822. 6U is the transcript from the December 10th hearing on the Debtor's motion for a TRO against Mr. Dondero. We believe the entirety of that transcript is highly relevant, and it relates specifically to the Debtor's request for the exculpation, gatekeeper, and injunction provisions of their plan. And on that basis, we would offer that into evidence.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. This is Clay Taylor on behalf of Mr. Dondero.

We do object, on the same basis that it is hearsay. There has certainly been plenty of testimony before this Court and on the record as to why the Debtor believes that its plan provisions are appropriate and allowable, and there's no need to allow hearsay in for that. All of the witnesses were available to be called by the Debtor. The Debtor is in the midst of its case and can call whoever else it needs to call to get these into evidence or to get those docs into evidence. And therefore, we don't believe that any residual exception

should apply.

THE COURT: Mr. Morris, your response?

MR. MORRIS: First, Your Honor, any statements made by or on behalf of Mr. Dondero would not be hearsay under 801(d)(2).

And secondly, there is no other evidence of the Debtor's motion of the -- of the argument that was had. There is no other evidence, let alone better evidence, than the transcript itself. And I believe 807 is certainly the best rule to capture that.

It is a statement that's supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. Again, these are the litigants appearing before Your Honor. It may not be sworn testimony, but I would hope that everybody is doing their best to comply with the guarantee of trustworthiness in that regard, putting aside advocacy.

And it is more probative on the point for which we're offering -- and that is on the very issues of exculpation, gatekeeper, and injunction -- than anything else we can offer in that regard.

THE COURT: All right. I overrule the objection and I will admit 6U. Okay.

(Debtor's Exhibit 6U, Docket Entry 1822, is received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: All right. Going back to the top, Your

Honor, Companions Exhibit D as in David and E as in Edward, which are at Docket 1822.

Exhibit D is an email string that relates to the Debtor's communications with the Creditors' Committee concerning a transaction known as SSP, which stands for Steel Products -- Structural and Steel Products. So that was an asset that the Debtor was selling, trying to sell at a particular point in time. And Exhibit E is a deck that the Debtor had prepared for the benefit of the UCC.

And if we looked that those documents, Your Honor, you'd see that the Debtor was properly following the protocols that were put in place in connection with the January 9th corporate governance settlement. And the Committee is being informed by the Debtor of what the Debtor intends to do with that particular asset.

And the reason that it's particularly relevant here, Your Honor, is Dustin Norris had submitted a declaration in support of their motion that was heard on September -- on December 16th. That declaration is an exhibit to what is Exhibit A on Docket 1822. Exhibit A on the docket is the Advisor and the Funds' motion. Okay? So, Exhibit A is the motion. Attached to that Exhibit A is an exhibit, which is Mr. Norris's declaration.

At Paragraph 9 of Mr. Norris's declaration, he takes issue with the Debtor's process for the sale of that particular

asset.

And so, having admitted already into the record Mr.

Norris's declaration, we believe that these documents rebut

the statements made in Mr. Norris's declaration, and indeed,

were part of the transcript that has now already been admitted

into evidence. So we think the documents are needed because

they were exhibits during that hearing.

THE COURT: All right. Any objection?

MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, yes, I object based on authenticity. This document has not been authenticated, nor has the attachment. And on hearsay. And I don't think that the Debtor can introduce one exhibit just to introduce another to rebut the first.

THE COURT: Your response?

MR. MORRIS: You know, in all honesty, I wish that the authenticity objection had been made yesterday and I might have been able to deal with that.

These documents have already been admitted by the Court against these very same parties. I think it would be a little unfair for them now to exclude the document that they had no objection to the first time around. They clearly relate to Paragraph 9 of Mr. Norris's declaration, which was admitted into evidence in this case without objection.

THE COURT: All right. I overrule the objection. D and E are admitted.

(Debtor's Exhibits D and E, Docket Entry 1822, is received into evidence.)

MR. MORRIS: Next, Your Honor, we have Exhibits 4D as in David, 4E as in Edward, and 4G as in Gregory. And those can all be found on Docket 1822. And to just cut to the chase, Your Honor, these are the K&L Gates letter that were sent in late December and my firm's responses to those letters.

Those letters are being offered, again, to support -well, the Debtor contends that, in the context of this case,
and at the time and under the circumstances, the letters
constituted interference and evinces a disregard for the

January 9th order, for Mr. Dondero's TRO, and for the Court's
comments at the December 16th hearing. And they go
specifically to the Debtor's request for the gatekeeper,
exculpation, and injunction provisions.

To the extent that those exhibits contain the letters that were sent on behalf of the Funds and on behalf of the Advisors, they would simply not be hearsay under 801(d)(2). And to the extent the objection goes to my firm's response, I think just as a matter of completeness the Court -- I won't offer them for the truth of the matter asserted. I'll simply offer the Pachulski responses at those exhibits for the purpose of stating the Debtor's position, without regard to the truth of the matter asserted.

THE COURT: All right. Any objection? 1 2 MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, with that understanding, 3 I'll withdraw my objection to these exhibits. 4 THE COURT: All right. So, 4D, 4E, and 4G are 5 admitted. (Debtor's Exhibits 4D, 4E, and 4G, Docket Entry 1822, are 6 7 received into evidence.) MR. MORRIS: Next, Your Honor, we've got Exhibit 5T 8 9 as in Thomas. That document can be found at Docket No. 1822. 10 Your Honor, that document is a schedule of a long list of 11 promissory notes that are owed to the Debtor by the Advisors, 12 Dugaboy, and Mr. Dondero. But I think that, upon reflection, 13 I'll withdraw that exhibit. THE COURT: All right. 14 15 (Debtor's Exhibit 5T is withdrawn.) MR. MORRIS: And then, finally, just one last one. I 16 17 think Mr. Rukavina objected to Exhibit 70 as in Oscar, which 18 can be found at Docket No. 1877. Exhibit 70 are the documents 19 that were admitted in the January 21st hearing, and I believe 20 that they all go -- they're being offered to support the 21 Debtor's application for the gatekeeper, exculpation, and 22 injunction provisions. 23 THE COURT: All right. 70 is being offered. 24 objection?

MR. RUKAVINA: Yes, Your Honor. I do object. Those

25

are exhibits from a separate adversary proceeding that has not been concluded. In fact, my witness is still on the stand in that.

And I'll note that that's another 20,000 pages that's very duplicative of the current record, and we already are going to have an unwieldy record. So I question why Mr. Norris -- why Mr. Morris would even need this.

So that's my objection, Your Honor.

MR. MORRIS: You know what? That's a fair point,
Your Honor. And -- that is a fair point, and I guess what I'd
like to do is at some point this morning see if I can single
out documents that are not duplicative and come back to you
with very specific documents. I think that's a very fair
point.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MORRIS: And with that, Your Honor, I think we've now addressed every single document that the Debtor has offered into evidence, and I believe, other than the withdrawal of --

THE COURT: 5T.

MR. MORRIS: -- 5T --

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MORRIS: -- and the open question on 70, I believe every single document at Docket 1822, 1866, and 1877 has been admitted. Do I have that right?

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go to the next witness?

THE COURT: All right. Yes, because I did admit yesterday 7F through 7Q, minus 7O, at 1877. So, yes, I agree with what you just said. MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, I apologize. And Mr. Morris. I have that 5S -- or six -- that 5S and 6C, Legal Entities List, have not been admitted. But if I'm wrong on that, then I apologize. THE COURT: Okay. 5S was part of 1866, which I admitted entirely. And what was the other thing? MR. RUKAVINA: I'm counting letters, Your Honor. One, two, three, four. 6D, Legal Entities List, Redacted. THE COURT: Okay. 6B would have been --MR. RUKAVINA: D, Your Honor, as in dog. I'm sorry. 6-dog. THE COURT: Okay. 6D, yeah, that was part of 1822 that I admitted en masse yesterday. MR. MORRIS: Yeah, I didn't hear an objection to that one yesterday, and I agree, Your Honor. My records show that it was already admitted. MR. RUKAVINA: Then I apologize to the Court. THE COURT: All right. Any --MR. MORRIS: No worries. Let's get --THE COURT: Any other housekeeping matters before we

1 MR. MORRIS: No, Your Honor. Not from the Debtor. 2 THE COURT: Anyone else? 3 All right. Well, let's hear from the next witness. 4 MR. MORRIS: All right, Your Honor. The Debtor calls 5 as its next and last witness Marc Tauber. THE COURT: All right. Mr. --6 7 MR. MORRIS: Mr. Tauber, if you're on the phone, please identify yourself. 8 9 (No response.) 10 THE COURT: Mr. Tauber, we're not hearing you. 11 Perhaps you are on mute. Could you unmute your device? 12 (No response.) 13 THE COURT: All right. If it's a phone, you need to hit *6. 14 15 Hmm. Any -- do you know which caller he is? 16 THE CLERK: I'm trying to find out. 17 THE COURT: All right. We've got well over a hundred 18 people, so we can't easily identify where he is at the moment. 19 All right. Mr. Tauber, Marc Tauber? This is Judge 20 Jernigan. We cannot hear you, so -- all right. Well, maybe 21 we can --22 MR. MORRIS: Can we just take a three-minute break 23 and let me see if I can track him down? 24 THE COURT: Yes. Why don't you do that? So let's 25 take a three-minute break.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

(A recess ensued from 10:02 a.m. until 10:04 a.m.)

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, if we may, he'll be dialing in in a moment. But I've been reminded that there is one more exhibit. It's the exhibit I used on rebuttal yesterday with Mr. Seery. There was the one document that was on the docket, and that was the Debtor's omnibus reply to the plan objections, where we looked at Paragraph 135, I believe. And we would offer that into evidence for the purpose of just establishing that the Debtor had given notice no later than January 22nd of its agreement in principle to assume the CLO management contracts.

And then the second exhibit that we had offered that I think I suggested could be marked as Exhibit 10A was the email string between my firm and counsel for the CLO Issuers where they agreed to the agreement in principle for the Debtor's assumption of the CLO management contracts.

And we would offer both of those documents into evidence as well.

THE COURT: All right. Any objections?

All right. Well, I will admit them.

As far as this email string with the CLO Issuers that you called 10A, does that appear on the docket? I remember you putting it on the screen, but, if not, you'll need to file a

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    supplement to the record, a supplemental exhibit.
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              MR. MORRIS: We will, Your Honor. We'll do that for
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    both of those exhibits.
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              THE COURT: And then as -- okay, for both? Because I
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    -- I've read that reply, and I could reference the docket
    number if we need to.
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              MR. MORRIS: We'll clean that up, Your Honor.
 8
              THE COURT: Okay.
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         (Debtor's Exhibit 10A is received into evidence.)
10
         (Clerk advises Court re new caller.)
              THE COURT: Oh, okay. Just a minute. I was looking
11
12
    up something.
13
         (Pause.)
              THE COURT: All right. Well, you're going to file --
14
15
    hmm, I really wanted to just reference where that reply brief
16
    appears on the record. There were a heck of a lot of things
17
    filed on January 22nd.
18
         (Interruption.)
19
              THE COURT: Okav. We'll --
20
              MR. MORRIS: All right. We're just going to need one
21
    more minute with Mr. Tauber. It's my fault, Your Honor.
22
              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
23
              MR. MORRIS: I didn't send him easily-digestible
24
    dial-in instructions. He'll be just a moment.
25
              THE COURT: Okay.
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(Court confers with Clerk regarding exhibit.)
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              THE COURT: Oh, it's at 1807? Okay. So, the reply
 3
    brief that we talked about Paragraph 35, that is at Docket No.
 4
    1807. Okay? All right.
 5
         (Debtor's Omnibus Reply to Plan Objections, Docket 1807,
    is received into evidence.)
 6
 7
         (Pause.)
              MR. TAUBER: Hi. It's Marc Tauber.
 8
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              THE COURT: All right.
              MR. MORRIS: Excellent.
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11
              THE COURT: Mr. Tauber, this is Judge Jernigan.
12
    can hear you, but I can't see you. Do you have a video --
13
              MR. TAUBER: Yeah, I don't know why it's not working.
14
              THE COURT:
                         Hmm.
15
              MR. TAUBER: I'm on WebEx all day. Usually it works
16
    no problem.
17
              THE COURT: Okay. Well, do you want to give it
18
    another try or two?
19
              MR. TAUBER: Yeah. It looks like it's starting to
20
             It's all -- pictures, so --
    come up.
21
              THE COURT: Okay.
22
              MR. TAUBER: -- hopefully you'll be able to see me in
23
    a second.
24
              THE COURT: Okay. The first thing I'm going to need
25
    to do is swear you in, so we'll see if the video comes up here
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1
    in a minute.
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              MR. TAUBER: Okay.
 3
                          Can you see us, Mr. Tauber?
              THE COURT:
 4
              MR. TAUBER: I can see four people. The rest are
 5
    just names still.
              THE COURT:
 6
                          Okav.
 7
              MR. TAUBER: I can go out and try to come back in, if
 8
    you think that's --
 9
              THE COURT:
                         I'm afraid of losing you.
10
    audio, is it on your phone or is it on --
11
              MR. TAUBER: No.
12
              THE COURT: -- a computer?
13
              MR. TAUBER: On the computer. Yeah.
14
              THE COURT: Okay. So you're coming through loud and
15
    clear on your computer.
              MR. TAUBER: Yeah. Like I said, we use WebEx for
16
17
    work, so I have them on all day long without any issues,
18
    typically.
19
              THE COURT: Okav.
20
         (Court confers with Clerk.)
21
              THE COURT: Okay. Our court reporter thinks it's a
22
    bandwidth issue on your end, so I don't --
23
              MR. TAUBER: There's only two of us here at home on
    the line right now, so I don't know why. It looks like it's
24
25
    trying to come in, and then just keeps --
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Tauber - Direct

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1 THE COURT: I at least see your name on the screen 2 now, which I did not before. 3 MR. TAUBER: Yeah. 4 THE COURT: So hopefully we're going to -- ah. 5 got you. 6 MR. TAUBER: There it is. 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MR. TAUBER: Yeah. 9 MR. MORRIS: There we go. 10 MR. TAUBER: I might lose you, though. Give me one 11 second, because I have a thing saying the WebEx meeting has 12 stopped working. Let me close that. 13 THE COURT: Okay. We've still got you. Please raise 14 your right hand. 15 MR. TAUBER: Okay. 16 MARC TAUBER, DEBTOR'S WITNESS, SWORN 17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Morris? 18 MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 DIRECT EXAMINATION 20 BY MR. MORRIS: 21 Good morning, Mr. Tauber. 22 Good morning. 23 I apologize for the delay in getting you the information. 24 Are you currently employed, sir? 25 Α Yes, sir.

Tauber - Direct

1 | Q By whom?

- A Aon Financial Services.
- 3 | Q And does Aon Financial Services provide insurance
- 4 | brokerage services among its services?
 - II A Yes.

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- Q And what position do you currently hold?
- 7 | A Vice president.
- 8 | Q How long have you been a vice president at Aon?
- 9 A Since October of 2019.
- 10 | Q Can you just describe for the Court generally your
- 11 | professional background?
- 12 | A Sure. I spent about 20 years on Wall Street, working in a
- 13 | variety of jobs, in research, trading, and as the COO of a
- 14 | hedge fund. And then in 2010 I switched to the insurance
- 15 | world. I was an underwriter for ten-plus years for Zurich and
- 16 | QBE. And then in 2019 switched to the brokering side for Aon.
- 17 | Q And what are your duties and responsibilities as a vice
- 18 | president at Aon?
- 19 | A Well, we're responsible or my team and I are responsible
- 20 | for creating bespoke insurance programs, focusing on D&O and
- 21 | E&O insurance for our insureds.
- 22 | Q And what is, for the benefit of the record, what do you
- 23 | mean by bespoke insurance program?
- 24 | A Well, each client is different, so the programs and the
- 25 policies that we put in place might be off-the-shelf policies,

26

Tauber - Direct

27

- but we endorse and amend them as needed to meet the needs of the individual client.
 - Q And during your work, both as an underwriter and now as a broker, have you familiarized yourself with the market for D&O and E&O insurance policies?
 - A Yes.

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- 7 | Q All right. Let's talk about the early part of this case.
- 8 Did there come a time in early 2020 when Aon was asked to
- 9 | place insurance on behalf of the board of Strand Advisors?
- 10 | A Yes.
- 11 | Q Can you describe for the Court how that came about?
- 12 | A Sure. One of our account executives, a man by the name of
- 13 | Jim O'Neill, had a relationship with a man named John Dubel,
- 14 \parallel who was one of the appointees to serve on -- as a member of
- 15 | Strand, which was being appointed, as we understood it, to be
- 16 | the general partner of Highland Capital Management by the
- 17 | Bankruptcy Court. And they -- we had done -- or, Jim and John
- 18 | had a longstanding relationship. I had actually underwritten
- 19 | an account for a previous appointment of John's when I was an
- 20 | underwriter, so I had some familiarity with John as well, and
- 21 | actually brokered a subsequent deal for John at Aon.
- 22 So I had, again, some familiarity with John, and we were,
- 23 | you know, tasked with going out and finding a program for
- 24 | Strand.
- 25 | Q Can you describe what happened next? How did you go about

accomplishing that task?

A So, there are a number of markets or insurance companies that provide management liability insurance, which this was a management liability-type policy. D&O is a synonym for management liability, I guess you'd say. And we approached the, I think, 14 or 15 markets that we knew to provide insurance in this space and that would be willing to buy the type of policy we were seeking and have interest in a risk like this, which had a little hair on it. Obviously, there was the Dondero involvement, as well as the bankruptcy.

Q As part of that process, did you and your firm put together a package of information for prospective interested

A Yes.

parties?

- 15 | Q Can you describe for the Court what was contained in the 16 | package?
 - A Had the *C.V.s*, some relevant pleadings from the case, court order. I'd have to go back and look exactly. But sort of just general, you know, general information that was available about the situation at hand and Strand's appointment.
 - Q And the court order that you just mentioned, is that the one that had that gatekeeper provision in it?
- 24 | A Correct.
- 25 | Q And can you explain to the Court why you and your team

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decided to include the order with the gatekeeper provision in the package that you were delivering to prospective carriers? Sure. In our initial conversations to discuss our engagement, the gatekeeper function was explained to us by John. And I'm not sure who else was on the initial call. And, but it was explained to us that I quess Judge Jernigan would sit as the gatekeeper between any potential claimant against the insureds and, you know, would basically have to approve any claim that would be made against (indecipherable), which would thereby prevent any frivolous claims from happening. All right. Let's just talk for a moment. How did you and your firm decide which underwriters to present the package to? Again, you know, I -- my background, or my Wall Street background, obviously, sort of made me have a -- it was very unique for the insurance world when I switched over, so I had sort of risen to a certain level of expertise within the space. And, you know, our team also is very experienced, and decades of experience in the insurance world. So we're very familiar with the markets that are willing to provide these types of policies and the markets that would be likely to take a look at a risk such as this. Okay. You mentioned that there was -- I think your words were a little hair on this, and one of the things you mentioned was bankruptcy. How did the fact that Strand was

Tauber - Direct

the general partner of a debtor in bankruptcy impact your ability to solicit D&O insurance?

A Well, it's just not a plain vanilla situation, so people are somewhat, you know, are -- I think -- so, the type of insurance, D&O insurance, that we write is very different from auto insurance, as an example. Auto insurance, people expect there to be a certain amount of claims, and they expect the premiums to cover the claims plus the expenses and then provide them a reasonable profit on top of that.

Our insurance is really much more by binary. The expectation for underwriters is that they will be completing ignoring -- or, avoiding risk at all costs, wherever possible. So anytime there is a situation that looks a little risky, so the premium might be a little higher, the deductible might be a little higher, but, again, the underwriters are really making a bet that they will not have a claim. Because the premiums pale in comparison to the limits that are available to the policyholder.

- 19 | 0 And so --
- \parallel A So, -- I'm sorry. What were you going to say?
- \parallel Q I didn't mean to interrupt.
- 22 | A Yeah.

- 23 | Q Have you finished your answer?
- 24 | A Sure.
- 25 | Q Okay. So, were some of the 14 or 15 markets that you

Tauber - Direct

contacted reluctant to underwrite because there was a bankruptcy ongoing?

A Well, I think that probably -- I mean, there are certain markets that we didn't go to in the beginning because they would be very reluctant to write a risk that had that kind of hair on it, based on our experience from dealing with them.

And, you know, I think the bankruptcy was certainly a little bit of an issue. And then, obviously, as people did their research and -- or if they weren't already familiar with Highland and got to know, you know, got -- I will just say for a simple Google search and learned a little bit about Mr.

Dondero, I think there was definitely some significant

Q Was the fact that the Debtor -- was the fact that the Debtor is a partnership an issue that came up, in your -- in your process?

reluctance to write this program.

- A There are certainly some carriers who won't write what's known as general partnership liability insurance. So, yes, that is part of that. It was part of the limiting factor in terms of who we went to.
- Q Okay. And, finally, you mentioned Mr. Dondero. What role did he play in your ability to obtain insurance for the Strand board?
- A Well, that's a very significant role. As, you know, as mentioned, the underwriters are very risk-averse, so the

litigiousness of Mr. Dondero is a very strong red flag prohibiting a number of people from writing the insurance at all. And the ones that were writing, that were willing to provide options, were looking for protections from Mr. Dondero.

Q And what kind of protections were they looking for?

A Well, the gatekeeper function was a key factor. That was really the only way we could even start a conversation with any of the people that we were able to engage. And in addition, they wanted a, you know, sort of a belts and suspenders additional protection of having an exclusion preventing any litigation brought by or on behalf of Mr.

- Q Were you able to identify any carrier who was prepared to underwrite D&O insurance for Strand without the gatekeeper provision or without a Dondero exclusion?
- 17 | A We were not.

Dondero.

- Q Okay. Let's fast-forward now. Has your firm been requested to obtain professional management insurance for the contemplated post-confirmation debtor entities and individuals associated with those entities?
- A Yes.
- Q Okay. So let's just talk about the entities first, the Claimant Trust and the Litigation Trust. In response to that request, have you and your team gone out into the marketplace

- 1 to try to find an underwriter willing to underwrite a policy 2 for those entities?
- $3 \parallel A \qquad \text{Yes.}$
- 4 | Q And have you been able to find any carrier who's willing
- 5 | to provide coverage for the Claimant Trust and the Litigation
- 6 | Trust?
- 7 | A Yes.
- 8 | Q And how many -- how many have expressed a willingness to
- 9 | do that?
- 10 | A Two.
- 11 \parallel Q And have those two carriers indicated that there would be
- 12 | conditions to coverage for the entities?
- 13 | A Both will require a -- the continuation of the gatekeeper
- 14 | function, as well as a Dondero exclusion.
- 15 \parallel Q Okay. Have you also been tasked with the responsibility
- 16 | of trying to find coverage for the individuals associated with
- 17 | the Claimant Trust and the Litigation Trust, meaning the
- 18 | Claimant Trustee, the Litigation Trustee, and the Oversight
- 19 | Board?

- A Yes. So we did it concurrently.
- 21 \parallel Q Okay. So, are the two firms that you just mentioned
- 22 | willing to provide insurance for the individuals as well as
- 23 | the entities?
- $24 \parallel A$ Correct. With the same stipulations.
- 25 | Q They require -- they both require the gatekeeper and the

Tauber - Direct

1	Dondero exclusion?
2	A That's correct.
3	Q Is there any other firm who has indicated a willingness to
4	consider providing D&O insurance for the individuals?
5	A There is one that is willing to do so, as long as the
6	gatekeeper function remains in place. They have indicated
7	that if the gatekeeper function was to be removed, that they
8	would then add a Dondero exclusion to their coverage.
9	Q So is there any insurance carrier that you're aware of who
LO	is prepared to insure either the individuals or the entities
L1	without a gatekeeper provision?
L2	A No.
L3	Q And that last company, I just want to make sure the record
L4	is clear: If the gatekeeper provision is overturned on appeal
L5	or is otherwise not effective, do you have an understanding as
L 6	to what happens to the insurance coverage?
L7	A They will either add an exclusion for any claims brought
L8	by or on behalf of Mr. Dondero or cancel the coverage
L9	altogether.
20	MR. MORRIS: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: All right. Cross of this witness?
22	CROSS-EXAMINATION
23	BY MR. RUKAVINA:

25 that's being written now for the post-bankruptcy entities, did

Mr. Tauber, I'm a little confused. So, the insurance

1 I hear you say that there is one carrier that would give that 2 insurance subject to having a Dondero exclusion? 3 So, first of all, there's nothing currently being written. 4 We have solicited quotes. So, just to make sure that that --5 I want to make sure that's clear. We have three carriers that are willing to provide varying 6 7 levels of coverage. All three will only do so with the 8 existence of the gatekeeper function continuing to be in 9 place. One of the three has -- two of those three will also 10 provide the coverage with -- even with the gatekeeper function 11 and the Dondero exclusion. The third one was not requiring a 12 Dondero exclusion unless the gatekeeper function goes away. 13 Okay. So the third one, you believe, will, whatever the 14 term is, write the insurance or provide the coverage without a 15 gatekeeper, as long as there is a strong Dondero exclusion? 16 Their initial requirement is that the gatekeeper No. 17 function remains in place. That is their preferred option. 18 If the gatekeeper function is removed, then they will add a 19 Dondero exclusion in place of the gatekeeper exclusion. In 20 addition, that carrier is only willing to provide coverage for 21 the individuals, not for the entities. 22 Okay. Thank you. 23 MR. RUKAVINA: I'll pass the witness, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. Other cross?

MR. TAYLOR: Clay Taylor on behalf of Mr. Dondero.

Tauber - Cross

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1 | THE COURT: Okay.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION

3 | BY MR. TAYLOR:

- Q Good morning, Mr. Tauber.
- A Good morning.
- Q Are you generally familiar with placing D&O insurance at distressed debt level private equity firms?
- A I am familiar with it probably more from the underwriting side, and I also worked at a fund that was distressed and had to be liquidated, so I -- as the COO, so I have a fair amount of familiarity, yes.
- Q Okay. Before taking this to market for the first time for the pre-confirmation policies that you have in place, did your firm conduct any due diligence or analysis of comparing the amount of litigation the Highland entities and Mr. Dondero were involved in as compared to other comparable firms in the marketplace? Say, you know, Apollo, Fortress, Cerberus, other
- A Well, it wouldn't really be our role as the broker.
- 20 | That's the role of the underwriter.

similar market participants?

- Q Are you familiar if any of the underwriters undertook any such analysis?
- A I would assume that they did, since they all had concerns about Mr. Dondero almost immediately.
- 25 Q Do you have any -- you didn't conduct any personal due

1 diligence on comparing the amount of litigation that the 2 Highland entities were involved in as compared to, say, 3 Fortress, do you? 4 Well, again, that wouldn't really be my role as the 5 broker. But I will say that I used to write the primary 6 insurance for Fortress Investment Group when I was at Zurich. 7 So I'm extremely familiar with Fortress, to use your example, 8 and I would say that the level of litigation at Fortress was 9 much, just out of personal knowledge, was significantly less 10 than I had encountered or than I had read about at Highland. 11 That you have read about? Is that based upon a number of 12 cases where Fortress was a plaintiff as compared to Highland 13 was a plaintiff? Over what time period? 14 Again, not my role. Not something that I've done. I'm 15 just generally familiar with Fortress and I'm generally 16 familiar with Highland. 17 All right. So you're generally familiar and you say that 18 -- you're telling me and this Court that Fortress is involved 19 in less litigation. Could you quantify that for me, please? 20 No, but it's really irrelevant to the situation at hand. 21 The issue is not my feelings whatsoever. The issue is the 22 underwriters' feelings and their concern with Mr. Dondero, not 23 mine or anybody else's. So, I appreciate your answer and thank you for that, but I 24 25 believe the question that was before you is, have you

- quantitatively -- do you have any quantitative analysis by
 which you can back up the statement that Fortress is less
 litigious than Highland?
 - A I wouldn't even try, no.

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- Q Okay. Do you have any quantitative analysis for -- that Cerberus is any less litigious than Highland?
- 7 A I don't have any real knowledge of Cerberus's 8 litigiousness.
 - Q Same question as to Apollo.
- A Again, the Fortress, you just happened to mention

 Fortress, which was a special case because I used to be their

 primary underwriter. I don't have any specific -- I'm not a

 claims attorney. I don't have any specific knowledge of the

 level of litigiousness.
 - And, again, it's not up to me, my decision. It's the underwriters' decision of whether or not they're willing to write the coverage, not mine.
 - Q You mentioned that the -- when you took this out to market, it had a little hair on it. Correct?
 - A Correct.
- Q And you put together a package of materials that you sent out to 14 or 15 market participants; is -- did I get that correct?
- 24 | A Yes.
- 25 | Q And in that package, you had certain pleadings, including

- the court order, correct?
- 2 | A Yes. I believe that's correct.
- $3 \parallel Q$ And that was after your initial conversation with John and
- 4 | -- where he pointed out the gatekeeper role. Correct?
 - A Correct.
- 6 | Q And so when you went out to market, presumably you
- 7 | highlighted the gatekeeper role to all the people you
- 8 | solicited offers from because you thought it included less
- 9 | risk, correct?
- 10 | A It offered a level of protection that was not -- that's
- 11 | not common. So it's, yes, it's a huge selling point for the
- 12 || risk.

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- 13 | Q Okay. So, to be clear, you never went out to the market
- 14 | to even see if you could get underwriting the first time
- 15 | without the gatekeeper function; is that correct?
- 16 \parallel A Well, it's my job as a broker to present the risk in the
- 17 | best possible light. So if we have a fact that makes the risk
- 18 \parallel a better write for the underwriters, we, of course, will
- 19 | highlight it. So, no, I did not do that.
- 20 | Q Okay. So, the quick answer to the question is no, you did
- 21 | not go out and solicit any bids without the gatekeeper
- 22 | function?
- 23 | A Correct.
- 24 | Q When you have approached the market for the post-
- 25 confirmation potential coverage, did you approach the same 14

- 1 or 15 parties that you did before? 2 I don't have the two lists in front of me. They would 3 have been vastly similar, yes. 4 Okay. And so, again, all of the 14 or 15 parties or the 5 lists that you solicited were already familiar with the 6 gatekeeper function, correct? 7 Yes. And so therefore they already had that right; they're not 8 9 going to trade against themselves and therefore say that, 10 without it, we'll go ahead and write coverage. Correct? 11 I -- I -- it'd be hard to answer that question. I don't 12 know. 13 Okay. Because you didn't try that, did you? 14 I would have had no reason to, no. 15 Okay. So you don't know if a market exists without the gatekeeper function because you haven't asked, have you? 16 17 I guess that's fair, yeah. 18 MR. TAYLOR: I have no further questions. 19 THE COURT: All right. Any other Objectors with 20 cross-examination? 21 MR. DRAPER: I have no questions for the witness,
 - MR. DRAPER: I have no questions for the witness
 Your Honor.
 - THE COURT: All right. Anyone else? Mr. Morris, redirect?
 - MR. MORRIS: Just one.

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Tauber - Redirect

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REDIRECT EXAMINATION

| BY MR. MORRIS:

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Q One question, Mr. Tauber. Is there any -- do all underwriters -- any underwriters for Fortress require, as a condition to underwriting the D&O insurance, require a gatekeeping provision?

A In my, you know, 11, 12 years of experience in this industry, in this space, I have never seen that gatekeeper function be available, as an underwriter or as a broker. So, no.

MR. MORRIS: No further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any recross on that redirect?

All right. Well, Mr. Tauber, you are excused. We thank you for your testimony today. So you can log off.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay.

(The witness is excused.)

THE COURT: Mr. Morris, does the Debtor rest?

MR. MORRIS: The Debtor does rest, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Well, what are we going to have from the Objectors as far as evidence?

MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, I will be very short. I will call Mr. Seery for less than ten minutes. I will call Mr. Post for less than ten minutes. I will have one exhibit. And I think that that's it for all the Objectors, unless I'm

mistaken, gentlemen.

MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I had one witness, Mr.

Sevilla, under subpoena to testify, and needed a brief moment to discuss with my colleagues whether we're going to call him, and if so, put him on notice that he would be coming up probably about -- I don't know your schedule, Your Honor, but probably, I'm guessing, either before lunch or after, and I need to let him know that also.

So I do need a brief three to five minutes to confer with my colleagues and some direction from the Court to, if we decide to call him, as to when we would tell him to be available.

THE COURT: All right. Well, before I get to that, Mr. Draper, do you have any witnesses?

MR. DRAPER: I do not.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's see. It's 10:34. We're making good time this morning. If Seery is truly ten minutes of direct, and Post is truly ten minutes of direct, and I don't know how long the documentary exhibits are going to take, it sounds to me like we are very likely to get to Mr. Sevilla before a lunch break.

So if you want to -- you know, I don't know what that involves, you sending text messages or making a quick phone call. Do you need a five-minute break for that?

MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor. It involves a phone

call and an email. Just a confirmatory phone call just to make sure that the guy -- just so you know who he is, he is actually a Highland employee, but he's represented by separate counsel, and so we do need to go through him just because that's the right thing to do.

THE COURT: All right. Well, again, I mean, I never know how long cross is going to take, but I'm guessing, you know, we're going to get to him in an hour or so, if not sooner, it sounds like. So, all right. So, do we need a five-minute break?

MR. RUKAVINA: And Your Honor, it might make more sense to make it a ten-minute break. I suspect that Mr. Taylor will be able to release his witness if he and I will just be able to talk. So I would ask the Court's indulgence for a ten-minuter.

THE COURT: Okay. We'll take a ten-minute break. We'll come back at 10:46 Central time.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(A recess ensued from 10:36 a.m. until 10:46 a.m.)

THE CLERK: All rise.

THE COURT: Please be seated. We're going back on the record in the Highland confirmation hearing. Are the Objectors ready to proceed?

MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, Davor Rukavina. We are.
THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Rukavina, are you

going to call your witnesses first?

MR. RUKAVINA: Yes, I will. Before that, if it might help the Court and Mr. Morris: Mr. Morris, with respect to that last exhibit, I do not object to the admission of any of the exhibits that were admitted at that PI hearing.

But I do think, Your Honor, for the record, that -- and I would ask Mr. Morris that he should refile those exhibits here in this case, except for those that are duplicative. Because, again, there's 10,000 pages of indentures, et cetera.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you very much, sir.

Your Honor, if that's acceptable to you, we'll do that as soon as possible.

THE COURT: All right. And let me make sure the record is clear. Are we talking about what you've described as 70? I'm getting mixed up now. Am I --

MR. MORRIS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MORRIS: It's 70, which is the documents that were introduced into evidence in the prior hearing. And Mr. Rukavina is exactly right, that there is substantial overlap between that and other documents that have already been admitted in the record in this case. So we'll just file an abridged version of Exhibit O that only includes non-duplicative documents.

THE COURT: All right. So that will be admitted, and

Seery - Direct

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1 we'll look for your filed abridged version to show up on the 2 docket. 70. 3 (Debtor's Exhibit 70 is received into evidence as 4 specified.) 5 THE COURT: All right. What's next? MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, Jim Seery, please. Mr. 6 7 James Seery. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Seery, welcome back. 8 9 Please raise your right hand. 10 MR. SEERY: Can you -- can you hear me, Your Honor? THE COURT: I can now. 11 12 JAMES P. SEERY, CERTAIN FUNDS AND ADVISORS' WITNESS, SWORN 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 14 Mr. Rukavina, go ahead. 15 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. RUKAVINA: 16 17 Mr. Seery, --18 MR. RUKAVINA: Thank you. 19 BY MR. RUKAVINA: 20 Mr. Seery, good morning. 21 MR. RUKAVINA: Mr. Vasek, if you'll please pull up 22 the schedules. What we have here, Your Honor, is Docket 247, the Debtor's 23 schedules. I'd ask the Court to take judicial notice of it. 24 25 THE COURT: All right. The Court will do so.

1 | BY MR. RUKAVINA:

- Q Mr. Seery, are you familiar with these entities listed
- 3 | here on the Debtor's schedules?
 - A Generally. Each one a little bit different.
- 5 | Q Okay. Do you agree that the Debtor still owns equity
- 6 | interests in these entities?
- 7 | A I believe it does, yes.
- 8 \parallel Q Okay. Is it true that none of these entities are publicly
- 9 | traded?
- 10 | A I don't believe any of these are publicly-traded entities,
- 11 || no.

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- 12 | Q Okay. And none of these, to your knowledge, are debtors
- 13 | in this bankruptcy case, right?
- 14 | A No. We only have one debtor in the case.
- 15 | Q Okay. So, Highland Select Equity Fund, LP, the Debtor
- 16 \parallel owns more than 20 percent of the equity in that entity, right?
- 17 \parallel A I believe the Debtor owns the majority of that entity.
- 18 \parallel That is a fund with an on- and offshore feeder. And I, off
- 19 | the top of my head, don't recall exactly how the allocations
- 20 | of equity work. But I believe we do.
- 21 | Q Does 67 percent refresh your memory? Are you prepared to
- 22 | say that the Debtor owns 67 percent of that equity?
- 23 | A I'm not prepared to say that, no.
- 24 | Q Okay. Wright, Ltd. Does the Debtor own more than 20
- 25 | percent of that equity?

Seery - Direct

- 1 | A There's about -- I don't recall. There's about at least
- 2 | 25 artist, designers, or designs. Wright, AMES, Hockney,
- 3 | Rothco, all own in different places, and they all own in turn
- 4 | some other thing. So I don't know what each of them, off the
- 5 | top of my head, own. There's -- they're part of a myriad of
- 6 | corporate structures here.
- 7 | Q Strak, Ltd. Do you know whether the Debtor owns more than
- 8 | 20 percent of the equity of that entity?
- 9 A Stark? I don't know.
- 10 \parallel Q Okay. I don't know how to pronounce the next one. Eamis
- 11 | (phonetic) Ltd. Do you know whether the Debtor owns more than
- 12 | 20 percent of that equity?
- 13 | A Off the top of my head, I don't recall.
- 14 | Q What about Maple Avenue Holdings, LLC?
- 15 \parallel A I believe, I don't know if it's directly or indirectly,
- 16 | that we own a hundred percent of that entity. But I'm not
- 17 || sure.
- 18 | Q What about Highland Capital Management Korea, Ltd.?
- 19 | A Effectively, Highland Capital Management is owned a
- 20 | hundred percent.
- 21 || Q What about Highland Capital Management Singapore Pte.
- 22 | Ltd.?
- 23 | A We are in the process of shutting it down, so I don't know
- 24 || that -- what the equity percentages are. It's really just a
- 25 | question -- it's -- it's dissolved save for a signature from a

Seery - Direct

| Singaporean.

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- Q Okay. But did the Debtor own more than 20 percent of that entity?
- 4 | A I don't know the specific allocations of equity ownership.
- 5 | Q Okay. What about Pennant (phonetic) Management, LP? Do
- 6 you know whether the Debtor owns or owned more than 20 percent
- 7 \parallel of that entity?
- 8 A I don't recall, no.
- 9 MR. RUKAVINA: You can take that exhibit down, Mr.
- 10 | Vasek.
- 11 | BY MR. RUKAVINA:
- 12 | Q Mr. Seery, very quick, are you familiar with Bankruptcy
- 13 | Rule 2015.3?
- 14 \parallel A I am, yes.
- 15 Q Okay. Has the Debtor filed any Rule 2015.3 statements in
- 16 | this case?
- 17 | A I don't believe we have.
- 18 | Q Okay.
- MR. RUKAVINA: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll pass the
- 20 | witness.
- 21 | THE COURT: All right. Any other Objector
- 22 | questioning? None from Mr. Taylor, none from Mr. Draper, none
- 23 | from Ms. Drawhorn?
- 24 | All right. Any cross -- any examination from you, Mr.
- 25 | Morris?

Seery - Cross

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1 MR. MORRIS: Just one question.

2 | THE COURT: Go ahead.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. MORRIS:

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- Q Mr. Seery, do you know why the Debtor has not yet filed the 2015.3 statement?
- A I have a recollection of it, yes.
- Q Can you just describe that for the Court?
 - A When we -- when we initially filed, when the Debtor filed and it was transferred over, we started trying to get all the various rules completed. There are, as the Court is aware, at least a thousand and maybe more, more like three thousand, entities in the total corporate structure.

We pushed our internal counsel to try to get that done, and were never able to really get it completed. We did not have -- we were told we didn't have separate consolidating statements for every entity, and it would be difficult. And just in the rush of things that happened from the first quarter into the COVID into the year, we just didn't complete that filing. There was no reason for it other than we didn't get it done initially and I think it fell through the cracks.

MR. MORRIS: Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything further, Mr.

24 | Rukavina?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

1 BY MR. RUKAVINA: 2 Mr. Seery, I appreciate that answer. But you never sought 3 leave from the Bankruptcy Court to postpone the deadlines for 4 filing 2015.3, did you? 5 No. If it hadn't fallen through the cracks, it would have 6 been something we recalled and we would have done something 7 with it. But, frankly, it just fell off the -- through the cracks. We didn't deal with it. 8 9 Okay. 10 MR. RUKAVINA: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Mr. 11 Seery. 12 THE COURT: All right. Any other Objector 13 examination? 14 Mr. Morris, anything further on that point? 15 MR. MORRIS: No, thank you, Your Honor. No further 16 questions. 17 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Seery, thank you. You're 18 excused once again from the witness stand. 19 (The witness is excused.) 20 THE COURT: Your next witness? 21 MR. SEERY: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 23 MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, I'll call Jason Post. Mr. 24 Post, if you're listening, which I believe you are, if you'll 25 please activate your camera.

Post - Direct

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1 THE COURT: Mr. Post, we do not see or hear you yet. 2 MR. RUKAVINA: Talk, Mr. Post, and I think it'll 3 focus on you. 4 MR. POST: Yes. Can you hear me now? 5 THE COURT: We can hear you. We cannot see you yet. 6 Could you say, "Testing, one, two; testing, one, two"? 7 Testing, one, two. Testing, one, two. MR. POST: 8 THE COURT: There you are. Okay. Please raise your 9 right hand. 10 JASON POST, CERTAIN FUNDS AND ADVISORS' WITNESS, SWORN 11 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You may proceed. 12 DIRECT EXAMINATION 13 BY MR. RUKAVINA: 14 Mr. Post, good morning. State your name for the record, 15 please. Robert Jason Post. 16 17 How are you employed? 18 I'm employed by NexPoint Advisors, LP. 19 What is your title? 20 Chief compliance officer. 21 Were you ever employed by the Debtor here? 22 Yes. 23 Between when and when? Approximately? I believe it was July of '08 through October of 2020. 24 25 What was your last title while you were employed at the

| Debtor?

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- A Still chief compliance officer. For the retail funds.
- 3 Q Okay. Very, very quickly, what does a chief compliance
- 4 | officer do? Or what do you do?
- 5 | A It's multiple things. Interaction with the regulators.
- 6 | Adherence to prospectus and SAI limitations for the funds.
- 7 | And then establishment of written policies and procedures to
- 8 | prevent and detect violations of the federal securities laws
- 9 and then testing those on a frequent basis.
- 10 | Q And I believe you mentioned you're the CCO for NexPoint
- 11 | Advisors and Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors. Are
- 12 \parallel you also the CCO for any funds that they advise?
- 13 \parallel A Yes. For all the funds that they advise.
- 14 | O Okay. Does that include so-called retail funds?
- 15 A Yes. They're all retail funds.
- 16 0 What is a retail fund?
- 17 | A It typically constitutes funds that are subject to the
- 18 | Investment Company Act of 1940, such as open-end mutual funds,
- 19 | closed-end funds, ETFs.
- 20 | Q Obviously, you know who my clients are. Are any of my
- 21 | clients so-called retail funds that you just described?
- 22 | A Yes.
- 23 | Q Name them, please.
- 24 | A You've got NexPoint Capital, Inc., Highland Income Fund,
- 25 | and NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund.

1 Do those three retails funds hold any voting preference shares in the CLOs that the Debtor manages? 2 3 Yes. 4 MR. RUKAVINA: Mr. Vasek, if you'll please pull up 5 Exhibit 2. Your Honor, I believe I have a stipulation with Mr. Morris 6 7 that this exhibit can be admitted, so I'll move for its 8 admission. 9 MR. MORRIS: No objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Exhibit 2 will be admitted. 10 11 And let's be clear. That appears at -- is it Docket No. --12 let's see. Is it 1673 that you have your -- no, no, no. 13 1670? Is that where your exhibits are? 14 MR. RUKAVINA: No, Your Honor. It's 1863. I think 15 we did an amended one because we numbered our exhibits instead 16 of having seventeen Os and Ps. So it's 1863. 17 THE COURT: 1863? Okay. All right. There it is. 18 Okay. Again, this is -- I'm sorry. I got sidetracked. 19 exhibit? It's Exhibit 2, is admitted. Okay. 20 MR. RUKAVINA: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 (Certain Funds and Advisors' Exhibit 2 is received into 22 evidence.) 23 BY MR. RUKAVINA:

Q Real quick, Mr. Seery. What do these HIF, NSOF, NC, what do they stand for? Do they stand for the retail funds you

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Post - Direct 54

| just named?

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2 MR. SEERY: I don't think he meant me.

3 | THE WITNESS: Yeah.

- 4 | BY MR. RUKAVINA:
 - Q I'm sorry, Mr. Post. I didn't hear you.
- 6 | A You addressed me as Mr. Seery.
- $7 \parallel Q$ Oh. I apologize. What do those initials stand for?
- 8 A The names of the funds that I mentioned.
- 9 | Q Okay. And what do these percentages show?
- 10 | A The percentages show the amount of shares outstanding and
- 11 | the preference shares that each of the respective funds hold
- 12 | of the named CLOs.
- 13 | Q And those CLOs on the left there, those are the CLOs that
- 14 | the Debtor manages pursuant to agreements, correct?
- 15 A Yes. Those are some of them, correct.
- $16 \parallel Q$ Yes. The ones that the retail funds you mentioned have
- 17 | interests in, correct?
- 18 | A Correct.
- 19 | Q And what does the far-right column summarize or show?
- 20 \parallel A That would be the aggregate across the three retail funds.
- 21 | Q In each of those CLOs?
- 22 | A Correct.
- 23 | Q Thank you.
- 24 MR. RUKAVINA: Mr. Vasek, you may pull this down.
- 25 | BY MR. RUKAVINA:

Post - Direct

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1 Mr. Post, in the aggregate, how much do those three retail 2 funds have invested in those CLOs, ballpark? 3 I believe it's approximately \$130 million, give or take. Is it closer to 140 or 130? 4 5 A hundred -- I think it's 140, actually. 6 Okay. Thank you. Who controls those three retail funds? 7 Ultimately, the board --8 And what --9 -- of the funds. 10 What is -- what do you mean by the board? Do they have 11 independent boards? 12 Yes. They have a majority independent board, the funds 13 do. 14 Do you report to that board? 15 Yes. Α 16 Does Mr. Dondero sit on those boards? 17 He does not. 18 Okay. 19 MR. RUKAVINA: I'll pass the witness, Your Honor. 20 Thank you, Mr. Post. 21 THE COURT: All right. Any other Objector 22 examination of Mr. Post? 23 All right. Mr. Morris, do you have cross? MR. MORRIS: Yes, Your Honor, I do. 24

THE COURT: Okay.

Post - Cross

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CROSS-EXAMINATION

2 | BY MR. MORRIS:

- 3 | Q Mr. Post, can you hear me okay, sir?
- 4 | A Yes, I can hear you.
- 5 | Q Okay. Nice to see you again. When did you first join
- 6 | Highland?
- 7 | A I believe it was July of '08.
- 8 Q So you've worked with the Highland family of companies for
- 9 about a dozen years now; is that right?
- 10 || A Yes.
- 11 | Q And you were actually employed by the Debtor from 2008
- 12 | until October 2020; is that right?
- 13 | A Correct.
- 14 \parallel Q And you left at that time and went to join Mr. Dondero as
- 15 | the chief compliance office of the Advisors; do I have that
- 16 | right?
- 17 | A Yes. I transitioned to NexPoint Advisors shortly, I
- 18 | believe, after Mr. Dondero left, but I was already the named
- 19 | CCO for that entity.
- 20 | Q Right, but your employment status changed from being an
- 21 || employee of the Debtor to being an employee of NexPoint; is
- 22 | that right?
- 23 | A Correct.
- 24 | Q And that happened shortly after Mr. Dondero resigned from
- 25 | the Debtor and went to NexPoint Advisors, correct?

1 Correct. Α 2 Okay. You mentioned that the funds are controlled by 3 independent boards; do I have that right? 4 It's a majority independent board, correct. 5 There's no independent board member testifying in this hearing, is there? 6 7 I --MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, Mr. Post wouldn't know 8 9 that, but I'll stipulate to that as a fact. 10 THE COURT: All right. 11 MR. MORRIS: Okay. 12 BY MR. MORRIS: 13 Did you -- do you speak with the board members from time 14 to time? 15 Yes. Did you tell them that it might be best if they came and 16 17 identified themselves and helped persuade the Court that they 18 were, in fact, independent? 19 They have counsel to assist them with that determination. 20 I never mentioned anything along those line to them. 21 Okay. Can you tell me who the board members are? 22 Ethan Powell, Bryan Ward, Dr. Bob Froehlich, John 23 Honis, and then Ed Constantino. He is only a board member,

though, for NSOF. NexPoint Strategic Opportunities Fund.

All right. Mr. Honis, is he -- has he been determined to

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- 1 | be an interested director, for purposes of the securities
- 2 | laws?
- $3 \parallel A \qquad \text{Yes.}$
- 4 | Q Okay. Mr. Froeh..., do you know much about his
- 5 | background?
- 6 | A I believe he worked at Deutsche Bank and a couple of the
- 7 | other -- or maybe a couple of other investment firms in the
- 8 | past. And he also owns a minor league baseball team.
- 9 | Q Do you know how long he served as a director of the funds?
- 10 | A I don't know, approximately. I think maybe seven -- six,
- 11 | seven years.
- 12 | Q Okay. How about Mr. Ward? Did Mr. Froehlich ever work
- 13 || for Highland?
- 14 | A Not that I can recall.
- 15 | Q Did Mr. Ward ever work for Highland?
- 16 | A Not that I can recall.
- 17 | Q Do you recall how long he's been serving as a director of
- 18 | the funds?
- 19 | A Mr. Ward?
- 20 | Q Yes.
- 21 \parallel A $\,$ I believe -- I'd be -- I don't recall specifically. I
- 22 | think it's been, you know, 10 to 12 years, give or take.
- 23 | Q He was a director when you got to Highland; isn't that
- 24 || right?
- $25 \parallel A$ He was on the board of directors.

- Q Yeah. So fair to say that Mr. Ward has been a director since at least the mid to late oughts? 2005 to 2008?
 - A I'm sorry, you cut out. Late what?
- $4 \parallel Q$ The late oughts. Withdrawn. Is it fair to say that Mr.
- 5 | Ward's been a director of the funds since somewhere between
- 6 | 2005 and 2008?

- 7 A Again, I don't recall specifically. You know, I joined
- 8 | the complex, the retail complex as the named CCO in 2015, and
- 9 | he had been serving in that role prior to that, and I believe
- 10 | it was for probably a period of five to seven years, so that
- 11 | sounds in line.
- 12 | Q Did you have a chance to review Dustin Norris's testimony
- 13 | from the December 16th hearing?
- 14 | A I did not.
- 15 | Q Do you know -- are you aware that he testified at some
- 16 | length regarding the relationship of each of these directors
- 17 | to Mr. Dondero and Highland?
- 18 | A I didn't review anything, so I don't know what he said or
- 19 | how long it took.
- 20 | Q Do you know if Mr. Powell's ever worked for Highland?
- $21 \parallel A \parallel He has.$
- 22 | Q Do you know in what capacity and during what time periods?
- 23 \parallel A He was -- I think his last title was -- I believe was
- 24 | chief product strategist, I believe. And he was also the
- 25 | named PM for one of -- or, a suite of ETF funds. I think he

- was last employed maybe --from my recollection, 2014, possibly. Or 2015. Somewhere around in there.
- Q Okay. And to the best of your knowledge, did Mr. Dondero appoint Mr. Powell to be the chief product strategist?
- 5 A I don't -- I don't know. I wasn't involved in the
 6 decision for his appointment. I don't know how he attained
 7 that role.
- 8 Q To the best of your knowledge, did Mr. Dondero appoint Mr. 9 Powell as the PM of the ETF funds?
- A Again, I wasn't involved in that determination, but he probably would have had a role in making the determination on who was the PM, along with probably some other investment professionals.
 - Q Okay. And did Mr. Powell join the board of the funds before or after he left Highland around 2015?

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- A I can't recall specifically if he was already on the board or was an interested member, but I believe he, you know, I believe he joined shortly after he left.
- Q Okay. So he went from being an employee and being a portfolio manager at Highland to being on the board of these funds. Do I have that right?
- A Again, I can't recall specifically. He may have already been on the board as an interested board member. But, you know, I believe, you know, if that wasn't the case, he would have joined the board shortly after leaving.

- Q And Mr. Ward, I think you said, has been on the funds'
 board since somewhere between 2005 and 2008. Does that sound
 right?
 - A I think that was a time frame you referenced, and I think that was kind of in line, walking it back. But I don't recall specifically when he joined.
 - Q And to the best of your knowledge, have the Advisors for which you serve as the chief compliance officer managed the Funds for which Mr. Ward has served as a director since the time he became a director?
- 11 | A I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question?
- Q Yeah. I'm just trying to understand if the advisors -withdrawn. The Advisors manage the Funds; do I have that
 right?
- 15 A They provide investment advice on behalf of the Funds.
- 16 Q And they do that pursuant to written agreements; do I have 17 that right?
- 18 | A Correct.

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- Q And is it your understanding that, for the entire time that Mr. Ward has served as a member of the board of the Funds, the Advisors have provided the investment advice to each of those Funds?
- A Yes, in one form or fashion. I believe at one period in time, historically, the Advisor may have changed its name, but it would have been, you know, at the end of the day, one or

Post - Cross

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1 more -- one of either NexPoint Advisors or Highland Capital 2 Management Fund Advisors would have advised those Funds. 3 Is it fair to say that each of the Advisors for which you 4 serve as the chief compliance officer has always been managed 5 by an Advisor owned and controlled by Mr. Dondero? 6 I believe so, yes. 7 MR. MORRIS: I have no further questions, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right. Any redirect? 9 MR. RUKAVINA: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Rukavina? MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, was I on mute? I 11 12 apologize. 13 THE COURT: Yes. REDIRECT EXAMINATION 14 15 BY MR. RUKAVINA: Mr. Post, why did you leave Highland? 16 17 It -- because I was a HCMLP employee and it was -basically, there was conflicts that were created by being an 18 19 employee of the Debtor and by also serving as the CCO to the 20 named Funds and the Advisors, and it coincided with Jim 21 toggling over from HCMLP to NexPoint. It just made sense more 22 functionally and from a silo perspective for me to be the 23 named CCO for that entity since he was no longer an employee 24 of HCMLP.

And by Jim, you mean Jim Dondero?

Post - Redirect/Recross

63 1 Yes, sorry. Jim Dondero. 2 You're not some kind of lackey for Mr. Dondero, where you 3 go wherever he goes, are you? 4 MR. MORRIS: Objection to the question. 5 THE WITNESS: No. THE COURT: Overruled. He can answer. 6 7 MR. RUKAVINA: Okay. 8 THE WITNESS: No. 9 MR. RUKAVINA: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. I'll 10 pass the witness. 11 THE COURT: Any other Objector examination? 12 All right. Any recross, Mr. Morris? 13 RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. MORRIS: 14 15 Just one question, sir. The conflicts that you just 16 mentioned, they were in existence for the one-year period 17 between the petition date and the date you left; isn't that 18 right? 19 I think -- I believe so, and I think they became more 20 evident as, you know, time progressed. 21 Okay. But they existed on day one of the bankruptcy 22 proceeding; isn't that right? 23 Yes, I believe so.

MR. MORRIS: No further questions, Your Honor.

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All right.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Post. You're excused from the virtual witness stand.

(The witness is excused.)

THE COURT: All right. Your next witness?

MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, my exhibit has been admitted, I promised I'd be short, and my evidentiary presentation is done. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Taylor, your evidence?

MR. TAYLOR: First of all, given the testimony that we have received just recently, we have released Mr. Sevilla from his subpoena and are not going to call him.

With that being said, we do have some documents that we would like to get into evidence. We filed our witness and exhibit list at Docket No. 1874. I don't believe any of these are controversial. I'm trying to keep from duplicating those that are already into evidence by the Debtor. And therefore I would like to offer into evidence Exhibits No. 6 through 12 and 17. And that is it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Is there any objection to Dondero Exhibits 6 through 12 and 17, appearing at Docket 1874?

MR. MORRIS: I just want to be clear that Exhibits 6 and 7, which are letters, I believe, from Mr. Lee (phonetic) are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted in either letter.

MR. TAYLOR: That is correct, Your Honor. Just merely that those requests and the words that were stated in there were indeed sent on those dates.

MR. MORRIS: And the same comment, Your Honor, with respect to Exhibits 9 through 12, that those documents are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted.

MR. TAYLOR: Again, just that those requests were sent and those responses as stated were sent.

And I apologize. I missed one, Your Honor. Also No. 15. 6 through 12, 15, and 17.

MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, the Debtor has no objection to Exhibits 15, 16, and 17.

THE COURT: All right. So, so they are all admitted with the representation that 6 and 9 through 12 are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. With that representation, you have no objection, Mr. Morris?

MR. MORRIS: That's right. I do just want to get confirmation that Exhibits 1 through 5 and 13 through 16 -- 13 and 14 are not being offered at all.

THE COURT: Mr. Taylor?

MR. TAYLOR: So, that -- that is correct. 1 through 5 would be duplicative of what has already been introduced into the record by Mr. Morris, so I am not offering those.

And do not believe that 13 and 14 are relevant anymore, and so therefore did not offer those.

1 THE COURT: Okay. So, with that, I have admitted 6 2 through 12, 15, 16, and 17 at Docket Entry 1874. 3 (Dondero Exhibits 6 through 12 and 15 through 17 are 4 received into evidence.) 5 THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Taylor? MR. TAYLOR: No, Your Honor. We are not calling any 6 7 witnesses. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Draper, what about you? 8 9 Any evidence? 10 MR. DRAPER: No evidence or witnesses. The evidence 11 that's been introduced by Mr. Taylor and Mr. Rukavina are 12 sufficient for me. 13 THE COURT: All right. Ms. Drawhorn, anything from 14 vou? MS. DRAWHORN: No additional evidence, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: All right. Well, then, Mr. Morris, did 16 17 you have anything in rebuttal? 18 MR. MORRIS: No, Your Honor. I think we can proceed 19 to closing statements. I would just appreciate confirmation 20 by the Objecting Parties that they rest. 21 THE COURT: All right. Well, I guess we'll get that 22 clear if it is isn't clear. All of the Objectors rest. 23 Confirm, yes, Mr. Rukavina? 24 MR. RUKAVINA: Confirm. 25 THE COURT: And Mr. Taylor?

MR. TAYLOR: Confirmed, Your Honor. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. And Draper and Drawhorn? 3 MR. DRAPER: Yes, Your Honor. 4 MS. DRAWHORN: Confirmed, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: All right. By the way, I assume Mr. 6 Dondero has been participating this morning. I didn't 7 actually get that clarification before we started. Mr. 8 Taylor, is he there with you this morning? 9 MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, he is. He has been participating. He is sitting directly to my left about 10 11 slightly more than six feet apart. 12 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Good. 13 All right. Well, let's talk about our closing arguments 14 and let me figure out, do we have -- should we break a bit 15 before starting? I have an idea in my brain about a time 16 limitation, but before I do that, let me ask. Mr. Morris, 17 first I'll ask you. How much time do you think you need for a 18 closing argument? 19 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, --20 MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor? 21 MR. MORRIS: -- I'll defer to Mr. Pomerantz, who's 22 going to deliver that portion of our presentation today. 23 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Pomerantz? 24 MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, I will be making -- yes, 25 Your Honor. I will be making the majority portion of the

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argument. Mr. Kharasch will be making the portion of the argument dealing with the Advisor and Funds' objection. But I expect my closing to be quite lengthy, given the 1129 requirements, all the legal issues, which I plan to spend a fair amount of time. So I would anticipate a range of an hour and 45 minutes. THE COURT: An hour and 45 minutes? All right. Well, --MR. POMERANTZ: Correct. THE COURT: I'm getting an echo. MR. CLEMENTE: Your Honor, it's Matt Clemente on behalf on the Committee. I'll have 15 minutes or less, Your Just some things I would like to touch on. Honor. THE COURT: All right. So, two hours. If I were to MR. POMERANTZ: And then you need, Your Honor, to add Mr. Kharasch. I think he's on. He can indicate how long his part of the closing will be. THE COURT: Mr. Kharasch? MR. KHARASCH: Yes. I would figure my argument would probably be about 20 minutes to 30 minutes. THE COURT: Okay. MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, let me interject something that I think will help everyone out. With the CLOs having

consented through their counsel to the assumption, the bulk of

my objection is now moot. We no longer can and will argue that the contracts are unassignable under 365(b) or (c) because we do have now their consent. So that will hopefully help the Debtor on that issue.

MR. KHARASCH: Your Honor, Ira Kharasch again. I was not anticipating that. I believe that that will take away the bulk of my argument. I'm still going to be dealing with some of the other non-assumption-type arguments raised by the CLO Objectors, kind of dovetailing with Mr. Pomerantz's arguments on the injunction. But that will greatly reduce, Your Honor, my argument.

THE COURT: All right. So if I say two hours of argument for the Debtor and Creditors' Committee, Rukavina, Taylor and Draper and Drawhorn, can you collectively manage to share that two hours? Have a two-hour argument in the aggregate? That seems fair to me.

MR. RUKAVINA: Your Honor, I think -- I think that's fine, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And I quess I'll --

MR. TAYLOR: This is Mr. Taylor. And yes, I agree.

THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Draper?

MR. DRAPER: This is Douglas Draper. I agree. I agree also, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And I'm going to ask --

MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, I --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, we -- I think we may need like two hours and ten minutes, because mine was 1:45, Mr. Clemente was 15, and then Mr. Kharasch. But we'll be around that. And I tend to speak fast, so I might even shorten mine.

THE COURT: Okay. You negotiated me up to two hours and ten minutes, Debtors/Objectors, each.

I'm going to ask one more time. The U.S. Trustee lobbed a written objection, but we've not heard anything from the U.S. Trustee. Are you out there wanting to make an oral argument?

MS. LAMBERT: Yes, Your Honor. The United States
Trustee is on the line. And we've been listening to the
hearing. I can turn my video on. I think you're --

THE COURT: Yes. I can hear you. I can't see you.

MS. LAMBERT: Okay. All right. And so the U.S. Trustee feels that the issues about the releases have been adequately joined and raised by the other parties and that it's an issue of law. The U.S. Trustee does not feel that we can add to that dialogue by, you know, wasting more of the Court's time. I think it's been adequately briefed and it's been adequately argued here today.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LAMBERT: And we do have an agreement to include governmental release language in the order. I understand that agreement is still being honored. That's a separate agreement

than the issue of whether the releases are precluded. But we're going to let the other people carry the water on that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POMERANTZ: Yeah. And that is correct. That is correct, Your Honor. They asked for some information -- a provision on government releases. They also asked for a provision regarding joint and several liability for Trustee fees.

As I mentioned previously, the IRS has asked for a provision in the confirmation order, as have the Texas Taxing Authorities.

We have not uploaded a proposed confirmation order, but I will state right now on the record that, before we do so, we will, of course, give Ms. Lambert, Mr. Adams, and the Texas Taxing Authorities the opportunity to review. We expect there won't be any issue because the language has already been agreed to.

THE COURT: All right. Well, how about this. It's 11:23 Central time. Let's break until 12:00 noon Central time, okay, so that gives everyone a little over 30 minutes to have a snack and get their notes together, and we'll start with closing arguments at 12:00 noon. All right? So we're in recess until then.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(A recess ensued from 11:24 a.m. until 12:05 p.m.)

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THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. All right.
This is Judge Jernigan. We are back on the record in
Highland. Let me make sure we have the people we need. Do we
have the Pachulski team there? Mr. Pomerantz, Mr. Kharasch?
         MR. POMERANTZ: Yes, you do, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: All right. For our Objectors, Mr.
Taylor, are you there?
         MR. TAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor, I am.
         THE COURT: All right. I see Mr. Draper there on the
video.
       You're there.
         MR. DRAPER: I'm here. Can you hear me?
         THE COURT: I can hear you loud and clear, yes.
         MR. DRAPER: Great, because I didn't -- I'm not
hearing, something so I apologize.
         THE COURT: All right. So we have Mr. Rukavina, and
I think I see Mr. Hogewood there as well. Is that correct?
You're ready to go forward?
         MR. RUKAVINA: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: All right.
         MR. RUKAVINA: Yes, Your Honor. Good afternoon.
         THE COURT: All right. And Ms. Drawhorn, you're
there?
         MS. DRAWHORN: Yes, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Okay. Committee. Mr. Clemente, are you
there?
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MR. CLEMENTE: Yes, Your Honor. I'm here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good. All right. So, let me reiterate. We've given two-hour and 10-minute time limitations for the Debtor, and that'll be both any time you reserve for rebuttal and your closing, initial closing argument. Mr. Clemente, you're going to be in that time frame as well. Okay?

MR. CLEMENTE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And so, as supporters of the plan.

And then, of course, the Objectors, they have collectively two hours and ten minutes.

A couple of things. I'm going to have my law clerk, Nate, who you can't see but he's to my right, he's going to keep time. I promise I won't be a jerk and cut anyone off midsentence, but please don't push the limit if I say, you know, "Time."

The other thing I will tell you is I'll probably have some questions here or there. And I've told Nate, cut off the timer if we're in a question-answer session. I won't count that as part of the two hours and ten minutes.

All right. So, with that, Mr. Pomerantz, you may begin.

CLOSING STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE DEBTOR

MR. POMERANTZ: Thank you, Your Honor. As Your Honor is aware, the Debtor has been able to resolve all objections

to confirmation other than the objection by Mr. Dondero or his entities and the United States Trustee.

Your Honor, I have a very lengthy closing argument, given the number of issues that are raised in the objections, and I want to make a complete record, since I understand that there's a good likelihood that (garbled) appeal.

With that in mind, Your Honor, I'm prepared to go through each and every confirmation requirement in Section 1129.

However, as an alternative, I might propose that I can go through each of the Section 1129 requirements that are the subject of pending objections or otherwise depend upon evidence that Your Honor has heard.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POMERANTZ: And of course, I'll be happy to answer any questions that you have in the process.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POMERANTZ: And after my closing argument, I will turn it over to Mr. Kharasch to address the Advisor and Funds' objections.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POMERANTZ: Before I walk the Court through the confirmation requirements, I did want to note for the Court, as I did previously, that we filed an updated ballot summary at Docket No. 1887. And as reflected in the summary, Classes 2 and 7 have voted to accept the plan with the respective

numerosity and amounts required. In fact, the votes are a hundred percent.

Class 8, however, has voted to reject the plan. Seventeen creditors in Class 8 voted yes and 24 objectors, which are, I think, all but one the employees with one-dollar claims for voting purposes, voted against.

In dollar amount, Class 8 has accepted the plan by 99.8 percent of the claims. And I will address the issues of the cram-down over that class a little bit later on.

Lastly, during the course of my presentation, I will identify for the Court certain modifications we have made to address the objections that were filed on January 22nd and then also on February 1st. And at the end of my presentation, I will raise a couple of other modifications that I won't get to during my presentation and will explain to the Court why all the modifications do not require resolicitation and are otherwise appropriate under Section 1127.

Your Honor, as Your Honor is aware, Section 1129 requires the Debtors to demonstrate to the court that the plan satisfies a number of statutory requirements. 1129(a)(1) provides that the plan requires — complies with all statutory provisions of Title 11, and courts interpreted this provision as requiring the debtor to demonstrate it complies with Section 1122 and 1123.

With respect to classification, Your Honor, there has been

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one objection that was raised to essentially a classification, and that was raised by Mr. Dondero to Article 3C of the plan on the grounds that it purports to eliminate a class that did not have any claims in it as of the effective date but which may later have a claim in that class.

I think he was primarily concerned about Class 9 subordinated claims. But Mr. Dondero misunderstands the provision. It only eliminates a claim for voting purposes, and if there's later a claim in that class, it will be treated as the plan provides the treatment.

In any event, Class 9, as we know now, will be populated by the HarbourVest claims, as well as the UBS claims and the Patrick Daugherty claims, if the Court approves the settlement approving those claims.

Next, Your Honor, Section 1123(a) contains seven mandatory requirements that a plan must include. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of 1123(a) apply to the classification of claims and where they're impaired and treatment. The plan does that.

There has been an objection to 1123(a)(3) raised by several parties with respect to the classification and treatment of subordinated claims. The concerns stem from the mistaken belief that the Debtor reserved the right to subordinate claims without providing parties with notice and without obtaining a court order.

The Debtor never intended to have unilateral ability to

subordinate claims without affording parties due process rights, and we've added some clarificatory language to so provide.

We made changes to the plan on January 22nd, and then on February 1st, and the plan addresses all those issues in Article 3(j) and it talks about when a claim is going to be subordinated as a non-creditor. We've also redefined the definition of subordinated claims to make clear that a claim is only subordinated upon entry of an order subordinating that claim.

Mr. Dondero also objected on the grounds that the plan did not contain a deadline pursuant to which the Debtor would be required to seek any subordination, and we have revised Article 7(b) of the plan to provide that any request to subordinate a claim would have to be made on or before the claim objection deadline, which is 180 days after the effective date.

Lastly, certain former employees, Mr. Yang and Borud, objection also joined by Mr. Deadman, Travers, and Kauffman, objected to the inclusion of language in the definition of "Subordinated Claims" that a claims arising from a Class A, B, or C limited partnership is deemed automatically subordinated. The concerns were that the language could broadly apply to any potential claims by a former partner, and could be also read to encompass claims outside the statutory scope of 510(b) or

otherwise relating to limited partnership interests.

While the Debtor does reserve the right to seek to subordinate the claims on any basis, we have modified the plan to address that concern and to address the concern that we're not attempting to create any new causes of action for subordination that don't otherwise exist under applicable law, but it just preserves the parties' rights with respect to subordination and deals with that at a later date.

Next, Your Honor, Section 1123(a)(5). I skipped over 1123(a)(4) because there are no objections to that provision.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POMERANTZ: Section 1123(a)(5), a plan must provide for adequate means of implementation. And the plan provides a detailed structure and blueprint how the Debtor's operations will continue, how the assets will be monetized, including the establishment of the Claimant Trust, establishment of the Litigation Sub-Trust, the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust Oversight Board. And the documents precisely describing how this will occur were filed as part of the various plan supplements.

1123(a)(7), Your Honor, requires that the plan only contain provisions that are consistent with the interest of equity holders and creditors with respect to the manner, selection, and -- of any director, officer, or trustee under the plan. And as discussed in the plan, at the disclosure

statement, and as testified to by Mr. Seery, the Committee and the Debtor had arm's-length negotiations regarding the post-effective date corporate governance and believe that the selection of the claimant Trustee, the Litigation Sub-Trustee, and the Claimant Trust Oversight Board are in the best interest of stakeholders.

HCMFA has raised a particular objection, I think, to these issues, but I will address it in the context of the requirement under Section 1129(a)(5).

Your Honor, Section 1129(a)(2) requires that the plan comply with the disclosure and solicitation requirements under the plan. Section 1125 requires that the Debtor only solicit with a court-approved disclosure statement. The Court approved the disclosure statement on November 23rd, and pursuant to the proofs of service on file, the plan and disclosure statement were mailed, along with solicitation materials that the court approved.

Now, there has been an objection raised by Dugaboy, and also alluded to by Mr. Taylor in some of his comments before, that the plan does violate 1129(a)(2) because the Debtor's disclosure statement was deficient.

In support of that argument, Dugaboy points to the reduction in the anticipated distribution to creditors from the November plan analysis to the January plan analysis, and argues that that reduction requires resolicitation. However,

those arguments are not well-taken.

First, none of the people making these objections were solicited for their vote on the plan, or if they had been, they didn't vote or decided to reject the plan. And to the extent that Class 8 creditors, the distribution has gone down — that's the class that Mr. Taylor and Mr. Draper are concerned about — you don't hear the Committee, Acis, Redeemer, UBS, HarbourVest, Daugherty, or the Senior Employees making their argument, this argument, and they represent over 99 percent of the claims in that class. And in fact, of the 17 Class 8 creditors that have accepted the plan, 15 are represented by the parties I just mentioned.

So who are the two creditors that they're so concerned about? One is Contrarian, which is a claims trader that actually elected to be treated in Class 7, and one is one of the employees who voted to accept the plan.

Second, Your Honor, the argument conflates the difference between adverse change to the treatment of a claim or interest that would require a resolicitation under Section 1127 and a change to the distribution that would not.

More importantly, Your Honor, the argument is specious.

As Mr. Seery testified yesterday, the material differences
between the analysis contained on November and late January
and the one we filed on February 1st were based on three types
of changes: an update regarding the increased value of assets

based upon events that had transpired during this period, which included an increase in asset value, no recoveries, and revenues expected to be generated by the CLO management agreements; an update to the expected costs of the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust as a result of the continued evaluation of staffing needs, operational expenses, and professional fees; and an update to reflect resolution of the HarbourVest and UBS claims.

In the filing Monday, Your Honor, we updated the plan projection, a liquidation analysis which revised the unsecured claims based upon the UBS settlement that I was able to disclose to Your Honor. And in the filing, the distribution now revised to Class 8 creditors is now 71 percent, compared to the 87 percent that was in the disclosure statement that went out for solicitation.

Your Honor, there can be no serious argument that the creditors in this case were not fully aware of the potential for the UBS and HarbourVest creditors receiving claims. Your Honor's UBS 3018 order granting its claim for voting purposes was entered right around the time that the disclosure statement was approved. And, in fact, a last-minute addition to the disclosure statement disclosed the 3018 amount, although the amount did not make it to the attachment to the disclosure statement. And that reference, Your Honor, to the UBS claim being allowed for voting purposes can be found at

Page 41 of Docket No. 1473.

And the HarbourVest settlement was filed on about December 23, two weeks before the voting deadline, sufficient time for people to take that into consideration.

And as Your Honor surely knows, the hearings in this case have been very well-attended by the major parties, and I believe that if we went back and looked at the records of who was on the WebEx system during the HarbourVest and UBS hearings, you would find that representatives of basically every creditor, every major creditor in this case in Class 8 participated.

Moreover, Your Honor, creditors were not guaranteed any percentage recovery under the plan and disclosure statement, which clearly identified the size of the claims pool as a material risk.

Article 4(a)(7) of the disclosure statement, which is at Docket 1473, is entitled "Claims Estimation" and warns creditors that there can be no assurances that the Debtor's claims estimates will prove correct, and that the actual amount of the allowed claims may vary materially.

And if Dugaboy is arguing it was misled as the holder of a disputed administrative claim and general unsecured claim, that argument is simply preposterous.

Dugaboy cites several cases for the proposition that deficient disclosure may warrant resolicitation, and the

Debtor agrees with the proposition as a general matter. But if one looks at the cases that were filed -- that Dugaboy cited to, it will see that they are clearly inapposite and distinguishable.

In re Michaelson, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California, revoked confirmation because the debtor failed to disclose in the disclosure statement a mail fraud indictment of the turnaround specialist who was to lead the reorganization effort and a prior Chapter 7 company he drove into the ground.

In In re Brothy, the Ninth Circuit BAP affirmed a decision of the Bankruptcy Court that the individual debtor's decision to modify its financial projections on the eve of confirmation did not require a resolicitation. And there, the financial projections were off by 75 percent.

And in Renegade Holdings, the Bankruptcy Court granted a motion by a group of states to revoke confirmation by the debtors, who manufactured and distributed tobacco products, because the debtors failed to disclose in its disclosure statement that the debtor and its principals were under criminal investigation for unlawful trafficking in cigarettes, which was not disclosed to creditors.

Your Honor, none of these cases are remotely analogous to this case, and they certainly do not stand for the proposition that the Debtor was required to resolicit.

Next, Your Honor, the next requirement is 1129(a)(3), which requires that any plan be proposed in good faith. As Mr. Seery testified at length, and the Court has personal knowledge of, having presided over this case for a year, the plan is the result of substantial arm's-length negotiations with the Committee over a period of several months.

Mr. Seery testified yesterday that, soon after the board was appointed, the Committee wanted to immediately pursue down the path of an asset monetization plan. However, as Mr. Seery testified, the board decided that it was inappropriate to rush to judgment and that it should consider all potential restructuring alternatives for the Debtor. And Mr. Seery testified what those alternatives were: a traditional restructuring and continuation of the Debtor's business; a potential sale of the Debtor's assets in one or more transactions; an asset monetization plan like the one before the Court today; and, last but not least, a grand bargain plan that would involve Mr. Dondero sponsoring the plan with a substantial equity infusion.

As Mr. Seery testified, by the early summer of 2020, the Debtor decided that it was appropriate to start moving down the path of an asset monetization plan while it continued to work on the grand bargain plan. Accordingly, Mr. Seery testified that the Debtor commenced good-faith negotiations with the Committee regarding the asset monetization plan, and

that those negotiations took several months, were hard-fought and at arm's-length, and involved substantial analysis of the appropriate post-confirmation corporate structure, governance, operational, regulatory, and tax issues. And on August 12th, Your Honor, the plan was filed with the Court.

And although the Debtor at that time had not reached an agreement with the Committee on some of the most significant issues, Mr. Seery testified that the independent board believed that it was important to file that plan at that time, a proverbial stake in the ground to act as a catalyst for reaching a consensual plan with the Committee or others, which it has done.

As Mr. Seery testified, he continued to work with Mr. Dondero to try to achieve a grand bargain plan, while at the same time proceeding down the path of the filed plan.

He testified that the parties participated in mediation at the end of August and early September to try to reach an agreement on a grand bargain plan, but were unsuccessful. And the Debtor proceeded on the path of the August 12th plan and sought approval of its disclosure statement on August 27th, 2020.

Mr. Seery testified that, at that time, the Debtor still had not reached an agreement with the Committee on certain significant issues involving post-confirmation governance and the scope of releases. And as a result, after a contested

hearing, Your Honor, Your Honor did not approve the disclosure statement on October 27th, but asked us to go back again to try to work out the issues, and we came back on November 23rd.

Mr. Seery testified that the Debtor continued to negotiate with the Committee to resolve the material disputes leading -- which led up to the November 23rd hearing, where we came in with the support of the Committee. But as Mr. Seery has also testified, he has continued to try to reach a consensus on a global plan, notwithstanding the approval of the disclosure statement. And he spent personally several hundred hours since his appointment trying to build consensus.

As part of this process, Mr. Seery testified that Mr. Dondero received access to substantial information regarding the Debtor's assets and liabilities, most recently in connection with a series of informal document requests which were made at the end of December.

And after the Court asked the parties to again reengage in efforts to try to reach a global hearing after the Debtor's preliminary injunction motion, Mr. Seery testified that he and the board participated in calls with Mr. Dondero and his advisors and the Committee to see if common ground could be attained.

Unfortunately, as Mr. Seery testified, the Committee and Mr. Dondero were not able to reach an agreement.

Accordingly, Your Honor, the testimony unequivocally and

overwhelmingly demonstrates that the plan was proposed in good faith.

I expect the Objectors may argue in closing that they have filed a plan under seal that is a better alternative than that being proposed by the plan that the Debtor seeks to confirm. Your Honor, as a threshold matter, yesterday I said any mention of the specifics of the recent plan would be inappropriate. We are not here today to debate the merits of Mr. Dondero's plan, which the Court permitted him to file under seal. He had ample opportunity to file this plan after exclusivity was terminated, seek approval of a disclosure statement, and, if approved, solicit votes in connection with a confirmation hearing, but he failed to do so.

What matters today, Your Honor, is whether the Debtor's plan, the plan that has been accepted by 99.8 percent of the amount of creditors, and opposed only by Mr. Dondero, his related entities, and certain employees, meets the confirmation requirements of Section 1129, which we most certainly argue it does.

And perhaps most importantly, Your Honor, the Court remarked at the last hearing that, without the Committee's support for a competing plan, Mr. Dondero's plan would be dead on arrival. And as you have heard from Mr. Clemente, Mr. Dondero does not yet have the Committee's support.

Next, Your Honor, is Section 1129(a)(5). That requires

that the plan disclose the identity of any director, affiliate, officer, or insider of the debtor, and such appointment be consistent with the best interest of creditors and equity holders. Courts have held that this section requires the disclosure of the post-confirmation governance of the reorganized entity.

HCMFA objects to the plan, arguing that it did not comply with Section 1129(a)(5) because it didn't disclose the people who would control and manage the Reorganized Debtor and who might be a sub-servicer. HCMFA's objection is off-base.

Under the plan, Mr. Seery will be the claimant Trustee and Marc Kirschner will be the Litigation Trustee. Mr. Seery testified extensively about his background, and he has appeared before the Court many times and the Court is familiar with him. We have also introduced his C.V. into evidence.

As he testified, he will be paid \$150,000 per month, subject to further negotiations with the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee regarding the monthly amount and any success fee and severance fee, which negotiation is expected to be completed within the 45 days following the effective date.

Mr. Seery also testified regarding the names of the members of the Claimant Trust Oversight Committee, which information was also contained in the plan supplement and it generally includes the four members of the Committee and David

Pauker, a restructuring professional with decades of restructuring experience.

The members of the Oversight Committee will serve without compensation, except for Mr. Pauker, who Mr. Seery testified will receive \$250,000 in the first year and \$150,000 for subsequent years.

As set forth in the Claimant Trust agreement, if at any time there is a vacant seat to be filled by another independent member, their compensation will be negotiated by and between the Claimant Trust Oversight Board and them.

Mr. Seery has also testified that he believed the Claimant Trust will have sufficient personnel to manage its business. Specifically, he has testified that he intends to employ approximately ten of the Debtor's employees, who will be sufficient to enable him to continue to operate the Debtor's business, including as an advisor to the managed funds and the CLOs, until the Claimant Trust is able to effectively and efficiently monetize its assets for fair value, whether that takes two years or whether that takes 18 months or whether that takes longer.

Mr. Seery further testified that he believes that the operations can be best conducted by the Debtor's employees.

And while he did consider the retention of a sub-servicer, he ultimately decided, in consultation with the Committee, that the monetization would be a lot more effective if done with a

subset of the Debtor's current employees.

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The proposed corporate governance is also consistent with the interests of the Debtor and its stakeholders. The Court is very familiar with Mr. Seery and the Debtor, and I believe that Mr. Clemente, when he comments, will say the Committee can think of no better person to continue managing the Claimant Trust than Mr. Seery.

Mr. Kirschner is also well qualified to be the Litigation Trustee. His C.V. is part of the evidence that's been admitted and contains additional information regarding his background. And he will receive \$40,000 a month for the first three months and \$20,000 a month thereafter, plus a to-benequeiated success fee.

There just simply can be no challenge to Mr. Seery's or Mr. Kirschner's qualifications or abilities to act in a manner contemplated by the plan or that their involvement is not in the best interest of the estate and its creditors.

Your Honor, the next requirement that is objected to is Section 1129(a)(7). That, of course, requires the Debtor to demonstrate that creditors will receive not less under the plan than they would receive if the Debtor was to be liquidated in Chapter 7. And on February 1st, Your Honor, we filed our updated liquidation analysis, which contains the latest-and-greatest evidence to support that.

These documents, the updated documents, in connection with

the prior analysis, was provided to objecting parties in advance of the January 29th deposition, and Your Honor has heard the differences between the January 29th and the February 1st documents being very minimal.

The Court heard extensive evidence and testimony from Mr. Seery regarding the assumptions that went into the preparation of the liquidation analysis and the differences of what creditors are projected to receive under the plan as compared to what they are projected to receive in a Chapter 7.

Such testimony also included a comparison between the liquidation analysis that was filed with the plan in November, the updated liquidation analysis filed on the -- or, provided to parties on January 28th, and the last version, filed on February 1st.

Mr. Seery testified that, on the revenue side, the liquidation analysis was updated to include the HCLOF interest, which was required as part of the settlement with HarbourVest; the increase in value of certain assets, including Trussway; revenue expected to be generated from continued management of the CLOs; and increased recovery on notes as a result of the acceleration of certain related notes.

On the expense side, Mr. Seery testified regarding his best estimate of the likely expenses to be incurred by a Chapter 7 trustee -- by the Claimant Trust, including

personnel costs; professional costs, which increase because of the litigious nature this case has become; and operating expenses.

And lastly, on the claim side, Your Honor, Mr. Seery testified that the claims numbers have been updated to include the settlement from HarbourVest and initially the amount approved to UBS pursuant to the 3018 order and then the reduction at \$50 million based upon the settlement announced. And like the prior liquidation analysis, the current analysis demonstrates that creditors will fare substantially better under in Chapter -- under the plan than in Chapter 7. In fact, the projected recovery under the plan is 85 percent for Class 7 creditors and 71.32 percent for Class 8 creditors, as compared to 54.96 percent for all unsecured creditors in a Chapter 7.

Mr. Seery also testified that expenses are expected to be more under Chapter 11 than under Chapter 7, but he also testified that the tens of millions of dollars in greater revenue and asset recoveries under the plan will more than offset the additional expenses.

As a result, the Court has more than sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that the Debtor has carried its burden to prove that it meets the best interest of creditors best.

But Mr. Dondero's counsel spent a lot of time crossing --

cross-examining Mr. Seery, in a vain attempt to demonstrate to the Court that a Chapter 7 actually would be much better for creditors. And this argument has also been made by Dugaboy and the Advisors and the Funds.

Before I address these arguments on its merits, Your
Honor, I just wanted to remind the Court of the Objectors -these Objectors' interest in this case. Mr. Dondero owns no
equity in the Debtor. He owns a general partner. Strand, in
turn, owns a quarter-percent -- a quarter of one percent of
the total equity in the Debtor. And Mr. Dondero's claim, it's
only a claim for indemnification. Dugaboy asserts two claims:
a frivolous administrative claim relating to the postpetition
management of a Multi-Strat, which, as an administrative
claim, if it's valid, would not even be affected by the best
interest of creditors test, because it would have to be paid
in full. And he also asserts a claim that the Debtor's
subsidiary -- against the Debtor's subsidiary for which it
tries to pierce the corporate veil.

Just think about it. Dugaboy, Mr. Dondero's entity, is arguing that he should be able to pierce the corporate veil to get at the entity that was his before the bankruptcy.

Dugaboy's only other interest in this case relates to a -- a one -- point eighteen and several-hundredths percent of the equity interest of the Debtor, and that is out of the money.

And as I mentioned previously, Your Honor, Mr. Rukavina's

clients either didn't file any general unsecured claims or filed them and withdrew them. Their only claim is a disputed administrative claim against the Debtor that was filed a week ago and which, at the appropriate time, the Debtor will demonstrate is without merit.

And I understand that, just today, NexPoint Advisors also filed administrative claim.

So I'm not going to argue to Your Honor that these parties do not have standing, although their standing is tenuous, at best, to assert this argument. The Court should keep their relative interests in mind when evaluating the merits and the good faith of this objection.

The principal objection, as I said, is that creditors will do better in a Chapter 7. Essentially, they argue that a Chapter 7 trustee can liquidate the assets just as well as Mr. Seery can and not require the cost structure that is included in the Debtor's plan projections. Yes, they argue that a Chapter 7 will be more efficient.

Mr. Seery's testimony, the only testimony on the topic, however, establishes that this preposterous proposition has no basis in reality. Mr. Seery testified that a Chapter 7 trustee's mandate would be to reduce Debtor's assets as fast as possible, while he will monetize assets as and when appropriate to maximize the value.

But even if you can assume that the Chapter 7 trustee

could get court authority in a Chapter 7 to operate, there are several reasons Mr. Seery testified why a liquidation by a Chapter 7 trustee would be far worse than the plan.

First, Your Honor, no matter how competent the Chapter 7 trustee is -- and Mr. Seery did not say he is more competent than anyone else out there -- the lack of a learning curve that Mr. Seery established through the 13 months in this case puts Mr. Seery at such a major advantage compared to a Chapter 7 trustee.

Second, Mr. Seery questioned whether the Chapter 7 trustee would be able to retain the Debtor's existing professionals, even assuming they were willing to be retained. I'm not sure what's the Court's practice or the practice in the Northern District, but in many districts around the country debtor's counsel and professionals cannot be retained by Chapter 7 trustee, as general counsel, at least.

And I could just imagine, Your Honor, Mr. Dondero's position if the Chapter 7 trustee actually sought to hire Pachulski Stang and DSI.

Third, Your Honor, regardless of whether the Chapter 7 trustee obtained some operating authority, the market perception will be that a Chapter 7 trustee will sell assets for less value than would Mr. Seery as claimant Trustee. Mr. Seery testified to that.

The argument that the Objectors make that a Chapter 7

process, whereby the trustee would seek court approval of assets, is better for value than a process overseen by the Claimant Trust Board lacks any evidentiary basis and also is contradicted by Mr. Seery's testimony.

In fact, Mr. Seery testified that the Chapter 7 process, the public process of it, would very likely result in less recovery than a sale conducted in the Claimant Trust.

And lastly, Mr. Seery testified that it's unlikely that the ten or so valuable employees who Mr. Seery is planning to heavily rely on to assist him with post-confirmation would agree to a work for Chapter 7 trustee. Your Honor is all too familiar with the fights in the Acis case and Chapter 7 trustee, and it's just hard to believe that any of the Highland employees would go work for the Chapter 7 trustee.

So why is Mr. Dugaboy -- why is Dugaboy and Mr. Dondero actually making this objection and advocating for a Chapter 7? It's because they would expect to buy the Debtor's assets on the cheap from a Chapter 7 trustee, exactly what they've been trying to do in this case.

Your Honor, moving right now to Section 1129(a)(11), that requires the debtor to demonstrate that the plan is feasible. In other words, it's not likely to be followed by a further liquidation or restructuring. Under the Fifth Circuit law, the debtor need only demonstrate that the plan will have a reasonable probability of success to satisfy the feasibility

requirement, and the Debtor has easily met this standard.

As Mr. Seery testified, the Debtor's plan contemplates continued operations through which time the assets will be monetized for the benefit of creditors. The plan contemplates that Class 7 creditors will be paid off shortly after the effective date. Class 8 creditors are not guaranteed any recovery but will receive pro rata distributions over a period of time. Class 2, Frontier secured claim, will be paid off over time, and the projections demonstrate that it will -- the Debtor will have money to do so.

Mr. Seery testified at length regarding the assumptions that went into the preparation of the projections most recently filed on February 1, and based on that testimony, the Debtor has clearly demonstrated that the plan is feasible.

Your Honor, I think that brings us to Section 1129(b). On course, again, Your Honor, if Your Honor has any other questions with the sections I'm skipping over. I believe we've adequately covered them in the briefs and I don't think there's any objection.

But as I mentioned before, we have three classes that have voted to reject the plan. Class 8 is the general unsecured claims. They voted to reject the plan. Yes. Even though, based upon the ballot summary, 99 percent of the amount of claims in that class voted to accept the plan, approximately 24 employees voted to reject the plan. And accordingly, the

Debtor cannot satisfy the numerosity requirement of Section $1126\,(c)$.

I do want to briefly recount for Your Honor Mr. Seery's testimony regarding the nature of the claims of the 24 employees who voted to reject the plan. And I'm not doing this to argue that the votes from these contingent creditors are not valid or that the Debtor doesn't need to satisfy the cram-down requirements. The Debtor understands it needs to demonstrate to the Court that Section 1129(b) is satisfied for the Court to confirm the plan.

Rather, why I do this, Your Honor, is to provide the Court with context about the nature and extent of the creditors in this class as the Court determines whether the plan is, in fact, fair and equitable and can be crammed down to a dissenting vote.

Mr. Seery testified that these employees originally had claims under the annual bonus plan and the deferred compensation plan. And as he testified, in order for claims under each of those plans to vest -- I think he referred to them as be-in-the-seat plans -- the employee was required to remain employed as of that date.

Mr. Seery testified that the Debtor terminated the annual bonus plan in the middle of January and replaced it with the key employee retention plan that the Court previously approved.

Accordingly, Mr. Seery testified that no employee who voted to reject the plan anymore has a claim on the annual bonus plan. He also testified that, with respect to the deferred compensation plan, people have contingent claims under that plan and that no payments are due until May 20 -- 2021.

As Mr. Seery testified, if the employees who would be entitled to receive payments under the deferred compensation plan do not agree to enter into a separation agreement that was approved by the Court, they will be terminated before May and there will no -- not longer be any deferred compensation due.

Accordingly, while the 24 employees who voted to reject the plan do technically have claims at this time they have voted, Mr. Seery testified the claims will go away soon.

I do want to point out something that's obviously painfully obvious at this point, that while Class 8 voted to reject the plan, the Committee, the statutory fiduciary for all unsecured creditors, supports the plan enthusiastically and I believe it does so unanimously.

The other classes to reject the plan, Your Honor, are Class 11, the A limited partnerships, and none of the holders in Class B and C limited partnerships voted on the plan, so cram-down is required over those classes as well. So Your Honor is able to confirm the plan pursuant to the cram-down

procedures under 1129(b) if the Court determines that the plan is fair and equitable and does not discriminate unfairly against the rejecting classes.

Let's first turn to the fair and equitable requirement. A plan is fair and equitable if it follows the absolute priority rule, meaning that if a class does not receive payment in full, no junior class will receive anything under the plan. With respect to Class 8, no junior class -- junior class to Class 8 will receive payment, and here is the key point, unless Class 8 is paid in full, with appropriate interest.

NPA and Dugaboy -- Dugaboy in a brief filed on Monday -- argue that the plan does not satisfy the absolute priority rule because Class 10 and Class Equity Interests have a contingent right to receive property under the plan.

Your Honor, this argument misunderstands the absolute priority rule. Class 10 and Class Creditors will only receive payment after distribution to 8 and 9, the unsecured claims and the subordinated claims, are all paid in full, plus interest.

And, in fact, Dugaboy, in its brief, to its credit, admits that the argument is contrary to the Bankruptcy Court's decision of Judge Gargotta in the Western District case of *In re Introgen Therapeutics*. There, the Court was faced with a similar argument by a group of unsecured creditors who argued that the debtor's plan violated the absolute priority rule

because equity was retaining a contingent interest that would only be payable if general unsecured claims were paid in full.

In rejecting the argument, the Court reasoned, and I quote, "The only way Class 4 will receive anything is if Class 3, in fact, gets paid in full, in satisfaction of 1129(b)(2)(B)(i)," meaning that the absolute priority rule would not be an issue. If Class 3 is not paid in full, Class 4's property interest is not -- is just -- is not just valueless, it just doesn't exist.

Your Honor, this is precisely the situation in this case. Equity interests will only receive a recovery if Class 8 and 9 are paid in full.

But Dugaboy attempts to escape the logical reading of the absolute priority rule by claiming that *Introgen* was wrongly decided and goes against the Supreme Court's decision in *Ellers* (phonetic). Dugaboy argues that because the Supreme Court decided that property given to a junior class without paying a senior class in full is property, even if it's worthless.

But Dugaboy misses the point. Like the debtor in the Introgen, the Debtor here is not arguing that the property — the absolute priority rule is not violated because the contingent trust is worthless. Rather, the argument is that the absolute priority rule is not violated; it's, in order to receive anything on account of the junior — of the equity,

the senior creditors have to be paid a hundred percent plus interest.

In fact, Your Honor, if the plan just didn't give any recovery to the equity Class 10 and 11, I bet you Dugaboy and Mr. Dondero would be arguing that it violated the absolute priority rule because senior classes, unsecured creditors, could potentially receive more than a hundred percent of their interest. And there's a case in the Southern District of Texas, In re MCorp, where the Bankruptcy Court said that for a plan to be confirmed, its stockholders eliminated, creditors must not receive more than payment in full.

Excess proceeds, Your Honor, if any, have to go somewhere. They can't go to creditors, so they have to go to equity. And the absolute priority rule is not violated.

And how is Dugaboy harmed? They say they may want to buy the contingent interests, and the lack of a marketing effort violates the *LaSalle* opinion as well. And who holds the Class B and Class C partnership interests that come before Dugaboy that Dugaboy is concerned may have this opportunity rather than them? Yes, it's Hunter Mountain, Your Honor, an entity, like Dugaboy, that's owned and controlled by Mr. Dondero.

Accordingly, the argument that the plan violates the absolute priority rule is actually a frivolous argument.

Turning now to unfair discrimination, Your Honor, Dugaboy argued in its brief Monday that because the projected

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distribution to unsecured creditors has gone down in the recent plan projections, the discrepancy between Class 7 and Class 8 is so large that that amounts to unfair discrimination.

Again, the Court should first ask why is Dugaboy even the right party to be making the objection. Its claim against the Debtor to pierce the corporate veil, as I mentioned, is frivolous. It's subject to objection. It didn't even bother to have the claim temporarily allowed for voting purposes, as did other creditors who thought they had a valid claim. Yet this is another example of Mr. Dondero, through Dugaboy, trying to throw as many roadblocks in front of confirmation as he can.

But this argument, like the other ones, fails as well.

Class 8 contains the general unsecured creditor claims,

predominately litigation claims that have been pending against
the Debtor for years. The Debtor was justified in treating
the other unsecured creditors differently.

Class 6 consists of the PTO claims in excess of the cap, which are of different quality and nature than the other claims.

Class 7 consists of the convenience class. And it's appropriate to bribe convenience class creditors with a discount option for smaller claims to be cashed out for administrative convenience.

Mr. Seery testified that when the plan was formulated, the concept was to separately classify liquidated claims in small amounts in Class 7 and unliquidated claims in Class 8. Mr. Seery also testified that there's a valid business justification to treat the -- hold business 7 -- Class 7 claims differently. These creditors had a reasonable expectation of getting paid promptly, as compared to litigation creditors, who would expect to be paid over time.

As the Court is aware, the litigation claims in Class 8 involve litigation that has been pending for several years in the case of Acis, Daugherty, Redeemer, and more than a decade in UBS.

And most importantly, as Mr. Seery testified, the Committee and the Debtor had significant negotiation regarding the classification and treatment provisions of the plan for Class 7.

The Committee does have one constituent who is a Class 7 creditor. However, the other three creditors are all in Class 8 and hold claims in excess of \$200 million and supported the separate classification and the different treatment.

So, Your Honor, discrimination, different treatment among Class 7 and 8 is appropriate, and the different treatment is not unfair. In the February 1 projections, the Class 8 creditors are estimated to receive 71.32 percent of their claims, but that's just an estimate. As Mr. Seery testified,

the number can go up based upon the value he can generate from the assets and, importantly, from litigation claims. Class 8 creditors could up end up receiving a hundred percent on account of their claims. Class 7 creditors are fixed at 85 percent.

Giving Class 8 creditors the opportunity to roll the dice and potentially get more or less than the 85 percent offered to Class 7 is not at all unfair.

For these reasons, Your Honor, the Court has the ability and should confirm the plan pursuant to the cram-down provisions of 1129(b).

Your Honor, I'm now going to switch from the statutory requirements to all the issues raised by the release, injunction, and exculpation provisions.

I'd just like to take a brief sip of water.

Dugaboy -- I will first deal with the Debtor release provided in Article 9(f) of the plan, which we claim is appropriate. Dugaboy and the U.S. Trustee have objected to the release contained in Article 9(f). Dugaboy objects because it believes that the Debtor release releases claims that the Claimant Trust or Litigation Trust have that have not yet arisen, and the U.S. Trustee objects because it believes that the release is a third-party release.

These objections have no merit, and they should be overruled.

I would like to ask Ms. Canty to put up a demonstrative which contains the provision Article 9(f) of the plan.

Your Honor, as set forth in this Article 9(f), only the Debtor is granting any release. While that --

THE COURT: And for the record, it's 9(d)? 9(d), right?

MR. POMERANTZ: 9(d)? 9(d), correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. Okay.

MR. POMERANTZ: Sorry about that.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. POMERANTZ: While the release is broad, it does not purport to release the claims of any third party. The Claimant Trust and the Litigation Trust are only included in the release as successors of the Debtor. The release is specifically only for claims that the Debtor or the estate would have been legally entitled to assert in their own right.

Section 1123(b)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a plan may provide for the settlement or adjustment of any claims or interests belonging to the debtor or the estate, and that's exactly what the Debtor release provides.

Accordingly, Dugaboy is wrong that the release effects a release of claims that the Claimant Trust or the Litigation Sub-Trust have that won't arise until after the effective date. And the U.S. Trustee is simply wrong; there's no third-party release aspect under the release.

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The last point I will address on the release, Your Honor, is who is being released and why and what does the evidence show. The Debtor release extends to release parties which include the independent directors, Strand, for actions after January 9th, Jim Seery as the CEO and CRO, the Committee, members of the Committee, professionals, and employees.

You have heard Mr. Seery's testimony that the Debtor does not believe that any claims against the parties that are proposed to be released actually exist. You have heard Mr. Seery's testimony that he worked closely with the employees and believes that not only have they all been instrumental in getting the Debtor to the -- be on the cusp of plan confirmation, but that also Mr. Seery is not aware of any claims against them.

Moreover, as Mr. Seery testified, the release for the employees is only conditional. He testified that the employees are required to assist in the monetization of assets and the resolution of claims, and if they do not like -- if they do not lose their release, then any Debtor claims are tolled, such that could be pursued by the Litigation Trustee at a future time.

Lastly, I'm sure that the Dondero entities will argue that someone needs to investigate claims against Mr. Seery for mismanagement or for, God forbid, having failed to file the 2015.3 statements. Such claims are part of the continuing

harassment of Mr. Seery that the Dondero entities have embarked on after it was apparent that nobody would support their plan.

There is no evidence of any claims that exist, Your Honor. In fact, the Committee and its professionals have watched the Debtor through this case like a hawk. They have not been afraid to challenge the Debtor's actions in general and Mr. Seery's in particular. FTI has worked on a daily basis with DSI and the company, had access to information. When COVID was happening, they were looking at trades going on on a daily basis.

So if the Committee, whose members hold approximately \$200 million of claims against the estate, are okay with the release against the independent directors and Mr. Seery, that should provide the Court with comfort to approve the releases as part of the plan.

In summary, Your Honor, the Debtor release is entirely appropriate and does not affect the release of third-party claims that have not yet arisen.

Next, Your Honor, I want to go to the discharge. There's been objections to the discharge. Dugaboy and NexPoint have objected that the Debtor receiving a discharge under the plan — argue a debtor is liquidating. The objection is not well taken based upon Mr. Seery's testimony regarding what it is the Claimant Trust and the Reorganized Debtor plan to do after

the effective date, as compared to what the limitations of a discharge are under 1141(d)(3).

Your Honor, Article 9 of the -- 9(b) of the plan provides that as -- except as otherwise expressly provided in the plan or the confirmation order, upon the effective date, the Debtor and its estate will be discharged or released under and to the fullest extent provided under 1141(d)(A) [sic] and other applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Court. Bankruptcy Code.

Section 1141(d)(3) provides an exception to the discharge, and I'd like to have that section put up for Your Honor at this point. Ms. Canty?

As this -- as the section reflects, and as the Fifth Circuit has ruled in the TH-New Orleans Limited Partnership case cited in our materials, in order to deny the debtor a discharge under 1141(d)(3), three things must be true: (1) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property in the estate; (2) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the plan; and (3) the debtor would be denied a discharge under 727(a) of this title if the case was converted to Chapter 7. Here, only C applies.

With respect to A, Your Honor, while the plan does project that it will take approximately two years to monetize the Debtor's assets for fair value, the Debtor is just not liquidating within the meaning of Section A.

As Mr. Seery testified, during the post-confirmation period, post-effective date period, the Debtor will continue to manage its funds and conduct the same type of business it conducted prior to the effective date. It'll manage the CLOs. It'll manage Multi-Strat. It'll manage Restoration Capital. It'll manage the Select Fund, and it'll manage the Korea Fund.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York's 2000 opinion in *Enron*, cited in our materials, is on point. There, the Court found that a debtor liquidating its assets over an indefinite period of time that is likely to take years is not liquidating within the meaning of Section 1141(b)(3)(A), justifying a denial of discharge.

But even if we failed A, based upon Mr. Seery's testimony, we would not fail B. The Debtor will be continuing to do what it has done during the case, as it did before, as I said, managing its business. B says the debtor does not engage in the business after management. So while Mr. Seery testified that it would take approximately two years, it could take more, it could take less, and there is no requirement to liquidate assets over a period of time.

Accordingly, Your Honor, the Debtor is conducting the type of business contemplated by Section B so as not to just deny a discharge.

As the Fifth Circuit said in the *TH-New Orleans* case, the court granted a discharge there because it was likely that the

debtor would be liquidating its assets and conducting business (indecipherable) years following a confirmation date. And this result makes sense, Your Honor, because the Debtor will need the discharge and the tenant injunctions, which I'll get to in a moment, in order to prevent interference with the Debtor's ability to implement the terms of the plan and make distributions to creditors.

I would now like, Your Honor, to turn to the exculpation provisions, which there's been -- there's been a lot of briefing on it, and I know Your Honor is very aware of the exculpation provisions and the *Pacific Lumber* case. And several parties have objected to the exculpation contained in the plan, based primarily on the Fifth Circuit ruling in *Pacific Lumber*.

The exculpation provision, which is not dissimilar to what is found in many plans around the country, including in plans confirmed in bankruptcy courts in the Fifth Circuit, acts to exculpate the exculpated parties for negligent-only acts as it contains the standard carve-outs for gross negligence, intentional conduct, and willful misconduct.

I do want to bring to the Court's attention a deletion we made to the parties protected by the exculpation in the plan and now -- were filed on February 1st. The definition of exculpated parties included, before February 1, not only the Debtor but its direct and indirect majority-owned subsidiaries

and the managed funds. In the plan amendment, we have deleted the Debtor's direct and indirect majority-owned subsidiaries and managed funds from the definition and are not seeking exculpation for those entities.

But before, Your Honor, I address *Pacific Lumber* and why the Debtor believes it does not preclude the Court from approving the exculpation in this case, I do want to focus on something that the Objectors conveniently ignore from their argument.

As I mentioned in my opening argument, Your Honor, the independent directors were appointed pursuant to the Court's order on January 9, 2020. They have resolved many issues between the Debtor and the Committee, and avoided the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee.

The January 9th order was specifically approved by Mr. Dondero, who was in control of the Debtor at the time, and I believe the transcripts that are admitted into evidence will demonstrate that he was fully behind the approval of the January 9th order.

In addition to appointing the independent directors into what was sure to be a contentiously litigious case, the January 9th order set the standard of care for the independent directors, and specifically exculpated them from negligence.

You have heard Mr. Seery and Mr. Dubel testify that they had input into what the order said and would have not agreed

to be appointed as independent directors if it did not include Paragraph 10, as well as the provisions regarding indemnification and D&O insurance.

I would like to put a demonstrative on the screen, which is actually Paragraph 10 of that order. Your Honor, Paragraph 10, there's two concepts embedded here. First, it requires any parties wishing to sue the independent directors or their agents to first seek such approval from the Bankruptcy Court. Secondly, and importantly for purposes of the independent directors and their agents, who would include the employees, it set the standard of care for them during the Chapter 11 and entitled them to exculpation for negligence. Paragraph 10 says the Court will only permit a suit to go forward if such claim represents a colorable claim for willful misconduct or gross negligence.

And Your Honor, Paragraph 10 does not expire by its terms.

By not including negligence in the definition of what a

colorable claim might be, the Court has already exculpated the

independent directors and their agents, which include the

employees acting at their direction.

And because the independent directors and their agents are exculpated under Paragraph 10, Strand needs to be exculpated as well for actions occurring after January 9th. This is because a suit against Strand for conduct after the independent board was appointed is effectively a suit against

the independent directors, who were the only people in control of Strand at that time.

After the effective date, Mr. Dondero will regain control of Strand, as the independent directors will be discharged. And for parties able to sue Strand essentially for negligence for conduct conducted by the independent directors after January 9th, Strand will then be able to seek indemnification from the Debtor under the Debtor's partnership agreement because the partnership agreement does provide the general partner is entitled to indemnification.

Accordingly, an exculpation for Strand is really the functional equivalent of an exculpation for the independent directors and the Debtor.

The January 9th order was not appealed, and an objection to exculpation at this point as it relates to the independent directors, their agents, and Strand is a collateral attack on this order. So, Your Honor, Your Honor does not even need to get to the thorny issues addressed by *Pacific Lumber*.

However, even in the absence of the January 9th order, exculpation of the independent directors and their employees, as well as the other exculpated parties, is not prohibited by Pacific Lumber. In Pacific Lumber, the Fifth Circuit reversed a bankruptcy court order confirming a plan because the exculpation provision was too broad and included parties that the Fifth Circuit thought could not be exculpated under

Section 524(e) of the Code.

A close look at the issue before the Court, Your Honor, the reasoning for the Court's ruling and why certain parties like Committee and its members were entitled to exculpation, reflects that this case does not prevent the Court from approving exculpation of this case.

A careful read of the underlying briefs and opinions in Pacific Lumber reveals that the concern that the Appellants had in that case was the application of exculpation to non-fiduciary sponsors. There were two competing plans in the case. The first was filed by the indenture trustee. The second was filed by the debtor's parent and lender, and was deemed -- called the Marathon Plan. The Court confirmed the Marathon Plan, and the indenture trustee appealed, and the indenture trustee argued that the plan sponsors could not be exculpated.

After determining that the appeal of the exculpation provisions were not equitably moot, the Fifth Circuit determined that exculpation was not authorized under 524(e) of the Code because that section provides a discharge of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on such debt.

However, and here's the important part, Your Honor: The Fifth Circuit did not say that all exculpations are prohibited under the Code and authorized the exculpation of the Committee

and its members. And why did the Court do that? Because it looked at the Committee's qualified immunity under 1103 and also reasoned that Committee members are essentially disinterested volunteers that should be entitled to exculpation on negligence.

The Court also cited approvingly *Colliers* for the proposition that if Committee members were not exculpated for negligence and subject to suit by people who are unhappy with them, they just would not serve.

Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit based its willingness to exculpate Committee members on the strong public policy that supports exculpation for those parties under those circumstances. And against this backdrop, Your Honor, there are several reasons why the Court should authorize exculpation in this case, notwithstanding *Pacific Lumber*.

First, Your Honor, the independent directors in this case are analogous -- much more analogous to the Committee members that the Fifth Circuit ruled were entitled to than the incumbent officer and directors.

Your Honor has the following facts before the Court, based upon the testimony of Mr. Seery and Mr. Dubel and other evidence in the record. The independent board members were not part of the Highland enterprise before the Court appointed them on January 9th. The Court appointed the independent directors in lieu of a Chapter 11 trustee to address what the

Court perceived as the serious conflicts of interest and fiduciary duty concerns with current management, as identified by the Committee.

The independent directors would not have agreed to accept their role without indemnification, insurance, exculpation, and the gatekeeper function provided by the January 9th order.

And Mr. Dubel testified regarding the significant experience he has as an independent director during his 30-plus years in the restructuring community, including several engagements as an independent director in Chapter 11 cases. And he testified that independent directors have become commonplace in complex restructurings over the last several years and have been appointed in many cases, including high-profile cases. We've cited to just a few of those cases in our brief, but we could go on and on.

Mr. Dubel testified that the independent directors are a critical tool in proper corporate governance and restoring creditor confidence in management in modern-day restructurings, and he testified that, based upon his experience, independent directors expect to be indemnified by the company, expect to obtain directors and officers insurance, and expect to be exculpated from claims of negligence when they agree to be appointed.

He further testified that if independent directors cannot be assured that they will be exculpated for simple negligence,

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he believes they will be unwilling to serve in contentious cases like the one we have here, which will have a material adverse effect on the Chapter 11 restructuring process as we know it.

Based upon the foregoing testimony, Your Honor, which is uncontroverted, the Court should have no problem finding that the independent directors are much more analogous to the Committee members in *Pacific Lumber* who the Fifth Circuit said could be exculpated.

The facts, these facts also distinguish this case from the Dropbox v. Thru case which Your Honor decided and which was reversed on this issue by the District Court. In neither Pacific Lumber or Thru was there an argument that the policy reasons that supported exculpation of Committee members also supported the exculpation of the parties sought to be exculpated.

Moreover, Your Honor, the independent directors in this case were pointed as essentially as substitute for a Chapter 11 trustee. There was a Chapter 11 trustee motion filed a few days before, I believe, and the Court, in approving this, said that you -- better than a Chapter 11 trustee. And Chapter 11 Trustees are entitled to qualified immunity. So, while, yes, the independent directors aren't truly Chapter 11 trustees, they are analogous.

Second, Your Honor, while there is language in Pacific

Lumber that says that the directors and officers of the debtor are not entitled to exculpation, the issue before the Court really on appeal was the plan sponsors and whether they were. So I would argue that any discussion of the exculpation not being available for directors and officers in the Fifth Circuit opinion in Palco is actually dicta.

Third, Your Honor, as I discussed before, the *Pacific Lumber* decision was based solely on 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which only says that the discharge of a claim against the debtor does not affect the discharge of a third party. However, the Debtor is not relying on 524(e) as the basis of their exculpation. As we outline in our brief, Your Honor, we believe that the exculpation is appropriate under Section 105 and 1123(b)(6) as a means -- part of an implementation of the plan.

Importantly, Your Honor, as other courts hostile to thirdparty releases have determined, exculpation only sets a standard of care for parties and is not an effort to relieve fiduciaries of liability.

Other courts that have aligned with the Fifth Circuit and rejected third-party releases, like the Ninth Circuit, have recently determined exculpation has nothing to do with 524(e). In *In re Blixseth*, a Ninth Circuit case decided at the end of 2020 cited in our materials, they examined several of their circuit cases that had strongly prohibited non-consensual

third-party releases under 524(e). But again, the Court concluded that 524(e) only prohibits third parties from being released from liability of a prepetition claim for which the debtor receives a discharge. The Court reasoned that the exculpation clause, however, protects parties from negligence claims relating to matters that occurred during the Chapter 11 case and has nothing to do with 524(e).

The Ninth Circuit, which along with the Fifth Circuit has been notorious for prohibiting third-party releases, issued its ruling against this backdrop and said that exculpations are appropriate.

Your Honor, the Objectors made a point yesterday of pointing out that Strand, as the Debtor's general partner, is liable for the debts under applicable law. To the extent they intend to argue that the exculpation is seeking to discharge any such prepetition liability, they would be wrong. The exculpation only applies to postpetition matters. And to the extent they argue that the exculpation seeks to discharge Strand's potential postpetition liability, for the reasons I discussed, a claim against Strand will essentially be a claim against the Debtor because the Debtor will be obligated to indemnify them.

Accordingly, Your Honor, we submit that if this matter goes up to appeal to the Fifth Circuit, which it may very well do, that the Fifth Circuit may very well come out the same way

as the Ninth Circuit and start relaxing the standard or otherwise provide that the independent directors are much more like Committee members.

Lastly, Your Honor, if the Court does confirm the plan, which we certainly hope it will do, it will have made a finding that the plan has been proposed in good faith, and in doing so, the Court essentially finds that the independent directors and their agents have acted appropriately and consistent with their fiduciary duties, and it makes — exculpation for negligence naturally flows from that finding.

Your Honor, I would now like to go to the injunction provisions, and my argument is that the injunction provisions as amended are appropriate.

THE COURT: Can I stop you?

MR. POMERANTZ: We received several of -- yes.

THE COURT: I want to just recap a couple of things I think I heard you say. You're not asking this Court, you say, to go contrary to Pacific Lumber per se. You have thrown out there the possibility that Pacific Lumber mistakenly relied on 524(e) in rejecting exculpations of plan sponsors. You're saying, eh, as a technical matter, I think they were wrong in focusing on that statute because that statute seems to deal with prepetition liability. Okay? Its actual wording, 524(e) states, discharge of a debt of a debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on such debts.

And reading between the lines, I think you're saying -well, maybe this isn't what you're saying, but here's what I
inferred -- "debt" is defined in 101(12) to mean liability on
a claim, and then "claim" is defined in 101(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code as meaning right to payment. It doesn't say
as of the petition date, but I think if you look at, then,
Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code that addresses claims and
interests, clearly, it seems to be referring to the
prepetition time period, you know, claims and interest as of
the petition date. And then -- that's 502. And then 503
speaks of, for the most part, postpetition administrative
expenses.

So that was my rambling way of saying I'm understanding you to say, eh, as a technical matter, we think the Fifth Circuit was wrong to focus on 524(e) because when you're talking about exculpation you're talking about postpetition liability, not prepetition liability. And 524(e) is talking more about prepetition liability.

But I think what I also hear you saying is, at bottom,

Pacific Lumber was sort of a policy-driven holding where, you

know, we're worried about no one would ever sign up for being

on an unsecured creditors' committee if they could be exposed

to lawsuits. They're fiduciaries, we think, for policy

reasons. Exculpation is appropriate for this one group. And

you're saying, well, they didn't have an independent board

that they were considering. They were just considering non-fiduciary plan sponsors. And so the rationale presented by Pacific Lumber applies equally here, and just they didn't make a holding in this factual context.

Have I recapped what you're saying?

MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, that's generally -generally correct, with a couple of nuances. So, yes, first,
I think, on a policy basis, Your Honor -- again, putting aside
the January 9th order, because we don't see --

THE COURT: Right. Right.

MR. POMERANTZ: -- Your Honor even needs to get to this issue.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. POMERANTZ: But if Your Honor does get to this issue, we think, as a first point, Your Honor could be totally consistent with *Pacific Lumber* because there's policy reasons and there was not a categorical rejection of exculpation.

Okay. So if there was a categorical rejection, then it wouldn't have been okay for committee members. Okay.

Second argument, yes, we don't think -- we think it's part of dicta. It's not part of the holding. We understand that other courts may have not agreed, maybe your *Thru* case, which Your Honor was appealed on.

But the third issue, our argument is all they looked at was 524(e). They said 523 -- 4(e) does not authorize it.

They did not say 524(e) prohibits it.

We think there's other provisions in the Code. And then when you basically add in the analysis that Your Honor provided, which we agree with, and what 524 was -- to do, 524(e) just says that discharge doesn't affect. It doesn't say that under another provision of the Code or for another reason you are authorized to give an exculpation. I think it's a nuance and it's a difference there.

And my point of bringing up the *Blixseth* case -- which, of course, is Ninth Circuit and it's not binding on Your Honor, it's not binding on the Fifth Circuit -- is to say, when that was presented to them, they saw the distinction that 524(e) has nothing to do with an exculpation. And while, yes, the Fifth Circuit hasn't ruled on that, and if the Fifth -- if that argument is made to the Fifth Circuit, we don't know how they would rule, I think that, based upon their analysis -- which, again, Your Honor, is no more than a page and a half of their opinion, right, of a long, lengthy opinion on the confirmation issues. So I think, Your Honor, with the Fifth Circuit, there is a good chance that based upon the developing case law of exculpation, based upon the sister circuit in *Blixseth* making that distinction, that there is a very good chance that the Fifth Circuit would change.

But look, I recognize that argument requires Your Honor to say, okay, this is outside and -- and what *Pacific Lumber* did

or didn't do. But I think, Your Honor, there's several potential reasons, there's several potential arguments that you can get to the same place.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. POMERANTZ: Okay. If I may just get another glass of -- sip of water before my time starts?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. POMERANTZ: Okay, Your Honor. We're now turning to the injunction provision. The Debtor received several objections to the injunction provisions in -- I think I have it right now -- Article 9(f) to the plan. And we've modified Article 9(f) to address certain of those concerns, and we believe that, as modified, that the injunction provision implements and enforces the plan's discharge, release, and exculpation provisions to prevent parties from pursuing claims in interest that are addressed by the plan and otherwise interfering with consummation and implementation of the plan.

I'd like to put up the first paragraph of the injunction on the screen now.

Okay, Your Honor. The first paragraph, all it does is prohibits the enjoined parties from taking action to interfere with consummation or implementation of the plan. I suspect a sentence like that is probably in hundreds of plans in the Fifth Circuit and elsewhere.

Initially, to address a concern that it applied to too

many parties, the Debtor added a definition in the revised plan that defines "enjoined parties," which I'd like to now put that definition up on the screen.

The changes -- it's a little hard to read there, but you have it in the -- oh, there you go. The changes made clear that only parties who have a relationship to this case, either holding a claim or interest, having appeared in the case, be a -- or be a party in interest, Jim Dondero, or related entity, or related person of the foregoing are covered. The claim objectors argue that the word "implementation and consummation" is vague, or vague and unclear. Your Honor, these terms are both defined in the Bankruptcy Code and under the case law, and they're, as I said, common features of many plans.

Section 1123(a) (5) of the Code provides that a plan shall provide for its implementation, and identifies a list of items that the plan can include. Article 4 of our plan is defined as "Means of Implementation of This Plan," and describes the various corporate steps required to implement the provisions of the plan, including canceling equity interests, creation of new general partners and a limited part of the Reorganized Debtor, the restatement of the limited partnership agreement, and the establishment of the various trusts.

Paragraph 1 rightly and appropriately enjoins efforts to interfere with these steps.

Nor is the term "consummation of the plan" vague.

"Consummation" also is a commonly-used term and has been defined by the Fifth Circuit and the Code. 1102 -- 1101(2) defines "Substantial Consummation" to be the transfer of assets to be transferred under the plan, the assumption by the debtor of the management of all the property dealt with by the plan, and the commencement of distributions under the plan.

Section 1142 gives the Court authority to direct a party to perform any act necessary for consummation of a plan. And as the Fifth Circuit, in *United States Brass Corp.*, which is said in our material, states, said the Bankruptcy Court had post-confirmation jurisdiction to enforce the unperformed terms of a plan with respect to a matter that could affect the parties' post-confirmation rights because the plan had not been fully consummated.

And Your Honor just wrote on this issue last year in the Senior -- the Texas -- the TXMS Real Estate v. Senior Care case, and you cited to U.S. Brass to find that, in that case, post-confirmation jurisdiction existed to resolve a dispute relating to an assumed contract because the matter related to interpretation, implementation, and execution of the plan.

Accordingly, Your Honor, neither implementation or consummation are vague, and the first paragraph of the injunction is necessary and appropriate to enforce the Debtor's discharge.

As I said before, I will leave it to Mr. Kharasch to address specifically the concerns that the Advisor and the Funds have with the injunction.

The second and third paragraphs of the injunction, Your Honor, certain parties have objected to them on the ground that they constitute an improper release of the independent directors as well as the release of claims against the Reorganized Debtor, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust, entities that will not have come into existence until after the effective date.

We believe we have addressed these concerns by modifications to the second and third paragraphs of the injunction, which I would now like to put the second and third paragraphs on the screen.

(Pause.)

MR. POMERANTZ: As that is happening, Your Honor, I will -- there we go.

We believe that the changes that were made to these paragraphs should address the Objectors' concerns.

First, as with the first paragraph, we have created a defined term of "Enjoined Parties" who are subject to the injunction which is narrower than all persons, I believe, or all entities that was included in the prior plan. So we've narrowed that.

"Enjoined Parties" are generally defined, as I mentioned

before, as entities involved in this case or related to Jim Dondero, or have appeared in this case.

Second, we have removed independent directors from these paragraphs to address the concern that the injunction was a disquised third-party release.

Third, we have removed the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust from the second paragraph and moved them to the third paragraph. We did this to make clear that the Reorganized Debtor and Claimant Trust were only getting the benefit of the injunction as the successors to the Debtor. As the Reorganized Debtor and the Claimant Trust receives the property from the Debtor free and clear of all claims and interests and equity holders under 1141(c), they are entitled to the benefit of the injunction.

Fourth, we have addressed the concern that the injunction improperly affected set-off rights. We added language to make clear that the injunction would only affect the parties' set-off of an obligation owed to the Debtor to the extent that that was permissible under 553 and 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In other words, we are punting the issue for another day, and there's nothing in the plan that gives the Debtor any more set-off rights than it otherwise has under the Bankruptcy Code.

Lastly, Your Honor, certain Objectors have argued that the

injunction somehow prevents them from enforcing the rights they have under the plan or the confirmation order. We don't really understand this concern, as the language leading into the second paragraph of the injunction says, except as expressly provided in the plan, the confirmation order, or a separate order of the Bankruptcy Court.

With these modifications, Your Honor, the provisions do nothing more than implement 1123(b)(6) and 1141 by preventing parties from taking actions to interfere with the Debtor's plan.

The Court has also heard testimony from Mr. Seery regarding the importance of the injunction to implementation of the plan. He testified that he intends to monetize assets in a way that will maximize value. And to effectively do that, he has testified that the Claimant Trust needs to be able to pursue its objectives without interference and continued harassment from Mr. Dondero and his related entities.

In fact, Mr. Seery testified that if the Claimant Trust were subject to interference by Mr. Dondero, it would take him more time to monetize assets, they would be monetized for less money, and creditors would be harmed.

If Your Honor doesn't have any questions for me on the injunction provisions, I'd like to turn to the last part of the injunction, which is really the gatekeeper provision.

THE COURT: All right. You may.

MR. POMERANTZ: Your Honor, the last paragraph in Article 9(f) is really not an injunction but is rather a gatekeeper provision. And as originally drafted, it'd do two things: first, it'd require that before any entity, which is defined very broadly, could file an action against a protected party relating to certain specified matters, the entity would have to seek a determination from this Court that the claim represented are colorable claim of bad faith, criminal conduct, willful misconduct, fraud, or gross negligence. The specified matters to which the gatekeeper provision would apply included the Chapter 11 case, negotiations regarding the plan, the administration of the plan, the property to be distributed under the plan, the wind-down of the Debtor's business, the administration of the Claimant Trust, or transactions related to the foregoing.

Subject to certain exceptions for Dondero-related parties, protected parties were defined to include the Debtor, its successors and assigns, indirect and direct, majority-owned subsidiaries and managed funds, employees, Strand, Reorganized Debtor, the independent directors, the Committee and its members, the Claimant Trust, the Claimant Trustee, the Litigation Trust, the Litigation Sub-Trustee, the members of the Oversight Committee, retained professionals, the CEO and CRO, and persons related to the foregoing. Essentially,

parties related to the pre-effective-date administration of the estate or the post-confirmation implementation of the plan.

Second, the gatekeeper provision as originally presented gave the Bankruptcy Court exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate any cause of action that it determined would pass through the gate. The gatekeeper provision, Your Honor, is not a release in any way. Rather, it permits enjoined parties who believe they have a claim against the protected parties to pursue such a claim, provided they first make a showing that the claim is colorable to the Bankruptcy Court.

Several parties, Your Honor, objected to the Bankruptcy
Court having exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims
that pass through the gate. The Debtor believes that the
Bankruptcy Court would ultimately have jurisdiction of any of
those claims that pass through the gate. However, the Debtor
did, upon reflection, appreciate the concern that if the Court
agreed to that now, it would essentially be determining its
jurisdiction before a claim was filed.

Accordingly, in the January 22nd plan, Your Honor, we amended the provision to provide that the Bankruptcy Court will only have jurisdiction over such claims to the extent it was legally permissible to do so, essentially deferring the issue to a later time.

And as Your Honor, I believe, in one of cases called the

Icing on the Cake, the retention and jurisdiction provisions in the plan only are to the extent under applicable law and are quite broad and include the things that we would have the Court -- have jurisdiction for the Court, otherwise determined.

The Court made some other changes to the gatekeeper provision, and I would like to place the amended gatekeeper provision on the screen right now. In addition to the change I mentioned, the Debtor made the following changes: the provision is limited now to apply only to enjoined parties, rather than any entity. Than any entity. Much narrower. The provision added the administration of the Litigation Sub-Trust to the matters to which the provision would apply. The provision makes clear now that any claim, including negligence, is a claim that could be sought and pursued through the gatekeeper function. And the provision made some other syntax changes.

We believe, Your Honor, with these changes, we believe that the gatekeeper provision is within the Court's jurisdiction and it's appropriate to include under the plan.

But certain parties have argued that the Court does not have the authority, the jurisdictional authority to perform the gatekeeper function, separate and apart from whether it has jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims that pass through the gate.

Your Honor, we submit that these arguments represent a fundamental misunderstanding of Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction and the Court's authority to make sure the Debtor is free of interference in carrying out the plan which I'll get to in a couple moments.

As a preliminary matter, Your Honor, it is important for the Court to remember that Paragraph 10 of the January 9 order already contains a gatekeeper provision as it relates to the independent directors and their agents. And as I mentioned on a couple of occasions, that order is not going away, it doesn't expire by its terms, and it cannot be collaterally attacked in this forum.

The Debtor does acknowledge, though, that the gatekeeper provision in the plan is broader in terms of the people it protects and it applies to post-confirmation matters.

Before I address the Court's authority to approve the gatekeeper provision, I want to summarize the evidence that it has heard from Mr. Seery and Mr. Tauber regarding why the gatekeeper is so important a provision to the success of the plan.

Although the Court is all too familiar with the history of litigation initiated by and filed against Mr. Dondero and his related affiliates, Mr. Seery spent some time on the stand testifying about the litigation so the Court would have a complete record for this hearing. He testified that prior to

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the petition date, the Debtor faced years of litigation from Mr. Terry and Acis that led to the Acis bankruptcy case, which Your Honor has said many times it's still in your mind. Years of litigation with the Redeemer Committee which precipitated the filing of a bankruptcy case and resulted in an award very critical of the Debtor's conduct. Years of litigation with UBS. Years of litigation with Patrick Daugherty. And we placed all the dockets for all these matters before the Court.

Also, during the bankruptcy and after the Committee essentially rejected the Debtor's pot plan proposal and indicated -- and the Debtor indicated it would be terminating the shared service agreements with Mr. Dondero and his related entities, the Debtor was the subject of harassment from Mr. Dondero and related entities which resulted in the temporary restraining order against him, a preliminary injunction against him, a contempt motion, which Your Honor is scheduled to hear Friday, a motion by the Debtor's controlled -- by the Dondero-controlled investors and funds in CLO managed -managed by the Debtor, which the Court referred to that motion as being frivolous and a waste of the Court's time. Multiple plan objections, most of which are focused on allowing the Debtors to continue their litigation crusade against the Debtor and its successors post-confirmation. An objection to the Debtor approval of the Acis order and a subsequent appeal. An objection to the HarbourVest settlement and subsequent

appeal. A complaint and injunction against the Advisors and the Funds to prevent them from violating Paragraph 9 of the January 9th order. And a temporary restraining order against those parties, which was by consent.

Mr. Dondero's counsel tends to argue that he is the victim here and that the litigation is being commenced against him and -- instead of by him. That response does not even deserve a response, Your Honor. It is disingenuous.

Mr. Tauber testified that he was part of the team at Aon that sourced coverage for the independent directors after their appointment in January 2020 and that he has over 20 years of underwriting experience. He testified that at Aon he builds bespoke insurance programs which are not cookie-cutter programs for his clients, with an emphasis on D&O and E&O. And he was asked by the independent board to obtain D&O and E&O insurance after the board's appointment on January 9th.

Based upon the process Aon conducted in reaching out to insurance carriers, Mr. Tauber testified that Aon was only able to obtain D&O insurance based upon the inclusion of Paragraph 10 of the January 9 order, the gatekeeper provision. I know Mr. Taylor said that that was spoon-fed to the insurers, but Mr. Tauber's testimony is they knew about Mr. Dondero and they knew about his litigation tactics, so it is not a good inference to be made from the testimony that they would not have required something. They probably would have

just said no.

Aon has now been -- Mr. Tauber testified that Aon has now been asked to obtain D&O coverage for the Claimant Trustee, the Litigation Trustee, the Oversight Committee, the members, the Claimant Trust, and the Litigation Sub-Trust. He testified that he and Aon have approached the insurance carriers that they believe might be interested in underwriting coverage.

And no, he hasn't approached every D&O and E&O carrier out there, and there may be, just like an investment banker doesn't have to approach everyone. They are experts in the field, and he testified they approached the people they thought would likely be willing or interested and potentially be willing to extend coverage. And as a result of Aon's efforts, Mr. Tauber has determined that there's a continued resistance to provide any coverage that does not contain an exclusion for actions relating to Mr. Dondero or his related entities. And he further believes that all carriers that will -- that have discussed a willingness to provide coverage will only do so if there is a gatekeeper provision, and only one carrier will agree to provide coverage without a Dondero exclusion.

Mr. Tauber testified that he believes that any ultimate policy will provide that if at any time the gatekeeper provision is not in place, either the carrier will not cover

any actions related to Mr. Dondero or his affiliates or that the coverage will be vacated or voided.

Based upon the foregoing record, Your Honor, which is uncontroverted, there's ample justification on a factual basis for approval of the gatekeeper provision.

I will now turn to the Court's authority to approve the gatekeeper provision.

There are three alternative bases upon which the Court can approve the gatekeeper provision. First, several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code give broad authority to approve a provision like the gatekeeper provision.

Second, the Court can analogize to the Barton Doctrine the facts and circumstances in this case and authorize the Court to act as a gatekeeper to prevent frivolous litigation from being filed against court-appointed officers and directors and those that will lead the post-confirmation monetization of the estate's assets.

And third, Your Honor, the Court can find that Mr. Dondero and his entities are vexatious litigants, and use the gatekeeper provision as a sanction to prevent the filing of baseless litigation designed merely to harass those in charge of the estate post-confirmation.

So, Bankruptcy Court authority. Your Honor, there are several provisions in the Bankruptcy Code which we rely on to support the Court's authority. First, Section 1123(a)(5)

permits the plan to approve adequate means of implementation, and contains a long, non-exclusive list. Mr. Seery's testimony is uncontroverted that a gatekeeper provision is necessary for the adequate implementation of the plan.

Second, Your Honor, 1123(b)(6) authorizes a plan to include any appropriate provision in a plan not inconsistent with any other provision in this Code. There are not any provisions and none have been cited by the Objectors that would prohibit a gatekeeper provision. Section 1141 effectively holds that the terms of a plan bind the debtor and its creditors and vest property in a reorganized debtor, free and clear of the interests of third parties.

If nothing else, Your Honor, the spirit of 1141 allows the Court to prevent, in appropriate cases, vexatious litigation by unhappy creditors and parties in interest from torpedoing the plan.

1142(b), Your Honor, provides that the confirmation -that, after confirmation, the Court may direct any parties to
perform any act necessary for the consummation of the plan,
and requiring the party to seek court-approval before filing
an action is certainly an act.

And lastly, Your Honor, Section 105 allows the Court to enter orders necessary to order other things, enforce orders of the Court like the confirmation order, and prevent an abuse of process which would certainly occur if baseless litigation

were filed against the parties in charge of the Reorganized

Debtor and the trust vehicles entrusted with carrying out the

plan.

Your Honor, gatekeepers are not a novel concept and have been approved by courts in appropriate circumstances. In the <code>Madoff</code> cases, the Court has been the gatekeeper post-confirmation to determine whether investor claims are derivative or direct claims.

In *General Motors*, the Court has been the gatekeeper postconfirmation to determine whether product liability claims are proper claims against the reorganized debtor.

Closer to home, Judge Lynn, Mr. Dondero's counsel, approved a gatekeeper provision, arguably even more far-reaching than the provision here, in the Pilgrim's Pride case. In that case, Judge Lynn held that Pacific Lumber prevented him -- prevented the Court from approving the exculpation provision in the plan. However, he did hold that it was appropriate for the Court to ensure that debtor representatives are not improperly pursued for their goodfaith actions by requiring that any actions against the debtor or its representatives, and further, on the performance of their obligations as debtor-in-possession, be heard exclusively before the Bankruptcy Court.

And Pilgrim's Pride is not the only case in this district to include a gatekeeper provision, as Judge Houser approved

one in the CHC Group in 2016, which is cited in our materials.

The theme in all these cases, Your Honor, is that there are circumstances where it is necessary and appropriate for the Bankruptcy Court to act as a gatekeeper as a means of reducing litigation that could interfere with a confirmed plan and that a Court has the authority to approve such provisions.

The Objectors argue that the Bankruptcy Court does not have jurisdiction to approve that provision. The Debtor understands the argument as it related to the prior provision, which gave the Court exclusive jurisdiction over any claim it found colorable, and we've amended the plan to address that issue. The jurisdiction to deal with those claims could be left to a later day.

But to the extent the Objectors still pursue the jurisdiction argument in light of the current provision, they're really conflating two very different things: the ability to determine whether a claim is colorable and the ability to adjudicate that claim if the Court determines it's colorable.

None of the authorities cited by the Objectors hold that the Court is without jurisdiction to approve a gatekeeper provision like the one here. So, rather, what they do is they try to -- they argue, based upon the *Craig's Stores* case, which is narrower than other circuits of post-confirmation jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Court, and argue that the

gatekeeper provision doesn't fall within that. But that -- such reliance is misplaced, Your Honor.

Craig held that the Bankruptcy Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a post-confirmation dispute over a private-label credit card agreement between the debtor and the bank. In declining to find jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit remarked that there was no antagonism or claim pending between the parties as of the reorganization and no facts or law deriving from the reorganization or the plan was necessary to the claim asserted by the debtor.

However, in so ruling, Your Honor, the Fifth Circuit did reason that post-confirmation jurisdiction in the Bankruptcy Court continues to exist for matters pertaining to implementation and execution of the plan. Requiring parties to seek Bankruptcy Court determination the claim is colorable before embarking on litigation that will impact indemnification rights and affect distributions to creditors is not an expansion of jurisdiction and fits well within the Craig reasoning.

Unlike the credit card agreement dispute in *Craig*, Mr. Dondero and his entities have demonstrated tremendous antagonism towards the Debtor. And while the Debtor's plan may be confirmed, further litigation has been threatened by Mr. Dondero. It's in the pleadings. That's one of the reasons Mr. Dondero says his plan is better. It'll avoid

tremendous amount of litigation.

After Craig, the Fifth Circuit again examined the bankruptcy court's post-confirmation jurisdiction in the Stoneridge case in 2005. In that case, the Fifth Circuit ruled that a bankruptcy court has post-confirmation jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between two nondebtors that could trigger indemnification claims against a liquidating trust formed as a result of a confirmed plan.

And lastly, as I mentioned Your Honor's decision before, the TXMS Real Estate case, I think just a couple of months ago, it stands for the proposition that post-confirmation jurisdiction exists for matters bearing on the implementation, interpretation, and execution of a plan. In that case, Your Honor ruled that Your Honor had jurisdiction to resolve a post-confirmation dispute between a liquidating trust formed under a plan and a landlord, the result of which could significantly and adversely affect the value of the liquidating trust and monies available for unsecured creditors.

And you have heard Mr. Seery testify that litigation will have an adverse effect on the ability to make distributions to creditors.

So, Your Honor, under these authorities, the Court undoubtedly would have jurisdiction to act as the gatekeeper for the litigation.

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There's also an independent basis for the gatekeeper provision, Your Honor, the Barton Doctrine, which the Court is very familiar from your opinion in the *In re Ondova* case in 2017 and which provides that before a suit may be brought against a trustee, leave of Court is required. In *Ondova*, the Court reviewed the history of the doctrine in connection with litigation brought by a highly-litigious debtor against a trustee and his professionals. This Court noted that there are several important policies followed by the doctrine, including a concern for the overall integrity of the bankruptcy process and the threat of trustees being distracted from or intimidated from doing their jobs. And Your Honor's language still: For example, losers in the bankruptcy process might turn to other courts to try to become winners there by alleging the trustee did a negligent job.

Your Honor, this is precisely what the Debtor is trying to prevent here, Mr. Dondero and his entities from putting the bad experience before Your Honor in this case behind it and going to try to find better luck in a more hospitable court.

Your Honor, the Barton Doctrine originally only applied to receivers, and over the course of time has been extended to apply to various court-appointed fiduciaries, as we have cited in our materials: trustees, debtors-in-possession, officers and directors, employees, and attorneys representing the debtor.

And I expect the Objectors to argue that there is a statutory exception to the Barton Doctrine under 28 U.S.C. 959 and it does not apply to acts or transactions in carrying out business conducted with a property. The exception, Your Honor, is very narrow and was meant to apply for things like slip-and-fall cases. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit in the Carter v. Rodgers case, 220 F.3d 1249 in 2000, held that Section 11 -- 28 U.S.C. 959(a) does not apply to suits against trustees for administering or liquidating the bankruptcy estate.

The Objectors also argue that the gatekeeper provision violates Stern v. Marshal. However, as the Court acknowledged in Ondova, the Fifth Circuit in Villegas v. Schmidt has recognized that the Barton Doctrine remains viable post-Stern v. Marshal. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that while Barton Doctrine is jurisdictional in that a court does not have jurisdiction of an action if preapproval has not been obtained, it does not implicate the extent of a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying claim, precisely the distinction we're making here. The bankruptcy court would be the gatekeeper for deciding whether the claim passes through the gate, and then after will decide if it has jurisdiction to rule on the underlying claim.

And this is important especially in a case like this, Your Honor, where Your Honor has had extensive experience with the

parties and is in the best position to determine whether the claims are valid or attempted to be used as harassment.

The Objectors will complain about the open-ended nature of the gatekeeper provision, whether it will or won't apply after the case is closed or a final decree is issued, and the unfair burden of their rights.

Your Honor has a previous reported opinion where basically jurisdiction does extend after a case is closed or a final decree is entered, so that issue is a red herring.

As Your Honor is well aware, it's a decade-long -- a decade of litigation against the Dondero-controlled entities that caused the Highland bankruptcy. And the Court is very well aware of the litigation that occurred in Acis, very well aware of the litigation that's occurred here that I mentioned a few minutes ago. Your Honor, it is not over, you'll be presiding over the contempt hearing.

And if the Court needs yet another ground to approve the gatekeeper provision, the Debtor submits that the procedure is an appropriate sanction for Dondero's vexatious litigation activities. We cited the *In re Carroll* case in the Fifth Circuit of 2017 that held that a bankruptcy court has the authority to enjoin a litigant from filing any pleading in any action without the prior authority from the bankruptcy court.

And in affirming the decision of the bankruptcy court, the Fifth Circuit commented on the reasons the bankruptcy court

gave for its ruling. After recounting the bad faith of appellants, the bankruptcy court determined that the Carrolls' true motives were to harass the trustee and thereby delay the proper administration of the estate, in the hope that they would be able to retain their assets or make pursuit of the assets so unappealing that the trustee would be compelled to settle on terms favorable to appellants.

Sounds familiar, Your Honor. The same can certainly be said about what Mr. Dondero is doing in this case.

And to make a showing that a party is vexatious litigant, the Court must find that the party has a history of vexatious and harassing litigation, whether the party has a good faith — the litigation or has filed it as a means to harass, the burden to the Court and other parties, and the adequacy of alternative sanctions.

And as Your Honor is well aware from all the litigation,
Your Honor is well, well able to make the finding required for
the vexatious litigation finding.

But here, we don't ask for the drastic sanction of enjoining from any further filings. Rather, we just ask for a less-severe sanction, requiring Mr. Dondero and his entities to first make a showing that he has a colorable claim.

The Fifth Circuit in $Baum\ v.\ Blue\ Moon,\ 2007,\ did\ exactly$ that. In $Baum,\ the\ district\ court\ barred\ a\ vexatious\ litigant$ from initiating litigation without first obtaining the

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approval of the district court. Ultimately, the matter reached the Fifth Circuit after the district court had modified the pre-filing injunction to limit it to a certain case, and then broadened it again based upon continued bad faith conduct. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, citing several prior cases, noted that a district court has the authority to impose a prefiling injunction to defer vexatious, abusive, and harassing litigation. And for those reasons, Your Honor, the Debtor asks the Court to overrule any objections to the gatekeeper provision. Your Honor, I was just going to then go to the plan modification provisions, but I wanted to stop and see if you had any questions at this point. THE COURT: I do not. Let's give him a time estimate, Nate. About how --THE CLERK: Twenty. MR. POMERANTZ: I have another five or six minutes, I think, based upon --THE COURT: Okay. MR. POMERANTZ: And then I'll be ready to turn it over to --THE COURT: Okay. MR. POMERANTZ: -- to Mr. Kharasch. THE COURT: All right. Yes. You've got -- you've

done an hour and 33 minutes. So you have about, I guess, 37 minutes left. Okay. Go ahead.

MR. POMERANTZ: Thank you, Your Honor.

I would like to address the modifications of the plan that were contained in our January 22nd plan and the additional changes filed on February 1, several of which I have referred.

As a preliminary matter, Your Honor, under 1127(b), the

Debtor can modify a plan at any time prior to confirmation if

-- and not require resolicitation if there's no adverse change
in the treatment of claim or interest of any equity holder.

With that background, I won't go through the changes we made that I've already discussed, but I will point out a couple, Your Honor, that I would like to point out now. We have modified the plan with respect to conditions of the effective date in Article 8. First, a condition to the effective date will now be entry of a final order confirming a plan, as opposed just to entry of order. And final order is defined as the exhaustion of all appeals.

In addition, the ability to obtain directors and officers insurance coverage on terms acceptable to the Debtor, the Committee, the Claimant Trustee, the Claimant Trustee

Oversight Board, and the Litigation Trustee is now a condition to the effective date.

The Court heard testimony today and has experienced firsthand the litigiousness of Mr. Dondero and his related

entities. And the Court heard testimony from Mr. Tauber and Aon that the D&O insurance will not be available post-effective date without assurances that the gatekeeper provision will be in effect for the duration of the policy and any run-off period.

Mr. Tauber further testified that he expected the final terms from the insurance carrier to provide that if the confirmation order was reversed on appeal and the gatekeeper was removed, it would void -- it would either void the directors and officers coverage or it'd result in a Dondero exclusion.

Mr. Dondero and his entities are no strangers to the appellate process, as Your Honor knows. They appealed several of your orders, and continue the tack in this case, having appealed the Acis and the HarbourVest orders and the preliminary injunction. It would not surprise the Debtor if Mr. Dondero and his entities appealed your confirmation order, if Your Honor decides to confirm the plan.

The Debtor is confident that it will prevail on any appeal in the confirmation order, as we believe the Debtor has made a compelling case for confirmation.

The Debtor also believes a compelling case exists that if the plan went effective without a stay pending appeal, that the appeal would be equitably moot, but we understand we are facing headwinds from the courts, bankruptcy court have addressed that issue before.

However, given the effect a reversal would have on the availability of insurance coverage, the Claimant Trustee, the Claimant Oversight Committee, and the Litigation Trustee are just not willing to take that risk.

We are hopeful that Mr. Dondero and his entities will recognize that any appeal is futile and step aside and let the plan proceed and become effective.

If Mr. Dondero and his related entities do appeal the confirmation order, preventing it from becoming final and preventing the effective date from the occurring, the Debtor intends to work closely with the Committee to ratchet down costs substantially and proceed to operate and monetize assets as appropriate until an order becomes final.

None of these modifications adversely affect the treatment of claims or interests under the plan, Your Honor, and for those reasons, Your Honor, we request that the Court approve those modifications.

And with that, I would like to turn the podium over to Mr. Kharasch to briefly address the remaining CLO objections.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kharasch?

CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE DEBTOR

MR. KHARASCH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'll be as brief as possible. I know we're under a deadline.

As you've heard yesterday, you've heard before in other

proceedings, Your Honor, the CLO Objecting Parties, the socalled investors, do have rights under the CLO management agreements and indentures, including contractual rights to terminate the management agreements under certain circumstances.

What they complain about today, Your Honor, is that the injunction language in the plan, including the language preventing actions to interfere with the implementation and consummation of the plan, is so broad and ambiguous that their rights are or may be improperly impacted, especially any rights to remove the manager for acts of malfeasance.

But the Debtor is primarily relying, Your Honor, not so much on the plan injunctions but on the clear provisions of the January 9 order, to which Mr. Dondero consented and which provides that Mr. Dondero shall not cause any of his related entities to terminate any agreements with the Debtor.

Yes, that is a broad provision, but it is very clear, and it does not even allow the CLO Objecting Parties to come to court under a gatekeeper-type provision. But that is what Mr. Dondero consented to on behalf of himself and his related entities.

Important to note, Your Honor, we are not here today to litigate who is and who is not a related entity. That will be left for another day. However, Your Honor, we have considered these issues, including last night and this morning, and we

are going to propose -- well, we will modify our plan through a provision in the confirmation order to provide the following: Notwithstanding anything in the plan or the January 9 order, the CLO Objecting Parties will not be precluded from exercising their contractual or statutory rights in the CLOs based on negligence, malfeasance, or any wrongdoing, but before exercising such rights shall come to this Court to determine whether those rights are colorable and to also determine whether they are a related entity. If the Court has jurisdiction, the Court can determine the underlying colorable rights or claims.

This does not impact the separate settlement we have with CLO Holdco, Your Honor.

We think that such modification addresses some of the concerns raised yesterday by the objecting parties by providing more clarity as to what the plan is doing and not doing with respect to the plan and the January 9 order, and we think it is also a fair resolution of some legitimate concerns.

So, with that, Your Honor, we think that, with that clarification that we did not have to make but are willing to make, that this should fully satisfy the CLO Objecting Parties with regard to their objections to the injunction and the gatekeeper.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Clemente?

CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE CREDITORS' COMMITTEE

MR. CLEMENTE: Yes, Your Honor. And I actually am

going to be brief. Mr. Pomerantz's discussion, obviously, was

Thank you, Your Honor. Matt Clemente, Sidley Austin, on behalf of the Committee.

very, very thorough, so I'm able to cut out a lot of stuff.

The plan, Your Honor, meets the confirmation standards and should be confirmed. Mr. Pomerantz covered a lot of ground, and I will endeavor not to repeat that, but there are a few points that I think the Committee wishes to emphasize.

Your Honor, since I first appeared in front of you, I have maintained consistently that no plan can or should be confirmed without the consent of the Committee. Your Honor, in her wisdom, understood this immediately, as it was obvious — it was the obvious conclusion, given the makeup of the creditor body, the asset pool, and the impetus for the filing of the case.

Unfortunately, not everyone came to this conclusion so easily, and it took much hard-fought negotiations as well as a defeated disclosure statement, among other things, and tireless dedication and commitment by each individual

Committee member to drive for a value-maximizing plan that is in the best interests of its constituencies and for us to get to where we are today.

And where we are today, Your Honor, is at confirmation for a plan that the Committee unanimously supports, which was the inevitable outcome for this case from the very beginning.

I've also said, Your Honor, that context is critical in this case. It has been from the beginning, and it remains so now. Mr. Draper, interestingly, began his comments yesterday by saying that even a serial killer is entitled to Miranda rights. While I will admit that at times the rhetoric in this case has been heated, I have never certainly likened Mr. Dondero to a serial killer. But the record shows, and Mr. Dondero's own words and actions show, that he is, in fact, a serial litigator who has no hesitation at all to take any position in an attempt to leverage an outcome that suits his self-interest. And he has no hesitation at all to use his many tentacles in a similar fashion.

That is a very important context in which the Court should view the remaining objections of the Dondero tentacles and weigh confirmation of the Debtor's plan.

Against this context of a serial litigator, Your Honor, we have a plan supported by each member of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, accepted by two classes of claims, Class 2 and Class 7, and holders of almost one hundred percent in amount of non-insider claims in Class 8.

The parties that have voted against the plan are either employees who are not receiving distributions under the plan

or are insiders or parties related to Mr. Dondero.

The overwhelming number and amount of creditors who are receiving distributions under this plan, therefore, have accepted the plan. The true creditors and economic parties in interest have spoken, they have spoken loudly, and they have spoken in favor of confirming the plan.

Your Honor, I'm not going to address the technical requirements, as Mr. Pomerantz did that. So I'm going to skip over my remarks in that regard, except I do want to emphasize the remarks regarding the gatekeeper, exculpation, and injunction provisions as they're of critical importance to the plan.

The testimony has shown and the proceedings of this case has shown, again, Mr. Dondero is a serial litigator with a stated goal of causing destruction and delay through litigation.

The testimony has further shown that none of the independent board members would have signed onto the role without the gatekeeper and injunction provisions and the indemnity from the Debtor.

Therefore, it follows that such provisions are necessary to entice parties to serve in the Claimant Trustee and other roles under the plan, which, as I remarked in my opening comments, are integral to providing the structure that the creditors believe is necessary to unlocking the value and

unlocking themselves from the Dondero web.

Regarding the exculpation and injunction provisions specifically, Your Honor, the Court will recall that the Committee raised objections to them in connection with the first disclosure statement hearing. In response, the Debtor narrowed the provisions, and the Committee believes they comply with the Fifth Circuit precedent, as Mr. Pomerantz ably walked Your Honor through.

And to be clear, Your Honor, not only does the Committee believe the exculpation and injunction provisions comply with Fifth Circuit law, the Committee does not believe the estate is harmed by such provisions, as the Committee does not believe there are any cognizable claims that could or should be raised that would otherwise be affected by the exculpation or injunction, and, frankly, with respect to the release that Mr. Pomerantz walked Your Honor through with respect to the directors and the officers.

Regarding the gatekeeper, Your Honor, Your Honor presciently approved it in her January 9th order, and the developments since then only serve as further justification for including it in the plan and confirmation order. Mr. Dondero is a serial and vexatious litigator, and the instruments put in place under the plan to maximize value for the creditors and to oversee that value-maximizing process must be protected, and the gatekeeper function serves that

protection while also, importantly, as Mr. Pomerantz pointed out, providing Mr. Dondero with a forum to advance any legitimate claims he and his tentacles may have.

In short, Your Honor, the gatekeeper provision is necessary to the implementation to the plan, is fair under the circumstances of the case, and is therefore within this Court's authority, and it is appropriate to approve.

Your Honor, in sum, it has been a long road to get here today, but we are finally here. And we are here, Your Honor, I believe in large part as a result of the tireless efforts of the individual members of my Committee, and for that I thank them.

The Committee fully supports and unanimously supports confirmation of the plan. As demonstrated by the evidence, the plan meets all the requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. The Committee believes the plan is in the best interests of its constituencies. And therefore the Committee, along with two classes of creditors and the overwhelming amount of creditors in terms of dollars, urge you to confirm the plan.

That's all I have, Your Honor, but I'm happy to answer any questions you may have for me.

THE COURT: Okay. Not at this time.

Nate, how much time --

(Clerk advises.)

THE COURT: Twenty-five minutes remaining? All

right. Just so you know, you've got a collective Debtor's counsel/Committee's counsel 25 minutes remaining for any rebuttal, if you choose to make it.

Let's take a five-minute break, and then we'll hear the Objectors' closing arguments. Okay.

THE CLERK: All rise.

(A recess ensued from 2:00 p.m. until 2:06 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right. Please be seated. We're going back on the record in Highland. We're ready to hear the Objectors' closing arguments. Who wants to go first?

MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, this -- this is Douglas Draper. I get the joy of going first.

THE COURT: Okay.

CLOSING ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE GET GOOD AND DUGABOY TRUSTS

MR. DRAPER: We've heard a great deal of testimony about the Debtor's belief that the circumstances in this case warrant an exception to existing Fifth Circuit case law, the Bankruptcy Code, and Court's post-confirmation jurisdiction.

I would not be standing here today objecting to the plan if the Debtor didn't attempt to extend, move past and beyond the Barton Doctrine, move beyond 1141, move beyond Pacific Lumber. In fact, I think I heard an argument that Pacific Lumber is not applicable and this Court should disregard Fifth Circuit case law.

Let's start with the exculpation provision. And the focus

of this case has been, and what we've heard over the last few days, is about the independent directors. I understand there was an order entered earlier, the order stands, and the order is applicable in this case. It cuts off, however, when we have a Reorganized Debtor, because these independent directors are no longer independent directors. It cuts off when we have a new general partner.

And so the protections that were afforded by that order do not need to be afforded to the new officers and new directors of the new general partner. And in fact, the protections that they're entitled to are completely different than the protections that were entitled -- that are covered by the order that the Court has looked at.

Let's first focus on, however, the exculpation provision. And I wanted to ask the Court to look at the exculpated parties. Have to be very careful and very interest — and focus solely on the independent directors. But if you look at the parties covered by exculpation provision, it includes the professionals retained by the Debtor. My reading of Pacific Lumber is that neither the Creditors' Committee counsel nor the Debtor can be covered by an exculpation provision. This in and of itself makes the plan non-confirmable. This exculpation provision is unwarranted and unnecessary.

Two, --

THE COURT: Well, let's drill down on that.

1 MR. DRAPER: -- we have --2 THE COURT: Let's drill down on that. Mr. Pomerantz 3 says that this wasn't what they considered one way or another 4 by Pacific Lumber. Debtor, debtor professionals. Okay? 5 you disagree with that? MR. DRAPER: I disagree with that. Pacific Lumber 6 7 said you could only have releases and exculpations for the 8 Creditors' Committee members. And the rationale behind that 9 was that those people volunteered to be part and parcel of the 10 bankruptcy process, that those parties did not get paid. 11 Here, we have two professionals who both volunteered and are 12 being paid, and are not entitled to an exculpation under 13 Pacific Lumber. They're not entitled to a --14 THE COURT: Okay. So you say Pacific --15 MR. DRAPER: -- release. Now, ultimately, they --16 THE COURT: -- Pacific Lumber categorically rejected 17 all exculpations except to Creditors' Committee and its 18 members. That's your --19 MR. DRAPER: I agree. That's --20 THE COURT: -- interpretation of Pacific Lumber? 21 MR. DRAPER: Yes. 22 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So you just absolutely 23 disagree, one by one, with every one of the arguments, that it 24 was really -- the only thing before the Fifth Circuit was plan 25 sponsors, okay? A plan proponent that I think was like a

competitor previously of the debtor, and I think a large creditor or secured creditor. I think those were the two plan proponents.

So you disagree -- I'm going to, obviously, go back and line-by-line pour through *Pacific Lumber*, but you disagree with Mr. Pomerantz's notion that, look, it was really a page and a half or two of a multipage opinion where the Fifth Circuit said, no, I don't think 524(e) is authority to give exculpation from postpetition liability for negligence as to these two plan sponsors. And I guess it was also -- I don't know. They say, Pachulski's briefing says it was really only looking at these two plan sponsors and the Committee and its members on appeal, you know, going through the briefing, and in such, you can see that these were all that was presented and addressed by the Fifth Circuit. You disagree with that?

MR. DRAPER: Look, I know the facts of Pacific Lumber and they -- I know what the posture of the case was. However, the literal language by the opinion in it, it transcends just a dispute in the case. And I think the U.S. Trustee's position that this exculpation provision is correct as a matter of law support -- is further evidence of the fact that the U.S. Trustee, as watchdog of this process, and Pacific Lumber say this cannot be done, period, end of story.

THE COURT: Okay. So you, at bottom, just totally disagree with Mr. Pomerantz? You say Pacific Lumber is

actually a very broad holding, and I guess, if such, there's a conflict among the Circuits, right?

MR. DRAPER: Well, that's okay.

THE COURT: So, --

MR. DRAPER: I mean, quite frankly, Pacific Lumber is binding on you.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. DRAPER: There may be a conflict in the Circuits, and ultimately the Supreme Court may make a decision and decide who's right and who's wrong.

But for purposes of today and for purposes of this exculpation provision and for purposes of this confirmation, Pacific Lumber is the applicable law.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, again, this is a hugely important issue, although in many ways I don't understand why it is, because we're just talking about postpetition acts and negligence, okay? You know, many might say it's much ado about nothing, but it's front and center of your objection.

So I guess I'm just thinking through, if the Fifth Circuit was presented these exact facts and was presented with the argument, you know, the Blixseth case says 524(e) has nothing to do with exculpation because exculpation is a postpetition concept, and it's just talking about standard liability — these people aren't going to be liable for negligence; they can be liable for anything and everything else — if presented

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with that Blixseth case, you know, there are several arguments that Mr. Pomerantz has made why, if you accept that 524(e) might not apply here, let's look at the reasoning, the little bit of reasoning we had of Pacific Lumber, that it was really a policy rationale, right? These independent fiduciaries, strangers to the company and case, they'd never want to do this if they knew they were vulnerable for getting sued for negligence. Mr. Pomerantz's argument is that these independent board members are exactly analogous to a Committee, more than prepetition officers and directors. do you have to say about that policy argument? MR. DRAPER: Well, I think there's a huge distinction between the members of a Creditors' Committee who are volunteers and are not paid versus a paid independent director. And more importantly, I think there's a huge difference between a member of a Creditors' Committee who's not paid and counsel for a Debtor and counsel for a Creditors' Committee. THE COURT: Okav. MR. DRAPER: Look, you have -- you've --THE COURT: So, at bottom, it was all about compensation to the Fifth Circuit? MR. DRAPER: Well, no. The Fifth Circuit policy

decision was we want to protect a party who wants to serve and

do their civic duty to serve on a Creditors' Committee for no

compensation. I agree with that. I think it's a laudable policy decision. I think it makes sense.

However, the Fifth Circuit in its language basically said, nobody else gets it. It didn't say, look, you know, if there are circumstances that are different, we may look at it differently. The language is absolute in the opinion. And that's what I think is binding and I think that's what the case stands for.

And look, just so the Court is very clear, when Pachulski files its fee application and the Court grants the fee application, any claim against them is res judicata. So, in fact, they do have -- they do have protection. They do have the ability to get out from under. The Court -- they're just not -- they just can't get out from under through an exculpation provision. And the same goes for Mr. Clemente and his firm.

THE COURT: Which, --

MR. DRAPER: And the same goes for DSI.

THE COURT: Which, by the way, that's one reason I think sometimes this is much ado about nothing. It goes both ways. The Debtor professionals, the Committee professionals, estate professionals, they're going to get cleared on the day any fee app is approved, right? I mean, there's Fifth Circuit law that says --

MR. DRAPER: I -- I --

THE COURT: -- says that's res judicata as to any future claims.

But I guess I'm really trying to understand, you know, at bottom, I feel like the Fifth Circuit was making a holding based on policy more than any directly applicable Code provision.

I mean, it's been said, for example, that Committee members, they're entitled to exculpation because of, what, 1103, some people argue, 1103, which subsection, (c)? That's been quoted as giving, quote, qualified immunity to Committees. But it doesn't really say that, right? It's just something you infer.

MR. DRAPER: No. Look, what I think, if you really want to put the two concepts together, I think what the Fifth Circuit, when they told lawyers and professionals that you can't get an exculpation, was very mindful of the fact that you can get released once your fee app is approved. So, as a policy, they didn't need to do it in a exculpation provision. There was another methodology in which it could be done.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. DRAPER: And so that's -- you have to look at it as holistic and not just focus on the exculpation provision.

Because, in fact, they recognize and they -- I'm sure they knew their existing case law on res judicata, and that's why they read it out.

So, honestly, there's no reason for Pachulski to be in here. There's no reason for Mr. Clemente to be in here. There's no reason for the professionals employed by the Debtor to be in here. They have an exit not by virtue of the plan.

THE COURT: But so then it boils down to the independent directors and Strand post January 9th?

MR. DRAPER: It boils down somewhat to them, but quite frankly, there are two parts to this. One is you have an order that's in place. I am not asking the Court to overturn the order. And quite frankly, this provision could have been written to the effect that the order that was in place on -- that's been presented to the Court is applicable and applied.

However, let's parse that down. Let's look at Mr. Seery. The order that's in place solely protects the independent directors acting in their capacities as independent directors. If somebody's acting as -- and if you want to liken it to a trustee, their protection is afforded by the Barton Doctrine, and that's how the protection arises.

What's going on here is they're extending the provisions, first of all, of the Court's order, and number two, of the Barton Doctrine, which are -- which cannot be -- which should not be extended. The law limits what protections you have and what protections you don't have. And we, as lawyers -- look, I'll give you the best example. Think of all the times you

had somebody write in the concept of superpriority in a cash collateral order. And how many times have you had a lawyer rewrite the concept of the issue as to diminution in value? The Code says diminution in value, and quite frankly, a cash collateral order should just say if, to the extent there's diminution in value, just apply the Code section. It's written there. Smart people put it in, and Congress approved it. And once you start getting beyond that, those things should be limited.

And what we have are lawyers trying to extend out by definitions things that the Code limits by its reach. That goes for post-confirmation jurisdiction. That goes for the injunction. That goes for the so-called gatekeeper provision.

And so, again, I would not be here if, in fact, they had said, we have an injunction to the full extent allowed by the Bankruptcy Code and Pacific Lumber. We have an exculpation provision that's allowed by virtue of the Court's order. We have the full extent and full reach of the Barton Doctrine. Those are legitimate. Once you start expanding upon that, you're reaching into matters that are not authorized and not allowed.

And then you get into 105 territory, which is always very dangerous. And that's really what's going on here. And that's the tenor of my argument and what I'm trying to say.

The Code gives protections. It is not for us to extend the

protections. It's not for us to enlarge them, even under a, gee, the other party's litigious.

And so that's -- let's take Craig's Store. Attempted to limit its reach. Craig's Store says once you have a confirmed plan, any dispute between the parties, for -- let's take an executory contract. If there's a breach of the executory contract, that's a matter to be handled aft... by another court. It's not a matter to be handled by this Court. This Court lets the parties out.

And in this case, it's even worse, because you basically have a new general partner coming in, you have an assumption of various executory contracts, and you have a -- Strand is no longer present.

If you adopted Mr. Seery's argument, anybody who appeals a decision, questions what he does or how he does it, is a vexatious litigator. That's not the case. And the fact that we are appealing a decision is a right that we have. It shouldn't be limited, and it shouldn't be held against us. Courts can rule against us. That's fine.

And so that's really what the focus is here and that's why
I gave the opening that I had. We are willing to be bound by
applicable law. And quite frankly, the concept that the
exigencies of a case allow a court to change what applicable
law is is problematic. I gave the criminal example as a
reason. And the reason was that, in certain instances, the

application of law may allow a criminal to go free. It's a problem with our system and how we work, but that's what the law does, and it is absolute in its application.

Let me address the so-called gatekeeper provision. The gatekeeper provision, in a certain sense, is recognized in the Barton Doctrine. It's jurisdictional, and it says, to the extent you're going to litigate with somebody who served during the bankruptcy, who was a trustee, then you have to come to the bankruptcy court and pass through a gate. It doesn't say you have to pass through a gate for a reorganized debtor who does something after a plan is confirmed and going forward. And so that's -- there's a distinction.

And if you look at Judge Summerhays' decision, which I will be happy to send to the Court, in WRT involving -- it's kind of (indecipherable) and Mr. Pauker, where, in that case, the trustee, the litigation trustee, spent more litigating than it had in recoveries, and Baker Hughes filed suit. Judge Summerhays said, look, the Barton Doctrine only applies to a certain extent. It is limited once you get into post-confirmation matters and related-to jurisdiction.

And so, again, the Barton Doctrine is what it stands for. We agree with it, we recognize it, and it should be applied. The Barton Doctrine, however, should not be extended, should not go past its reach, and should not go past the grant of jurisdiction for this Court.

And so you have in here, though they have — they have tried to hide it in a limited fashion, this gatekeeper provision. The gatekeeper provision, as currently written, covers post-confirmation claims that somebody has to come before this Court to the extent there's a breach of a contract. That's not proper, and it's not covered by your post-confirmation jurisdiction. To the extent there's an interpretation of an existing contract and an interpretation of the order, you do have authority, and I don't question that.

THE COURT: But address Mr. Pomerantz's statement that there's a difference between saying you have to go to the bankruptcy court and make an argument, we have a colorable claim that we would like to pursue, and having that jurisdictional step required. There's a difference between that and the bankruptcy court adjudicating the claim.

MR. DRAPER: Well, there are two parts to that.

Number one is there's an injunction in place from an action taken post-confirmation against property of the estate. We all agree at that, correct? And we believe that the injunction applies to post-confirmation action against property of the pre-confirmation estate. We all agree to that.

However, if in fact there's a breach of a contract postpetition that the parties have a dispute about, that